This is a book about military professionals. It outlines the personal reflections of a U.S. Army lieutenant/captain on active duty in Europe during the Vietnam War. There, the enemy was drugs, boredom, racism, and illiteracy. Few, if any, books concern the Vietnam-era veteran. "The American Military Ethic" tells the story of one such veteran--of basic combat training, of Infantry OCS, and of airborne school--who had charge of a nuclear weapons unit in Europe during the late 1960s and early 1970s. First person accounts are blended with a more traditional scholarly examination of professional military training for junior and senior officers (ROTC and the war colleges) and of the American military ethic itself.

Toner argues that the American military ethic has undergone a deserved rejuvenation. The ethic itself--which is the source of true professionalism--has a sacred character, for it involves its professors in a solemn oath: to preserve and to protect the republic. That mission can lead officers to the ultimate test of leadership: whether to accomplish the mission or to safeguard the people for whom the leader is responsible. Still, this book is not of the guts-and-glory variety. It is a study in practical, real leadership; it examines leadership problems of the type real junior officers confront daily; and it explores the kinds of ethical problems real senior officers frequently confront. Its thesis is this: A professional military ethic depends, ultimately, upon the formation of responsible character in (and by) its leaders; for that, sound education is a necessity. ROTC and senior professional military education depend, therefore, upon challenging, serious, and substantial academic experiences. In the end, the American military ethic is a function of the wisdom and virtue learned and taught by its officers. This volume will be of great interest to active duty military professionals, students of military history, and veterans of the Vietnam era.

Without the Red (or Soviet) Army, it is likely that the Western Allies would have taken much longer to defeat the Third Reich - they may even have lost altogether. However even decades after the war's end, little is widely known about this giant organization that numbered millions of soldiers. Broken down by key battles or campaigns within each theatre of war, The Red Army in World War II shows the strengths and organizational structures of the Red Army's ground forces campaign by campaign, building into a detailed compendium of information. With extensive organizational diagrams and full-colour campaign maps showing the disposition of units, The Red Army in World War II is an easy-to-use guide to the Russian, Polish, Czech and units of other nationalities that served as part of Stalin's army, their strengths during key campaigns and battles, and details of where they served throughout the war. The book will be an essential reference guide for any serious enthusiast of World War II.

El Salvador's civil war began in 1980 and ended twelve bloody years later.It saw extreme violence on both sides, including the terrorising and targetingof civilians by death squads, recruitment of child soldiers, and the death anddisappearance of more than 75,000 people. Examining El Salvador's vibrantlife-story literature written in the aftermath of this terrible conflict-includingmemoirs and testimonials-Erik Ching seeks to understand how thewar has come to be remembered and rebattled by Salvadorans and what thatmeans for their society today. Ching identifies four memory communities that dominate nationalpostwar views: civilian elites, military officers, guerrilla commanders, andworking class and poor testimonialists. Pushing distinct and divergent stories,these groups are today engaged in what Ching terms a "narrative battle"for control over the memory of the war. Their ongoing publications in themarketplace of ideas tend to direct Salvadorans' attempts to negotiate thewar's meaning and legacy, and Ching suggests that a more open, coordinatedreconciliation process is needed in this postconflict society. In the meantime,El Salvador, fractured by conflicting interpretations of its national trauma,is hindered in dealing with the immediate problems posed by the nexus ofneoliberalism, gang violence, and outmigration.

Insurgency-based irregular warfare typifies armed conflict in the post-Cold War age. For some years now, western and other governments have struggled to contend with ideologically driven guerrilla movements, religiously inspired militias, and systematic targeting of civilian populations. Numerous conflicts of this type are rooted in experiences of empire breakdown. Yet few multi-empire studies of decolonisation's violence exist. Decolonization and Conflict brings together expertise on a variety of different cases to offer new perspectives on the colonial conflicts that engulfed Europe's empires after 1945. The contributors analyse multiple forms of colonial counter-insurgency from the military engagement of anti-colonial movements to the forced removal of civilian populations and the application of new doctrines of psychological warfare. Contributors to the collection also show how insurgencies, their propaganda and methods of action were inherently transnational and inter-connected. The resulting study is a vital contribution to our understanding of contested decolonization. It emphasises the global connections at work and reveals the contemporary resonances of both anti-colonial insurgencies and the means devised to counter them. It is essential reading for students and scholars of empire, decolonization, and asymmetric warfare.

