Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances.

Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.

Are we prepared to meet the challenges of the next war? What should our military look like? What lessons have we learned from recent actions in Afghanistan and Iraq? Macgregor has captured the attention of key leaders and inspired a genuine public debate on military reform. With the dangerous world situation of the early 21st century-and possible flashpoints ranging from the Middle East to the Far East-interservice cooperation in assembling small, mobile units and a dramatically simplified command structure is essential. MacGregor's controversial ideas, favored by the current Bush administration, would reduce timelines for deployment, enhance responsiveness to crises, and permit rapid decision-making and planning.The Army is the nation's primary instrument of land warfare, but what capabilities can the Army field today, and what is the Joint Commander likely to need tomorrow? Stuck with a force structure that hasn't changed since Word War II, as well as an outdated command system, today's Army faces potential failure in a modern war. Without a conceptual redefinition of warfare as a "joint" operation, a new military culture that can execute joint expeditionary warfare will not emerge. New technology both compels and enables evolution of the armed forces' organization. MacGregor's visionary plan to integrate ground maneuver forces with powerful strike assets is the foundation for a true revolution in military affairs, and has sparked heated debates in policy and military circles.

Pressed by advancing enemy armies on both fronts, Adolf Hitler played his final card in World War II by mobilizing all German civilian males between sixteen and sixty and indoctrinating them for a final apocalyptic defense of the Reich. The Volkssturm, created as much to boost national morale as to bolster sagging defenses, has been viewed as a negligible factor in the war. David Yelton counters that view with new insights into why the German high command sought this means to prolong an unwinnable war-and why so many civilians chose to fight to the bitter end.

"Hitler's Volkssturm" is the only book in English-and the most comprehensive in any language-on the German militia, illuminating its role and contributions to the Nazi war effort and shedding new light on the last days of the Third Reich. It examines the militia's strategic purpose, organization, training, and combat performance on both war fronts and explores factors contributing to its sporadic tactical successes and its overall failure.

Yelton reveals why the Nazi leadership chose to assemble such last-ditch units rather than negotiating for peace and also why civilians in these units were more than willing to serve. The Volkssturm was, in fact, part of a broader, ideologically based strategy intended to turn the tide of the war. Yelton tracks the impact of this ideology on Nazi decision-making throughout the war's final year and illustrates how ideological assumptions were often a major reason for the failure of Nazi policies and strategies.

In an unprecedented examination of the Volkssturm at the local level, Yelton also shows the negative impact of national power struggles and demonstrates how the Wehrmacht, industry, and public opinion exerted influence on the militia in ways often contrary to its official objectives. His extensive and insightful analysis illuminates German mobilization priorities, reveals that a substantial number of its commanders had experience in both the military and the Nazi Party, and clarifies the impact of Volkssturm mobilizations on the overall German war economy.

Pathbreaking in both scope and depth, "Hitler's Volkssturm" stresses the factional lines and conflicting centers of power within the Nazi bureaucracy, clarifies policy formulation and implementation in the late Third Reich, and assesses the shifting power relationships among various groups and individuals. Ultimately, it gives us a more complete portrait of the Third Reich during the final phase of a devastating war and conveys important lessons about the use of militia forces in modern warfare.

No critical analysis has ever examined the specific reasons for the Ottoman defeat. Erickson's study fills this gap by studying the operations of the Ottoman Army from October 1912 through July 1913, and by providing a comprehensive explanation of its doctrines and planning procedures. This book is written at an operational level that details every campaign at the level of the army corps. More than 30 maps, numerous orders of battle, and actual Ottoman Army operations orders illustrate how the Turks planned and fought their battles. Of particular note is the inclusion of the only detailed history in English of the Ottoman X Corps' Sarkoy amphibious invasion. Also included are definitive appendix about Ottoman military aviation and a summary of the Turks' efforts to incorporate the lessons learned from the war into their military structure in 1914.

