This is a systematic, comparative attitudinal study of the Soviet fighting man. The author interviewed emigre ex-Soviet servicemen from all branches and of all ranks to determine their feelings about their military experience. Each of the three major sections of the work addresses one branch of the service, detailing the answers of respondents to eighty-one questions. The resulting sets of data are divided into twelve categories dealing with various aspects of military service in the Soviet Union: general views of military service, military life, combat ability, training, quality of officers and NCOs, leadership, morale and discipline, ideology, unit cohesion, desertion and AWOL, alcohol use, and suicide. Gabriel's conclusions, as well as the data he presents, answer critical questions about Soviet military effectiveness and encourage further analysis of the psychology of the Soviet fighting man.

Under Joseph Stalin's iron-fisted rule, the Soviet state tried to forge an army that would be both a shining example of proletarian power and an indomitable deterrent against fascist aggression. In reality, Roger Reese reveals, Stalin's grand military experiment failed miserably on both counts before it was finally rescued within the crucible of war.

Reese greatly expands our understanding of the Red Army's evolution during the 1930s and its near decimation at the beginning of World War II. Counter to conventional views, he argues that the Stalinist state largely failed in its attempt to use military service as a means to indoctrinate its citizens, especially the peasantry. After 1928, the regime's recruits became increasingly disenchanted with Stalin's socialist enterprise--primarily due to the disheartening changes brought on by collectivization and dekulakization. In effect, these reluctant soldiers turned their backs on both the army and Communist Party leadership, neither of which regained credibility until after World War II.

The soldiers' alienation and hostility, Reese demonstrates, was most clearly manifested in the highly volatile tensions between officers and peasant recruits following the military's chaotic expansion during the 1930s. Those tensions and numerous internal conflicts greatly undermined the regime's effort to create a well-trained, cohesive, and politically indoctrinated army. In place of this ideal, the regime stumbled along with a disunited and ineffective fighting force guided by outdated doctrines and led by an undeveloped officer corps. All of those elements made the Soviet Union particularly vulnerable to the devastating military disasters of 1941.

Along the way, Reese persuasively dispels a number of myths. He shows, for example, that the Red Army's humiliating defeats at the start of the war were not, as many still believe, due to Stalin's bloody purges of the officer corps during the 1930s nor to overwhelming German military and economic superiority. Stalin, Reese argues, was only one of many key influences on the Soviet's disorganized effort to field an effective fighting force. And, while the Red Army was actually technologically superior to the Wehrmacht, the Germans made far better strategic and tactical use of their forces to overwhelm the poorly-led Soviets.

A fascinating portrait of an army at war with itself, Reese's study illuminates the daily lives of soldiers, officers, and civilians and forever changes the way we look at the relation between political motives and military needs in the early Soviet state.

In a definitive new account of the Soviet Union at war, Alexander Hill charts the development, successes and failures of the Red Army from the industrialisation of the Soviet Union in the late 1920s through to the end of the Great Patriotic War in May 1945. Setting military strategy and operations within a broader context that includes national mobilisation on a staggering scale, the book presents a comprehensive account of the origins and course of the war from the perspective of this key Allied power. Drawing on the latest archival research and a wealth of eyewitness testimony, Hill portrays the Red Army at war from the perspective of senior leaders and men and women at the front line to reveal how the Red Army triumphed over the forces of Nazi Germany and her allies on the Eastern Front, and why it did so at such great cost.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was an extraordinary military leader and one of the most controversial figures in American history. An enormous amout of literature has accumulated about his career, which spanned most of the 20th century. General MacArthur is the subject of this first comprehensive assessment and survey of all of the writings by ad about him. Publication coincides and reflects the formal commemoration of the 50th anniversary of World War II. A short biographical essay and chronology set the stage for the historiographical critique, which is organized topically and into different time periods. This extensive historiographical narrative is cross-referenced to the annotated bibliography of 759 published and unpublished sources, both academic and popular, including film and fiction. Author and subject indexes complete the volume. This guide to the literature on MacArthur describes archival collections and research facilities; points to conflicting interpretations about the role of General MacArthur as Chief of Staff of the Army, in World War II, in the occupation of Japan, in the Korean War, and in the sensational recall from his position as Far Eastern Commander in 1951; and suggests areas for further research. The historiographical narrative and annotated bibliography cover the career of the general from his earliest years to his death in 1964. This easy-to-use research tool is designed for students, scholars, and readers at all levels; for use by all those concerned with recent U.S. and world history; and for special commemorations of World War II.