This volume represents a comprehensive analysis, by the best known experts in the field on both sides of the Atlantic, of how and why Germany and the United States found themselves at war against each other in 1917 and how the end of their confrontation in 1918/19 paved the way for an era of renewed cooperation. Perspectives offered go well beyond the diplomatic and military aspects of the German-American relationship and include cultural and economic questions.
Germany and the United States of America: The Krefeld Historical Symposia

I was hooked by the unusual style and, moreso, by the unusual approach to the familiar material . . . Articulate, sensitive, and intelligent . . . an unusually readable and persuasive narrative. Robert W. Lewis North Dakota Quarterly When in 1968 an American rifle battalion known as the First Wolfhounds landed near Dau Tieng, a rest area controlled by the North Vietnamese Army, they expected to interdict the NVA supply line there within three days. Instead, the soldiers found a prohibitive network of NVA troops, headquarters, hospitals, supplies, and local support for the NVA. It seemed impossible, even for the Wolfhounds, famed for their numbers and fighting strength. In the vivid prose of a mission survivor, Some Even Volunteered chronicles these brave soldiers' daily, deadly contact with the NVA, their attempts to win the villagers' trust, and how they struggled to accept and survive their circumstances. Eight months later, the Wolfhounds succeeded--destroying, in the process, an NVA unit of their own size. Alfred Bradford's sardonic voice is compelling. This narrative is witty, sometimes hilarious, and always captivating. Bradford--now a history professor--also provides one of the most insightful discussions ever written of Vietnam's assumed position in military history. Some Even Volunteered provides a marvelous description and a succinct evaluation of the life and the achievement of the American soldier in Vietnam trying to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese. In a style reminiscent of Michael Herr in Dispatches but still distinctly his own, Bradford relates the story of the First Battalion of the 27th Infantry Regiment (First Wolfhounds) of the 25th Infantry Division as they pacified the district of Tri Tam. The First Battalion--which had the highest body count of any rifle battalion in Vietnam--was air-lifted into an NVA rest area south of Dau Tieng (IIId Brigade basecamp) in the district of Tri Tam on 24 October 1968. They had been ordered to interdict the NVA supply line that stretched from the Ho Chi Minh trail in Cambodia through Dau Tieng to Saigon. They were expected to complete their mission in three days, but they uncovered such an extensive network of headquarters, hospitals, supply, troop concentrations and local support that the mission was extended to a week, then to a month, and finally, to eight months. Eight months later, the Wolfhounds had succeeded. Their fire support base was assaulted three times, their Brigade base twice. They established four independent forts, ran missions throughout the Third Brigade Area of Operations, and accepted the surrender of dozens of Viet Cong and NVA. In effect, they had destroyed an NVA unit of their own size. In vivid, staccato prose, Bradford delivers a first-rate narrative. In addition, the last chapter, entitled, The Will of the People, provides the reader with one of the best discussions ever written of Vietnam's assumed position in military history.

This edited volume critically assesses emerging trends in contemporary warfare and international interventionism as exemplified by the 'local turn' in counterinsurgent warfare. It asks how contemporary counterinsurgency approaches work and are legitimized; what concrete effects they have within local settings, and what the implications are for how we can understand the means and ends of war and peace in our post 9/11 world. This book is essential reading for anyone interested in understanding recent changes in global liberal governance as well as the growing convergence of military and seemingly non-military domains, discourses and practices in the contemporary making of global political order.

This book examines (1) the neglected but decisive role played by guerrillas in the Carolinas in 1780 and 1781, which led to the disastrous retreat of Cornwallis into Yorktown; (2) the 1793 uprisings in western France against the Revolutionary regime, whose conduct foreshadowed Nazi policies during World War II; (3) the French occupation of Spain from 1808 to 1814, from which the name guerrilla derives, and where the Napoleonic Empire suffered its most fatal wound; and (4) guerrilla campaigns in the American Civil War, explaining why Lee's surrender in 1865 failed to unleash the massive guerrilla outbreak feared by Lincoln and Grant. The concluding section compares the experiences of the French in Spain to those of the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the British in the Carolinas to the Americans in Vietnam.