The Ottoman Empire fought the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 against the joint forces of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia--and was decisively defeated. The Ottoman Army is frequently depicted as a mob of poorly clad, faceless Turks inept in their attempts to fight a modern war. Yet by 1912, the Ottoman Army, which was constructed on the German model, was in many ways more advanced than certain European armies.

In vergeelde foto’s van drie dekades gelede staan oopgesigseuns vol bravade voor Ratel-gevegsvoertuie. Hierdie dienspligtiges van 61 Gemeganiseerde Bataljongroep staan aan die begin van hul reis diep in Angola in om vir volk en vaderland te gaan veg.

In ’n bloedige geveg op Valentynsdag 1988 en in die doodsakker by Tumpo sou hul jeugdige onskuld egter sneuwel. In die hitte van die gevegte kom die besef: Nou gaan dit nie oor ideologie nie, maar om oorlewing.

Ná die oorlog gaan die lewe voort, maar die vrae en geestelike letsels wyk nie. In 2018 keer ’n groep van dié ouddienspligtiges terug na Cuito Cuanavale op soek na afsluiting - en om die wrak te vind van die Ratel waarin ’n makker op die laaste dag van die oorlog gesterf het.

Die Brug vertel van hul reis van jong man na veteraan en gee ook ’n stem aan die vroue in hul lewe. Dit is ’n verhaal van ontnugtering, maar ook van trotse kameraderie en genesing.

This extensive examination of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, Iraq, Germany, and the EU focuses on the history and development of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and its impact on transnational security, human rights, and democratization. The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy for Freedom explores the complexity of the 30-year guerrilla war of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) against the Turkish Republic, identifying longstanding obstacles to peace and probing the new dynamics that may lead to an end to the conflict. In doing so, the book provides fascinating insights into Turkey's national ethos, its dominant military culture, and civil society's struggle for increased democratization. The Militant Kurds offers an extensive analysis of the precarious position of the Kurdish minority, beginning with the establishment of the modern Turkish republic in 1923. Divided into five sections examining current political realities in Turkey, the book investigates the role of Islam and ethnicity, analyzes the rise of the PKK, discusses Turkish military culture, and explains the international dimensions of the Kurdish conflict. Comparative historical, political, and socioeconomic examples contextualize the long struggle for Kurdish self-determination. Each chapter offers an analysis of the underlying dynamics of the conflict and provides up-to-date explanations.

An insightful and valuable resource on the major conflicts between American Indian tribes and Euro-American settlers from the arrival of Columbus to the Battle of Wounded Knee. Historians, writers, and students will welcome this extensively illustrated and well-organized volume. An important historical resource, Encyclopedia of American Indian Wars covers the major clashes between American Indian tribes and Euro-American settlers from the arrival of Columbus to the Battle of Wounded Knee, centered mainly within the geographical area that now comprises the contiguous United States. It provides essential information on major battles and military campaigns, treaties, significant sites, American Indian tribes, and notable military and political leaders, both Indian and white, presented in a handy, encyclopedic style.

In the ruined Europe of World War II, American soldiers on the front lines had no eye for breathtaking vistas or romantic settings. The brutality of battle profoundly darkened their perceptions of the Old World. As the only means of international travel for the masses, the military exposed millions of Americans to a Europe in swift, catastrophic decline.

Drawing on soldiers' diaries, letters, poems, and songs, Peter Schrijvers offers a compelling account of the experiences of U.S. combat ground forces: their struggles with the European terrain and seasons, their confrontations with soldiers, and their often startling encounters with civilians. Schrijvers relays how the GIs became so desensitized and dehumanized that the sight of dead animals often evoked more compassion than the sight of enemy dead.

The Crash of Ruin concludes with a dramatic and moving account of the final Allied offensive into German-held territory and the soldiers' bearing witness to the ultimate symbol of Europe's descent into ruin--the death camps of the Holocaust.

The harrowing experiences of the GIs convinced them that Europe's collapse was not only the result of the war, but also the Old World's deep-seated political cynicism, economic stagnation, and cultural decadence. The soldiers came to believe that the plague of war formed an inseparable part of the Old World's decline and fall.