In a compact guide to essential sources, this bibliography covers the Soviet armed forces from the birth of the Red Army and the origins of the Soviet military system to the demise of the Soviet Union. The authors have selected over 1,400 titles that accommodate both wider interests and those of the specialist. Taking accessibility into account, they have provided a wealth of information on sources available in the West.

The bibliography opens with a section on reference sources and the imperial antecedents to the Soviet system. Part Two includes chapters on the Revolution and Civil War, the period from 1922-1940, and the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. In the concluding section, the authors cover the postwar period. The final chapter, Breakthrough Books, includes those works that have radically influenced the perception and discussion of Soviet military affairs.

Kaufman examines the training and status of British military surgeons during the late 18th and 19th centuries. Their management of the sick and wounded during the wars with France leading up to and including the Peninsular War is also described. He concludes with an analysis of the medical problems associated with the Crimean War.

Using important contemporary texts, Kaufman describes the personalities who served in the British Army Medical Department during the late 18th and 19th centuries, when diseases caused a much higher mortality than injuries sustained in battle. Many military surgeons were only poorly trained, and the management of the sick and wounded only gradually improved over this period despite significant advances in medicine, surgery, and hygene. Government spending cuts after the Peninsular War greatly depleted the medical service of the army so that by the time of the Crimean War it was unable to cope with a European-style war. Deficiencies were recognized and, in the case of the medical services, this led to the establishment of the Army Medical School in 1860. This analysis should be of particular interest to serving military medical officers and to historians and other researchers interested in the management of 18th and 19th century armies in times of peace and war.

This illuminating study provides a unifying framework for understanding the daily lives of British soldiers past and present.How different were the men who fought at Blenheim and at Goose Green? Is there a human thread that connects the redcoat of 300 years ago with the British soldier today? What would they find in common if they found a shared foe?This book focuses on the people who make up the British Army and the very human interactions between them in their daily lives. It marries the academic disciplines of Social Anthropology and Military History to provide a novel way of looking at the anatomy of the army at unit level from an entirely human perspective. Concentrating on the attitudes, expectations and concerns expressed by the people involved, it sets out a social model of life at regimental duty that can be used to describe, analyze and explain their behaviours over the past 300 years.The book is grounded in what soldiers of all ranks have said, using the author's research interview material for the modern witnesses and memoirs, diaries and letters for earlier ones. These first-hand statements are analyzed using techniques from Social Anthropology and the emerging patterns are captured in the model."Birmingham War Studies" ("BWS") is a series of works of original historical research in the area of History and War Studies. The works will cover all aspects of war studies from the Ancient Greeks and Romans to the present day.

The Rainbow Division (42nd Infantry Division) was the premier National Guard division to fight on the Western Front in the Great War. Made up of units from 26 states and the District of Columbia, the Rainbow was a unique attempt to combine units from every section of the nation and to get them to France as quickly as possible. The Rainbow arrived in France in December 1917, and served in every major battle the AEF (American Expeditionary Force) participated in. After the end of the war in November 1918, the Rainbow was selected to serve in the Army of Occupation, remaining in Germany until the spring of 1919. The division counted in its leadership Douglas MacArthur, William J. Wild Bill Donovan (later known for his service as the head of the OSS in World War II and for founding the CIA), soldier-poet Joyce Kilmer, Father Francis P. Duffy, plus future secretaries of the Army and the Air Force and two who would become Army Chiefs of Staff. George S. Patton's tanks supported The Rainbow Division during the St. Mihiel operations, the first time the legendary Patton planned for the use of tanks on the battlefield.