Relying on extensive candid interviews from members of Congress and staff on defense authorization committees and senior Army general officers, Scroggs provides a strong insider analysis with recommendations. He examines the impact of culture on the varying abilities of public agencies, specifically the Army, to pursue its organizational interests through lobbying or liaising Congress. Scroggs argues that despite structural similarities in how the four military services approach Congress, differences in service culture affect their relative success in achieving their goals on the Hill. Scroggs draws four major conclusions. First, despite a law prohibiting lobbying of Congress by public agencies, Congress views lobbying or liaising by public entities, especially the military services, not only as a legitimate activity, but essential to Members carrying out their constitutional responsibilities. Second, relative to the other services, the Army is viewed by Congress as the least effective in its lobbying. Third, the Army's patterned approach with Congress is largely a function of its unrecognized and uncompensated culture in the unique terrain of the nation's capital. Fourth, because of the need for balanced service representation to Congress, relatively less effective Army efforts have troubling implications for national security and Army self-interest.

This story is an account of the Santiago, Cuba, land campaign of the Spanish-American War, as conducted by General William R. Shafter's Fifth Army Corps. The narrative is based on firsthand information gathered from handwritten diaries, memoirs, and regimental and company histories of the men who participated in the campaign. These chronicles of frontline action paint an entirely different picture of what has been called "The Splendid Little War." The opponent, far from being the cowardly Spanish soldier of myth, is revealed to be a courageous, resourceful foe. Furthermore, the attack on the outer defenses of Santiago was totally mismanaged by William Shafter, the American General in command, and his incompetent staff. Only the U.S. Navy's victory over the Spanish squadron on July 3, 1898, rescued the army from disaster.

Drawing on unique first-hand data from Russia's North Caucasus, this study is the first of its kind to detail the causes and contexts of individual disengagement of various types of militants: avengers, nationalists, and jihadists. It aims to considerably enhance our theoretical understanding of individual militants' incentives to abandon violence.

The functions of staff officers in U.S. military history have been largely ignored by historians who have preferred to focus on the role of the combat officer. This examination of the career of General Walter Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and his valuable contribution to Allied success, represents an effort to fill a void in the current historiography of U.S. participation in Europe in World War II. While specifically looking at Smith's military career from his entry into the Indiana National Guard on his sixteenth birthday to his retirement from the U.S. Army as a four-star general 39 years later, the volume is also a general investigation of the role of Chief of Staff and a critical study of the interwar U.S. Army and its participation in the campaigns of the Mediterranean and Northwest Europe during World War II. The institutional and attitudinal structure that produced the generation of American officers that commanded armies and manned higher headquarters is thoroughly evaluated in this volume. D.K.R. Crosswell concludes that the normative influences of the Army's advance schools conditioned the U.S. approach to war in Europe: Eisenhower and Smith's broad front strategy is seen as a product of their Leavenworth educations. Smith's relationships with Eisenhower and George C. Marshall are also seen as important formative influences.

Despite a paucity of personal papers and no prior book on Smith, Crosswell had access to a wealth of primary materials in the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas and the resources of the Combat Studies Library at the Command and General Staff College in Leavenworth, Kansas. Substantial collections of materials at the federal research facilities in Washington, the U.S. Army Military History Institute holdings in Carlisle Barracks, Pa., and the George C. Marshall Library in Lexington, Va., were consulted. Personal interviews with surviving World War II officers and an examination of British sources were conducted to give the most complete picture of Smith to date. "The Chief of Staff" is divided into four major sections: Bedell Smith and Officership in the U.S. Army, 1917-1939; The Towering Figure: George C. Marshall; The First Campaign: The Mediterranean; Northwest Europe, and an epilogue which covers Smith's post-Army years. The 14 chapters present Smith as perhaps the best example of the World War II military manager. He emerges from these pages as a central figure of the period and his contributions within the Allied sphere proved fundamental to eventual battlefield success. Seven maps of World War II major theaters of operation from Morocco to Normandy and never-before-published archival photographs are included. Military history and World War II buffs won't want to miss this splendid read which will also appeal to academic military historians, libraries and research facilities, as well as current and retired military officers. The book is ideal supplemental reading for courses in U.S. military history.