Through widespread and relentless surprise attacks and ambushes, Confederate guerrillas drove Union soldiers and their leaders to desperation. Confederate cavalrymen engaged in hit-and-run tactics; autonomous partisan rangers preyed on Federal railroads, telegraph lines, and supply wagons; and civilian bushwhackers waylaid Union pickets. Together, all of these actions persuaded the Union to wage an increasingly punitive war.

Clay Mountcastle presents a new look at the complex nature of guerrilla warfare in the Civil War and the Union Army's calculated response to it. He examines guerrilla attacks and Federal responses in a number of operational theaters to show how the problem grew throughout the South and ultimately convinced the Union to adopt retaliatory measures that challenged the sensibilities of even the most hardened soldiers.

In revealing the impact that Confederate guerrilla activity had on the Union's prosecution of the war, Mountcastle reveals how the character of the war was shaped every bit as much by the troops on the ground as by their Union leaders. He draws on primary sources that vividly convey their reaction to the guerrilla problem and their justification for punitive action-with guerrillas described by one angry soldier as "thieves and murderers by occupation, rebels by pretense, soldiers only in name, and cowards by nature." Showing how much of the impetus for retaliation originated from the bottom up, starting in the western theater in 1861, he describes how it became the most influential factor in convincing Union generals, especially Grant and Sherman, that the war needed to be extended to include civilians and their property. The result was a level of destructiveness that has been downplayed by other scholars-despite the evidence of executions and incidents of entire towns being burned to the ground.

By 1864, punitive action had evolved into such a powerful and decisive force that it produced what has been called "a warfare of frightfulness." And although guerrilla activity deviled the Union until the end, the Union's response ultimately proved a significant factor in persuading leaders like General Lee to call a halt to such actions and, ultimately, to surrender. Mountcastle's book offers the most revealing look yet at this incompletely understood dimension of the Civil War and also raises provocative questions about the relationship between guerrilla and conventional warfare in any conflict.

Michigan has long been proud of its military service, but many of its early accomplishments are unknown to most of the state's residents. This book fills the void in our knowledge by bringing together an impressive array of information on Michigan's armed forces from 1775 to 1860. Here we find the name rank, unit, and dates of service for all known Michigan men who served in the Revolutionary War, Indian Wars, War of 1812, Black Hawk War, Toledo War, Patriot War, and the Mexican-American War. Accompanying histories explain the reasons behind the conflicts and include maps showing all theaters of operations for Michigan troops. The in-depth accounts of the state's role in these hostilities often serve as the first serious and comprehensive studies of the contributions made by its citizens in these events.

The book's many points of interest include its treatment of the dramatic Revolutionary War period, when local Indians, British garrisons at Detroit and Mackinac, and a few Michigan men, well placed, held sway over most of the old Northwest. The book also documents "foreigners" who fought for Michigan's cause, with a disproportionate number of soldiers of French descent serving during the War of 1812, and of Irish ancestry serving in the Mexican-American War. Specific information on names of Native American soldiers is not available, but their general roles as combatants are noted. Ultimately, this book stands as a fitting memorial to the many men who took up arms on behalf of Michigan.