When the United States entered the Great War in April of 1917, there were few officers with any staff training, and none had actually served on large, complex staffs in combat. This work traces the development of the staff of the AEF and describes how Pershing found the generals to command those divisions that fought on the Western Front in World War I. Many of Pershing's generals had been colonels only a few months prior to assuming command of divisions. John J. Pershing's task was to mold a diverse group of men into effective staff officers and into general officers to face the rigors of modern combat. How he accomplished this task, and how well the AEF did, is the focus of this work on the AEF's command and staff structure.

Since the Revolution, Americans have debated what action the military should take toward civilians suspected of espionage, treason, or revolutionary activity. This important book-the first to present a comprehensive history of military surveillance in the United States-traces the evolution of America's internal security policy during the past two hundred years. Joan M. Jensen discusses how the federal government has used the army to intervene in domestic crises and how Americans have protested the violation of civil liberties and applied political pressure to limit military intervention in civil disputes. Although movements to expand and to constrain the military have each dominated during different periods in American history, says Jensen, the involvement of the army in internal security has increased steadily. Jensen describes a wide range of events and individuals connected to this process. These include Benedict Arnold's betrayal of West Point; the colonial wars in Cuba, where Lt. Andrew Rowan, the nation's first officer spy, won a medal for carrying a "Message for Garcia"; the development of "War Plans White" in the 1920s to guide the army's response in the event of domestic rebellion; the activities of J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI in the 1950s and 1960s; the use of the National Guard in the South at the height of the civil rights movement; and the surveillance of and violence against protesters during the Vietnam War. Scrutinizing the historic workings of the American government at closer range than has ever been done before, Jensen creates a vivid picture of the growing invisible intelligence empire within the United States government and of the men who created it.

In April 1861, Dick and Tally Simpson, sons of South Carolina Congressman Richard F. Simpson, enlisted in Company A of the Third South Carolina Volunteers of the Confederate army. Their letters home--published here for the first time--read like a historical novel, complete with plot, romance, character, suspense, and tragedy. In their last year of college when the war broke out, Dick and Tally were hastily handed their diplomas so they could volunteer for military duty. Dick was twenty; Tally was twenty-two.
Well educated, intelligent, and thoughtful young men, Dick and Tally cared deeply for their country, their family, and their comrades-in-arms and wrote frequently to their loved ones in Pendleton, South Carolina, offering firsthand accounts of dramatic events from the battle of First Manassas in July 1861 to the battle of Chickamauga in September 1863. Their letters provide a picture of war as it was actually experienced at the time, not as it was remembered some twenty or thirty years later. It is a picture that neither glorifies war nor condemns it, but simply "tells it like it is." Written to a number of different people, the boys' letters home dealt with a number of different subjects. Letters to "Pa" went into great detail about military matters in Lee's Army of Northern Virginia--troop movements, casualties, and how well particular units had fought; letters to "Ma" and sisters Anna and Mary were about camp life and family friends in the army and usually included requests for much-needed food and clothing; letters to Aunt Caroline and her daughter Carrie usually concerned affairs of the heart, for Aunt Caroline continued to be Dick and Tally's trusted confidante, even when they were "far, far from home."
The value of these letters lies not so much in the detailed information they provide as in the overall picture they convey--a picture of how one Southern family, for better or for worse, at home and at the front--coped with the experience of war. These are not wartime reminiscences, but wartime letters, written from the camp, the battlefield, the hospital bed, the picket line--wherever the boys happened to be when they found time to write home. It is a poignant picture of war as it was actually experienced in the South as the Civil War unfolded.

This reference book by a well-known historian is the very first to give a short history of the development of the field artillery from the Middle Ages to the present, along with biographical profiles of leading figures, and bibliographical essays about the most important writings on the subject. Dastrup defines the evolution of this combat force and weapons system in terms of technology, organization, tactics, and doctrine. This volume is designed for academic and professional library reference sections and for use in courses in military history and military technology. This guide is suitable for reference and text purposes, and made accessible for varied uses through internal cross-referencing, appendices, and a well-framed general index.