From the American Civil War and the introduction of the metal cartridge in the 1860s up to the present day, The Encyclopedia of Weapons is an accessible reference guide to the most important small arms, armoured vehicles, aircraft and ships from all around the world. The book ranges from the first Gatling guns to favourites such as the Lee Enfield rifle and the AK-47; in terms of aircraft the book includes World War I biplanes, World War II’s Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress and Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero fighter and on to modern stealth aircraft; in naval weaponry the book features early ironclad submarines, classic ships such as Bismarck and the nuclear subs of today; from the first tanks on the Western Front in World War I, such as the Mark V Male, the book covers the development of armoured fighting vehicles, featuring such classics as the Soviet T-34 and modern tanks like the M1 Abrams. With an entry per page, each weapon is illustrated with two colour artworks – some of them cutaways – a colour or black-&-white photograph, an authoritative history on its development, production and service history and a box of essential specifications. Featuring more than 400 entries, The Encyclopedia of Weapons is a fascinating reference work on the most important tanks, guns, military ships and aircraft over the past 150 years.

Under Joseph Stalin's iron-fisted rule, the Soviet state tried to forge an army that would be both a shining example of proletarian power and an indomitable deterrent against fascist aggression. In reality, Roger Reese reveals, Stalin's grand military experiment failed miserably on both counts before it was finally rescued within the crucible of war.

Reese greatly expands our understanding of the Red Army's evolution during the 1930s and its near decimation at the beginning of World War II. Counter to conventional views, he argues that the Stalinist state largely failed in its attempt to use military service as a means to indoctrinate its citizens, especially the peasantry. After 1928, the regime's recruits became increasingly disenchanted with Stalin's socialist enterprise--primarily due to the disheartening changes brought on by collectivization and dekulakization. In effect, these reluctant soldiers turned their backs on both the army and Communist Party leadership, neither of which regained credibility until after World War II.

The soldiers' alienation and hostility, Reese demonstrates, was most clearly manifested in the highly volatile tensions between officers and peasant recruits following the military's chaotic expansion during the 1930s. Those tensions and numerous internal conflicts greatly undermined the regime's effort to create a well-trained, cohesive, and politically indoctrinated army. In place of this ideal, the regime stumbled along with a disunited and ineffective fighting force guided by outdated doctrines and led by an undeveloped officer corps. All of those elements made the Soviet Union particularly vulnerable to the devastating military disasters of 1941.

Along the way, Reese persuasively dispels a number of myths. He shows, for example, that the Red Army's humiliating defeats at the start of the war were not, as many still believe, due to Stalin's bloody purges of the officer corps during the 1930s nor to overwhelming German military and economic superiority. Stalin, Reese argues, was only one of many key influences on the Soviet's disorganized effort to field an effective fighting force. And, while the Red Army was actually technologically superior to the Wehrmacht, the Germans made far better strategic and tactical use of their forces to overwhelm the poorly-led Soviets.

A fascinating portrait of an army at war with itself, Reese's study illuminates the daily lives of soldiers, officers, and civilians and forever changes the way we look at the relation between political motives and military needs in the early Soviet state.

This is a systematic, comparative attitudinal study of the Soviet fighting man. The author interviewed emigre ex-Soviet servicemen from all branches and of all ranks to determine their feelings about their military experience. Each of the three major sections of the work addresses one branch of the service, detailing the answers of respondents to eighty-one questions. The resulting sets of data are divided into twelve categories dealing with various aspects of military service in the Soviet Union: general views of military service, military life, combat ability, training, quality of officers and NCOs, leadership, morale and discipline, ideology, unit cohesion, desertion and AWOL, alcohol use, and suicide. Gabriel's conclusions, as well as the data he presents, answer critical questions about Soviet military effectiveness and encourage further analysis of the psychology of the Soviet fighting man.

Kaufman examines the training and status of British military surgeons during the late 18th and 19th centuries. Their management of the sick and wounded during the wars with France leading up to and including the Peninsular War is also described. He concludes with an analysis of the medical problems associated with the Crimean War.