This unusual work offers a personal documentary and highly individual witness to the terrible events in Flanders in 1917. The Battle of "Third Ypres" - popularly known as "Passchendaele" - epitomized the worst slaughter on the western front of the First World War. Many thousands killed, to no avail; the trenches full of mud; the total annihilation of the landscape; attempts to break through to victory which only produced minor movement forward, and at a terrible cost.This book tells the previously untold story of daily life immediately behind the frontline during the tragic year of 1917.The author, who kept a detailed record of events and attitudes, was a village priest, Achiel Van Walleghem. He lived in Reninghelst, just west of Ypres, and kept an extensive day-by-day account. He was very well informed by the officers lodging in his presbytery. And, urged by his innate curiosity, he witnessed and noted the arrival of the first tanks and the increasing importance of the artillery. He also visited the camps of the Chinese Labour Corps and the British West Indies Regiment. On 7 June 1917 he awoke early to see the enormous mines of the Battle of Messines exploding. And he was present when a deserter was shot at dawn. He records all this - and much more - with an unusual humanity.As a bystander living amidst the troops, he often had a special view of the events that unfolded before his eyes. Van Walleghem notes much that mattered to the soldiers there, and to the local people. This includes the influence of bad weather on the mood and morale of both troops and civilians, as well as military events. His comments on the different attitudes of English, Irish, Australian or other Empire troops and divisions are often priceless. But Van Walleghem equally records the misery of the local Flemish population and their relationship with the British rank and file: in bad times such as when a local is accused of spying, but also in good times when a village girl gets married to a British soldier. This diary is not just a forgotten source of the western front, it is one that will forever change our views on the conflict, and on how men and women tried to cope.In a year when many works will be published about Passchendaele this is a unique book.

An examination of the life of General Manton S. Eddy, this study details his experiences in World War II as leader of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division through North Africa, Sicily and France, and subsequently, as commander of XII Corps, into the heart of Germany. While much has been written about the top military leaders of this era, there is little information about corps commanders whose missions were limited to doing battle and whose organizations were tailored exclusively for this task. Eddy's career provides a model for the Army's most ambitious officers, particularly those who, like Eddy, faced the challenge without family connections or the traditional West Point education. He devoted his life to the U.S. Army, enhancing his innate talents through the incorporation of a daily program of self-education.

Eddy had an excellent grasp of the basic principles of military tactics and strategy. He attained this art through home study and assiduous application at the Army's professional education institutions, in particular at the Command and General Staff College, where he served as an instructor for four years. He focused on people, quickly learning and applying basic skills to draw out their best efforts. He came to know what to expect from them in the chaos and under the pressure of combat. This facilitated his development of strong, mission-oriented subordinates. His personal goal was always to maximize all available power at the correct point for crushing his nation's enemies, and to this end, he was extraordinarily successful.

This is a book about military professionals. It outlines the personal reflections of a U.S. Army lieutenant/captain on active duty in Europe during the Vietnam War. There, the enemy was drugs, boredom, racism, and illiteracy. Few, if any, books concern the Vietnam-era veteran. "The American Military Ethic" tells the story of one such veteran--of basic combat training, of Infantry OCS, and of airborne school--who had charge of a nuclear weapons unit in Europe during the late 1960s and early 1970s. First person accounts are blended with a more traditional scholarly examination of professional military training for junior and senior officers (ROTC and the war colleges) and of the American military ethic itself.

Toner argues that the American military ethic has undergone a deserved rejuvenation. The ethic itself--which is the source of true professionalism--has a sacred character, for it involves its professors in a solemn oath: to preserve and to protect the republic. That mission can lead officers to the ultimate test of leadership: whether to accomplish the mission or to safeguard the people for whom the leader is responsible. Still, this book is not of the guts-and-glory variety. It is a study in practical, real leadership; it examines leadership problems of the type real junior officers confront daily; and it explores the kinds of ethical problems real senior officers frequently confront. Its thesis is this: A professional military ethic depends, ultimately, upon the formation of responsible character in (and by) its leaders; for that, sound education is a necessity. ROTC and senior professional military education depend, therefore, upon challenging, serious, and substantial academic experiences. In the end, the American military ethic is a function of the wisdom and virtue learned and taught by its officers. This volume will be of great interest to active duty military professionals, students of military history, and veterans of the Vietnam era.