Who was the enigmatic Jean Moulin, a man as skilled in deception as he was in acts of heroism? The memory of this French Resistance hero, who was betrayed to the Gestapo and tortured by Klaus Barbie, the infamous 'Butcher of Lyon', is revered alongside that of other national icons. But Moulin's story is full of unanswered questions and the truth of his life is far more complicated than the legend. Patrick Marnham, winner of the Marsh Prize for biography, thrillingly tells the epic story of France's greatest war hero, bringing to light the shadowy and often deceitful world of the French Resistance, and offers a shocking conclusion to one of the great unsolved mysteries of World War II.

This is the story of the early struggles of an ill-equipped ragtag French force, among the first to pledge its loyalty to General de Gaulle. It fought a lonely, almost secret war against the numerically superior Italian troops deep in the wildest parts of the Sahara, hundreds of miles from the main campaigns along the African coast. These daring Free French raids with their long thirsty treks and small-scale oasis battles have been nearly forgotten, although their path is marked by the graves of many hundreds of French, Italian, and native soldiers. Bimberg details the exotic units that participated in this struggle, including the "Tirailleurs Senegalaise du T'chad" (African Infantry), the "Compagnies Sahariennes" (Saharan Camel Companies), and "the Groupe Nomade du Tibesti" (a tribal militia recruited in the Tibesti Mountain region of the great desert).

Despite antiquated equipment and some of the world's worst terrain, the Free French were among the most dedicated soldiers in the Allied camp. The backdrop to their fierce fighting includes the barely surveyed Tibesti Mountains with their 10,000 foot volcanic peaks, interspersed with treacherous shifting sands--terrain which would prove to be an enormous challenge to the worn out, patched-together motor vehicles of the Free French. Much of the action takes place in the most remote areas of Italian Libya, the desert province of Fezzan with its fortified oases of Mourzouk and Koufra, each strongly defended by the Italians. While these skirmishes were a sideshow to the epic battles of North Africa, they were immortalized by heroic acts by the French and African troops alike, efforts that ultimately led to success in this far corner of the world.

Friedrich Beck was the single most important figure in the transformation of the inept Habsburg military into the modern military state that would wage World War I. He correctly perceived that only an elite body of officers responsible for war planning and preparation could provide lasting security for the Austro-Hungarian empire. After firmly establishing the general staff as an institution, Beck led war planning to counter threats from Russia, Italy, and the Balkans; and spearheaded a vast rebuilding of the rail network. While his rise to power marked a return to the favorite system of military administration of the early Franz Joseph period, Beck proved himself a man with real military ability that revolutionized an army.

Faced with severe budgetary constraints, a radically reduced force structure, and a crippling intellectual dogmatism, the American Infantry struggled throughout the interwar years to modernize its doctrine. Finlayson examines these difficulties, beginning with an overview of the experiences of the primary combatants of the First World War, comparing their battlefield doctrines with that of the American Expeditionary Force. The brief American appearance on the battlefield did much to shape the convictions of those men assigned the task of developing doctrine after the war.

The findings of the post-World War I Superior Board provide valuable insight into how institutional conservatism and the dogmatic approach to new ideas that existed among senior Army leaders stymied possible doctrinal advances. The Army would suffer greatly in the post-war demobilization and the subsequent ravages of the Great Depression. With little money and few soldiers spread around far-flung posts, little advancement in terms of doctrinal development was possible. As the likelihood of war became more imminent in the 1930s, a concerted effort to modernize was made; however, the magnitude of the task made success virtually impossible-a situation that was evident in the Infantry's poor performance in the early battles of the war. The U.S. entry into World war II would, unfortunately, find the infantry branch only partially prepared for the battle field of 1942.