Using important contemporary texts, Kaufman describes the personalities who served in the British Army Medical Department during the late 18th and 19th centuries, when diseases caused a much higher mortality than injuries sustained in battle. Many military surgeons were only poorly trained, and the management of the sick and wounded only gradually improved over this period despite significant advances in medicine, surgery, and hygene. Government spending cuts after the Peninsular War greatly depleted the medical service of the army so that by the time of the Crimean War it was unable to cope with a European-style war. Deficiencies were recognized and, in the case of the medical services, this led to the establishment of the Army Medical School in 1860. This analysis should be of particular interest to serving military medical officers and to historians and other researchers interested in the management of 18th and 19th century armies in times of peace and war.

In a compact guide to essential sources, this bibliography covers the Soviet armed forces from the birth of the Red Army and the origins of the Soviet military system to the demise of the Soviet Union. The authors have selected over 1,400 titles that accommodate both wider interests and those of the specialist. Taking accessibility into account, they have provided a wealth of information on sources available in the West.

The bibliography opens with a section on reference sources and the imperial antecedents to the Soviet system. Part Two includes chapters on the Revolution and Civil War, the period from 1922-1940, and the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. In the concluding section, the authors cover the postwar period. The final chapter, Breakthrough Books, includes those works that have radically influenced the perception and discussion of Soviet military affairs.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was an extraordinary military leader and one of the most controversial figures in American history. An enormous amout of literature has accumulated about his career, which spanned most of the 20th century. General MacArthur is the subject of this first comprehensive assessment and survey of all of the writings by ad about him. Publication coincides and reflects the formal commemoration of the 50th anniversary of World War II. A short biographical essay and chronology set the stage for the historiographical critique, which is organized topically and into different time periods. This extensive historiographical narrative is cross-referenced to the annotated bibliography of 759 published and unpublished sources, both academic and popular, including film and fiction. Author and subject indexes complete the volume. This guide to the literature on MacArthur describes archival collections and research facilities; points to conflicting interpretations about the role of General MacArthur as Chief of Staff of the Army, in World War II, in the occupation of Japan, in the Korean War, and in the sensational recall from his position as Far Eastern Commander in 1951; and suggests areas for further research. The historiographical narrative and annotated bibliography cover the career of the general from his earliest years to his death in 1964. This easy-to-use research tool is designed for students, scholars, and readers at all levels; for use by all those concerned with recent U.S. and world history; and for special commemorations of World War II.

This illuminating study provides a unifying framework for understanding the daily lives of British soldiers past and present.How different were the men who fought at Blenheim and at Goose Green? Is there a human thread that connects the redcoat of 300 years ago with the British soldier today? What would they find in common if they found a shared foe?This book focuses on the people who make up the British Army and the very human interactions between them in their daily lives. It marries the academic disciplines of Social Anthropology and Military History to provide a novel way of looking at the anatomy of the army at unit level from an entirely human perspective. Concentrating on the attitudes, expectations and concerns expressed by the people involved, it sets out a social model of life at regimental duty that can be used to describe, analyze and explain their behaviours over the past 300 years.The book is grounded in what soldiers of all ranks have said, using the author's research interview material for the modern witnesses and memoirs, diaries and letters for earlier ones. These first-hand statements are analyzed using techniques from Social Anthropology and the emerging patterns are captured in the model."Birmingham War Studies" ("BWS") is a series of works of original historical research in the area of History and War Studies. The works will cover all aspects of war studies from the Ancient Greeks and Romans to the present day.

The Rainbow Division (42nd Infantry Division) was the premier National Guard division to fight on the Western Front in the Great War. Made up of units from 26 states and the District of Columbia, the Rainbow was a unique attempt to combine units from every section of the nation and to get them to France as quickly as possible. The Rainbow arrived in France in December 1917, and served in every major battle the AEF (American Expeditionary Force) participated in. After the end of the war in November 1918, the Rainbow was selected to serve in the Army of Occupation, remaining in Germany until the spring of 1919. The division counted in its leadership Douglas MacArthur, William J. Wild Bill Donovan (later known for his service as the head of the OSS in World War II and for founding the CIA), soldier-poet Joyce Kilmer, Father Francis P. Duffy, plus future secretaries of the Army and the Air Force and two who would become Army Chiefs of Staff. George S. Patton's tanks supported The Rainbow Division during the St. Mihiel operations, the first time the legendary Patton planned for the use of tanks on the battlefield.