In 2001, Captain James "Yusuf" Yee was commissioned as one of the first Muslim chaplains in the United States Army. After the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, he became a frequent government spokesman, helping to educate soldiers about Islam and build understanding throughout the military. Subsequently, Chaplain Yee was selected to serve as the Muslim Chaplain at Guantanamo Bay, where nearly 700 detainees captured in the war on terror were being held as "unlawful combatants."
In September 2003, after serving at Guantanamo for ten months in a role that gave him unrestricted access to the detainees--and after receiving numerous awards for his service there--Chaplain Yee was secretly arrested on his way to meet his wife and daughter for a routine two-week leave. He was locked away in a navy prison, subject to much of the same treatment that had been imposed on the Guantanamo detainees. Wrongfully accused of spying, and aiding the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Yee spent 76 excruciating days in solitary confinement and was threatened with the death penalty.
After the U.S. government determined it had made a grave mistake in its original allegations, it vindictively charged him with adultery and computer pornography. In the end all criminal charges were dropped and Chaplain Yee's record wiped clean. But his reputation was tarnished, and what has been a promising military career was left in ruins.
Depicting a journey of faith and service, Chaplain Yee's "For God and Country" is the story of a pioneering officer in the U.S. Army, who became a victim of the post-September 11 paranoia that gripped a starkly fearful nation. And it poses a fundamental question: If our country cannot beloyal to even the most patriotic Americans, can it remain loyal to itself?

The Special Operations Executive (SOE) was one of the most innovative British creations of the Second World War. Its mission was to export resistance, subversion and sabotage to occupied Europe and beyond, disrupting the German war effort and building a Secret Army which would work in the shadows to help defeat the Nazis. Potential agents were put through intensive paramilitary and parachute training, then taught how to live clandestinely behind enemy lines, to operate radios and write in secret codes. They lived in constant fear of arrest, and of betrayal by treacherous collaborators. This book uses rare images from the collections of The National Archives and the Imperial War Museum to illustrate the lives of the men and women who made up the SOE, their rigorous training, the clever gadgets they used and their lives behind enemy lines.

This volume represents a comprehensive analysis, by the best known experts in the field on both sides of the Atlantic, of how and why Germany and the United States found themselves at war against each other in 1917 and how the end of their confrontation in 1918/19 paved the way for an era of renewed cooperation. Perspectives offered go well beyond the diplomatic and military aspects of the German-American relationship and include cultural and economic questions.
Germany and the United States of America: The Krefeld Historical Symposia

I was hooked by the unusual style and, moreso, by the unusual approach to the familiar material . . . Articulate, sensitive, and intelligent . . . an unusually readable and persuasive narrative. Robert W. Lewis North Dakota Quarterly When in 1968 an American rifle battalion known as the First Wolfhounds landed near Dau Tieng, a rest area controlled by the North Vietnamese Army, they expected to interdict the NVA supply line there within three days. Instead, the soldiers found a prohibitive network of NVA troops, headquarters, hospitals, supplies, and local support for the NVA. It seemed impossible, even for the Wolfhounds, famed for their numbers and fighting strength. In the vivid prose of a mission survivor, Some Even Volunteered chronicles these brave soldiers' daily, deadly contact with the NVA, their attempts to win the villagers' trust, and how they struggled to accept and survive their circumstances. Eight months later, the Wolfhounds succeeded--destroying, in the process, an NVA unit of their own size. Alfred Bradford's sardonic voice is compelling. This narrative is witty, sometimes hilarious, and always captivating. Bradford--now a history professor--also provides one of the most insightful discussions ever written of Vietnam's assumed position in military history. Some Even Volunteered provides a marvelous description and a succinct evaluation of the life and the achievement of the American soldier in Vietnam trying to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese. In a style reminiscent of Michael Herr in Dispatches but still distinctly his own, Bradford relates the story of the First Battalion of the 27th Infantry Regiment (First Wolfhounds) of the 25th Infantry Division as they pacified the district of Tri Tam. The First Battalion--which had the highest body count of any rifle battalion in Vietnam--was air-lifted into an NVA rest area south of Dau Tieng (IIId Brigade basecamp) in the district of Tri Tam on 24 October 1968. They had been ordered to interdict the NVA supply line that stretched from the Ho Chi Minh trail in Cambodia through Dau Tieng to Saigon. They were expected to complete their mission in three days, but they uncovered such an extensive network of headquarters, hospitals, supply, troop concentrations and local support that the mission was extended to a week, then to a month, and finally, to eight months. Eight months later, the Wolfhounds had succeeded. Their fire support base was assaulted three times, their Brigade base twice. They established four independent forts, ran missions throughout the Third Brigade Area of Operations, and accepted the surrender of dozens of Viet Cong and NVA. In effect, they had destroyed an NVA unit of their own size. In vivid, staccato prose, Bradford delivers a first-rate narrative. In addition, the last chapter, entitled, The Will of the People, provides the reader with one of the best discussions ever written of Vietnam's assumed position in military history.