This study argues that guerrilla insurgencies will be a major feature of the post-Cold War international scene, and that the advisability of intervention in some of them will become a serious issue in American politics. Americans therefore need to refine their understanding of insurgency. Anthony James Joes analyzes several major insurgencies of this century, all of which the United States became involved in to one degree or another. While approaching each guerrilla insurgency as a primarily political phenomenon within a definite historical and cultural context, Joes also provides the reader with a clear understanding of the military aspects of such conflicts.

The book deals with a variety of cases, some currently very controversial; provides jargon-free analysis of historical, political, and military factors; challenges some widely cherished views about the potency of third-world nationalism; emphasizes the neglected but often decisive effects of geography; examines the flaws in both the French and the American strategies in Viet Nam; and connects Soviet reverses in Afghanistan with the collapse of their empire in Europe. A major conclusion is that protracted guerrilla insurgency is usually the result of inept government policies; the author outlines a politico-military strategy for bringing an insurgency to an end. Another important conclusion is that our belief in the power of nationalism in insurgencies needs reevaluation. This volume will provide a new perspective for students, teachers, and general readers interested in international affairs, war, and foreign policy.

In spite of the outcome of the Cold War, English argues persuasively here that the nuclear defensive posture adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was inherently flawed. Victory in the Cold War, moreover, seems to have increased the attractiveness of this potentially dangerous model. In fact, NATO's attempts to replace conventional armies with nuclear technology represented a misreading of history inasmuch as war has always been more of a social than technological phenomenon. From his succinct survey of the growth and operations of field armies from medieval times to the Gulf War, English concludes that the legitimately constituted conventional army of the nation-state still remains the best instrument for bringing some semblance of order to the destructive chaos of war.

The development of field armies has involved much more sophistication than generally supposed. In both practice and theory, army operations have been as knowledge-based and intellectually rigorous as any academic discipline, ensuring them an enduring place as a practical means of applying massive force. Fortunately, the NATO attempt to replace conventional armies with nuclear technology was never tested in a real war. But English suggests that the likelihood of deterrence continuing in war, because of its transmutability, also offers hope that it can be controlled in the future, as it was in the past, by social forces. This book offers a longer, more realistic view of war than that normally embraced by technocrats in search of better weapons and peacemakers in search of utopia.

This book also addresses in detail the questions of why armies became so large and why war itself transmutated. The technological transformation of war that occurred after 1815 is discussed, in turn, for the effect it exerted upon the future operations of armies. A novel perspective on the tactical and operational progression of warfighting up to the end of World War II is also provided through an examination of modern defensive theory. On a more elevated plane, the book critically assesses the ways in which nuclear deterrence ultimately affected NATO's defensive posture in central Europe. Also subjected to detailed scrutiny are the theoretical and practical dimensions of ground force concepts for the defense of the NATO central front. Finally, English evaluates ground force operations in the Gulf War with a view to drawing relevant conclusions and lessons for the future.

This book examines both brigandage and irredentism in Greece since the War of Independence, tracing the intimate links between the two, their impact on Greek politics and statecraft, and their influence on the modern Greek state. It also served as a safety device which defused explosive situations. Unable to prevail over illegitimate group violence, the state tried to divert it into two generally acceptable channels - irredentist activity, and the incorporation of brigands into paramilitary units - giving it a semblance of legitimacy and rendering its activities less dangerous to the security of the state. Eventually the characteristics and values of brigandage itself and those who practised it became the predominant features of the modern Greek state and society, albeit wearing a mantle of Western respectability. Based on a wide range ogf sources, this study aims to separate reality from myth in examining the forces and factors involved in turning brigands into national heroes.