Alarming levels of fear and suspicion developed in Australia following the German victories in Europe of 1940. It was believed the Nazis had prepared an army of subversives a Fifth Column to undermine the war effort. These suspicions plagued the Australian home front for much of the war.

This book explores the ways in which democracies can win counterinsurgencies when they implement a proper strategy. At a time when the USA is retrenching from two bungled foreign wars that involved deadly insurgent uprisings, this is a particularly important argument. Succumbing to the trauma of those engagements and drawing the wrong conclusions about counterinsurgency can only lead to further defeat in the future. Rather than assuming that counterinsurgency is ineffective, it is crucial to understand that a conventional response to an insurgent challenge is likely to fail. Counterinsurgency must be applied from the beginning, and if done properly can be highly effective, even when used by democratic regimes. In fact, because such regimes are often wealthier; have more experience at institution-building and functional governance; are more pluralistic in nature and therefore enjoy higher levels of legitimacy than do autocracies, democracies may have considerable advantages in counterinsurgency warfare. Rather than give up in despair, democracies should learn to leverage these advantages and implement them against future insurgencies.

This is the story of the early struggles of an ill-equipped ragtag French force, among the first to pledge its loyalty to General de Gaulle. It fought a lonely, almost secret war against the numerically superior Italian troops deep in the wildest parts of the Sahara, hundreds of miles from the main campaigns along the African coast. These daring Free French raids with their long thirsty treks and small-scale oasis battles have been nearly forgotten, although their path is marked by the graves of many hundreds of French, Italian, and native soldiers. Bimberg details the exotic units that participated in this struggle, including the "Tirailleurs Senegalaise du T'chad" (African Infantry), the "Compagnies Sahariennes" (Saharan Camel Companies), and "the Groupe Nomade du Tibesti" (a tribal militia recruited in the Tibesti Mountain region of the great desert).

Despite antiquated equipment and some of the world's worst terrain, the Free French were among the most dedicated soldiers in the Allied camp. The backdrop to their fierce fighting includes the barely surveyed Tibesti Mountains with their 10,000 foot volcanic peaks, interspersed with treacherous shifting sands--terrain which would prove to be an enormous challenge to the worn out, patched-together motor vehicles of the Free French. Much of the action takes place in the most remote areas of Italian Libya, the desert province of Fezzan with its fortified oases of Mourzouk and Koufra, each strongly defended by the Italians. While these skirmishes were a sideshow to the epic battles of North Africa, they were immortalized by heroic acts by the French and African troops alike, efforts that ultimately led to success in this far corner of the world.

Friedrich Beck was the single most important figure in the transformation of the inept Habsburg military into the modern military state that would wage World War I. He correctly perceived that only an elite body of officers responsible for war planning and preparation could provide lasting security for the Austro-Hungarian empire. After firmly establishing the general staff as an institution, Beck led war planning to counter threats from Russia, Italy, and the Balkans; and spearheaded a vast rebuilding of the rail network. While his rise to power marked a return to the favorite system of military administration of the early Franz Joseph period, Beck proved himself a man with real military ability that revolutionized an army.

Faced with severe budgetary constraints, a radically reduced force structure, and a crippling intellectual dogmatism, the American Infantry struggled throughout the interwar years to modernize its doctrine. Finlayson examines these difficulties, beginning with an overview of the experiences of the primary combatants of the First World War, comparing their battlefield doctrines with that of the American Expeditionary Force. The brief American appearance on the battlefield did much to shape the convictions of those men assigned the task of developing doctrine after the war.

The findings of the post-World War I Superior Board provide valuable insight into how institutional conservatism and the dogmatic approach to new ideas that existed among senior Army leaders stymied possible doctrinal advances. The Army would suffer greatly in the post-war demobilization and the subsequent ravages of the Great Depression. With little money and few soldiers spread around far-flung posts, little advancement in terms of doctrinal development was possible. As the likelihood of war became more imminent in the 1930s, a concerted effort to modernize was made; however, the magnitude of the task made success virtually impossible-a situation that was evident in the Infantry's poor performance in the early battles of the war. The U.S. entry into World war II would, unfortunately, find the infantry branch only partially prepared for the battle field of 1942.