This book examines (1) the neglected but decisive role played by guerrillas in the Carolinas in 1780 and 1781, which led to the disastrous retreat of Cornwallis into Yorktown; (2) the 1793 uprisings in western France against the Revolutionary regime, whose conduct foreshadowed Nazi policies during World War II; (3) the French occupation of Spain from 1808 to 1814, from which the name guerrilla derives, and where the Napoleonic Empire suffered its most fatal wound; and (4) guerrilla campaigns in the American Civil War, explaining why Lee's surrender in 1865 failed to unleash the massive guerrilla outbreak feared by Lincoln and Grant. The concluding section compares the experiences of the French in Spain to those of the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the British in the Carolinas to the Americans in Vietnam.

Relying on extensive candid interviews from members of Congress and staff on defense authorization committees and senior Army general officers, Scroggs provides a strong insider analysis with recommendations. He examines the impact of culture on the varying abilities of public agencies, specifically the Army, to pursue its organizational interests through lobbying or liaising Congress. Scroggs argues that despite structural similarities in how the four military services approach Congress, differences in service culture affect their relative success in achieving their goals on the Hill. Scroggs draws four major conclusions. First, despite a law prohibiting lobbying of Congress by public agencies, Congress views lobbying or liaising by public entities, especially the military services, not only as a legitimate activity, but essential to Members carrying out their constitutional responsibilities. Second, relative to the other services, the Army is viewed by Congress as the least effective in its lobbying. Third, the Army's patterned approach with Congress is largely a function of its unrecognized and uncompensated culture in the unique terrain of the nation's capital. Fourth, because of the need for balanced service representation to Congress, relatively less effective Army efforts have troubling implications for national security and Army self-interest.

For Karl Strecker the defeat at Stalingrad and his subsequent captivity were the climax of a lifetime of political and military frustration. At an early age Strecker dedicated his life to the service of his country, but during his lifetime his country underwent so many political changes that he often had trouble understanding what or whom he was serving. Strecker often found himself applying his hard-earned military skills in an undeclared civil war and in the successive world wars that destroyed German military power and ultimately led to a politically divided Germany. The battle of Stalingrad serves as the focal point of this story because, for Strecker, it represented the height of military futility.

The mechanized infantry is one of the least-studied components of the U.S. Army's combat arms, and its most visable piece of equipment, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, is one of the military's most controversial pieces of equipment. This study traces the idea of mechanized infantry from its roots in the early armored operations of World War I, through its fruition in World War II, to its drastic transformation in response to the threat of a nuclear, biological, and chemical battlefield. The U.S. Army's doctrinal migration from the idea of specialized "armored infantry" to that of more generalized "mechanized infantry" led to problematic consequences in training and equipping the force. Haworth explores the origins, conduct, and outcome of the Bradley controversy, along with its implications for Army institutional cultures, force designs, and doctrines. Challenging traditional partisan views of the Bradley program, Haworth goes to the roots of the issue. The author details the mechanized infantry's problematic status in the Army's traditional division of roles and missions between its Infantry and Armored branches. While new conditions demand new equipment, old institutions and current commitments inevitably complicate matters; thus, traditional infantry considerations have driven the Bradley's requirements. The raw capability of the vehicle and the fortitude and ingenuity of its users have to some extent compensated for the conflicting pressures in its design. However, the reluctance of the Army to see mechanized infantry as a specialty has led to the problem the vehicle has faced, as this book clearly shows.

Frequently surprising, sometimes bloody, and always absorbing, Behind Enemy Lines offers up tales of espionage, hit-and-run raids, and guerrilla warfare. The book provides a new perspective on familiar aspects of Civil War history, including shadowy agents, women using their feminine wiles, unashamed looting, and vengeful crusades. Popular historian Wilmer L. Jones reveals that, by subverting the methods of traditional warfare, small and sometimes unorganized groups as well as intrepid spies, daring raiders, and mutinous guerrillas turned the tide of the Civil War far from the fronts of the now-legendary battlefields. Each of the three sections-spies, raiders, and Guerrillas-introduces riveting accounts of the often-overlooked heroes and heroines of unconventional warfare. Behind Enemy Lines spotlights such fabled infiltrators as Belle Boyd, Allen Pinkerton, and Timothy Webster. It also examines how the South, with its daring cavalry and constant struggle for supplies, resorted to sometimes brutal offensives led by men like Turner Ashby, John Mosby, and John Hunt Morgan. Finally, the gripping and detailed narrative peers into the bloody guerrilla warfare, spotlighting John Brown, William Clark Quantrill, and Bloody Bill Anderson, as well as the genesis of the James-Younger Gang. Civil war buffs, history lovers, and espionage enthusiasts will find this fascinating volume a welcome addition to their libraries.

Since the end of World War II, there have been 181 insurgencies around the world. Today, there are over three dozen violent insurgencies, including in such high-profile countries as Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. These insurgencies have been led by a range of groups, from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to the Taliban in Afghanistan. In fact, most warfare today occurs in the form of insurgencies. If we are to understand modern warfare, we need to understand insurgencies. While numerous books have been written on the subject of insurgencies, there is no book that brings together all of what we know into one accessible volume that policymakers can understand and use. Waging Insurgent Warfare is that book. Seth G. Jones, who has been deeply involved in the Afghanistan war over the last decade, aims to help policymakers, scholars, and general readers better understand how groups start, wage, and end insurgencies. He weaves together examples from today and from recent history into an analytic synthesis that focuses on several sets of questions. First, what factors contribute to the rise of an insurgency? Second, what are the key components involved in conducting an insurgency? As he explains, insurgent groups need to decide on a strategy, employ a range of tactics, select an organizational structure, secure outside aid from state and non-state actors, and conduct information campaigns. They then have to routinely re-assess these decisions over the course of an insurgency. Third, what factors contribute to the end of insurgencies? Finally, what do the answers to these questions mean for the conduct of counterinsurgency warfare? Waging Insurgent Warfare is not only a practical handbook for understanding insurgent warfare, but it also has implications for waging counterinsurgent warfare. Highly readable, empirically sophisticated, and historically informed, Waging Insurgent Warfare will become a standard work on the topic.

Insurgency-based irregular warfare typifies armed conflict in the post-Cold War age. For some years now, western and other governments have struggled to contend with ideologically driven guerrilla movements, religiously inspired militias, and systematic targeting of civilian populations. Numerous conflicts of this type are rooted in experiences of empire breakdown. Yet few multi-empire studies of decolonisation's violence exist. Decolonization and Conflict brings together expertise on a variety of different cases to offer new perspectives on the colonial conflicts that engulfed Europe's empires after 1945. The contributors analyse multiple forms of colonial counter-insurgency from the military engagement of anti-colonial movements to the forced removal of civilian populations and the application of new doctrines of psychological warfare. Contributors to the collection also show how insurgencies, their propaganda and methods of action were inherently transnational and inter-connected. The resulting study is a vital contribution to our understanding of contested decolonization. It emphasises the global connections at work and reveals the contemporary resonances of both anti-colonial insurgencies and the means devised to counter them. It is essential reading for students and scholars of empire, decolonization, and asymmetric warfare.