This is a comprehensive study of the life of Zebulon Butler, a participant in the French and Indian War, the Revolutionary War, and the intercolonial confrontations known as the Yankee-Pennamite Wars. Butler migrated to Pennsylvania in 1769 and soon became the military and civil leader of the Connecticut settlers in the Wyoming Valley of Northeastern Pennsylvania. During the Revolutionary War, he served in one of the most dangerous theatres of the war--the isolated Susquehanna frontier of Pennsylvania--where the struggling settlers were subject to Indian-Tory attacks and the hostility of the Pennsylvania government. After the war, Butler sought peace with the Pennsylvania authorities and exercised a steadying influence on the Wyoming community. When the longstanding land controversy between Connecticut and Pennsylvania again erupted in civil war and sparked a separate state movement encouraged by Ethan Allen, Butler counseled peace and assisted Timothy Pickering in the establishment of Luzerne County.

A compelling and in-depth history of one of the world's greatest armoured warfare commanders, Hermann Balck (1897-1982). During World War II, Balck commanded panzer troops from the front line and led by example, putting himself in extreme danger when rallying his soldiers to surge forward. He fought battles that were masterpieces of tactical operations, utilizing speed, surprise and a remarkable ability to motivate his men to achieve what they considered to be impossible. We follow his journey through the fields of France, mountains of Greece and steppes of Russia. In Greece, through flair and innovative leadership, his soldiers overcame every obstacle to defeat determined Australian and New Zealand soldiers defending the narrow mountain passes. Balck personally led his men to victory in battles at Platamon Ridge on the Aegean coast and in the Vale of Tempe, before entering Athens. This is also the story of a cultured and complex man with a great love of antiquity and classical literature, who nevertheless willingly fought for Hitler's Third Reich while remaining strangely detached from the horrors around him. The book is the result of extensive research of primary and secondary sources, including Balck's battle reports and first-hand accounts written by Allied soldiers who opposed him, panzer division war diaries and campaign assessments, and declassified Pentagon documents.

A meticulously documented challenge to previous views about the extent and effectiveness of Confederate manpower in the last year of the Civil War.

For more than one hundred twenty-five years virtually every history book in print has contended that no white man survived the Battle of the Little Bighorn, where Custer made his famous "last stand." This book provides compelling proof that at least one member of the Seventh Cavalry, a man named William Heath, did indeed escape. In this intriguing analysis of hitherto neglected historical documents, Vincent J. Genovese provides verifiable evidence that dispels the long-held myth that none of Custer's soldiers survived the massacre that took place in Montana on June 25, 1876.
Genovese chronicles the life of this "Lazarus of the Little Bighorn," who joined the army at age 27 after fleeing from Pennsylvania under threats on his life. Documents show that Billy Heath lived in a small coal-mining town in Pennsylvania and that he enlisted in the Seventh Cavalry in 1875, not long before the fateful battle. Further, U.S. Army records verify that he was one of the soldiers at the Little Bighorn. His name also appears on a list of those killed in action and is inscribed on the official monument that stands at the battle site.
What makes Genovese's contribution to the history of this famous event so interesting are public records that he here introduces, which show indisputably that William Heath lived on for fourteen more years after the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Birth records from his hometown in Schuylkill County, PA, indicate that he fathered seven children before dying in obscurity. His gravestone still exists in the local cemetery.
This is a unique and fascinating re-evaluation of a storied event in American history, which will surely provoke controversy.

War in the post-9/11 world is far different from what we expected it be. Counterinsurgency and protracted guerrilla warfare, not shock and awe, are the order of the day. David Kilcullen is the world's foremost expert on this way of war, and in The Accidental Guerrilla, the Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General David Petraeus in Iraq surveys war as it is actually fought in the contemporary world. Colouring his account with gripping battlefield experiences that range from the jungles and highlands of South and Southeast Asia to the mountains of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to the dusty towns of the Middle East and the horn of Africa, The Accidental Guerrilla will, quite simply, change the way we think about war. While conventional warfare has obvious limits, Kilcullen also stresses that neither counterterrorism nor traditional counterinsurgency is the appropriate framework to fight the enemy we now face. Certainly, traditional counterinsurgency is more effective than counterterrorism when it comes to entities like Al Qaeda, but as Kilcullen contends, our current focus is far too narrow, for it tends to emphasize one geographical region and one state. The current war presents a much different situation: stateless insurgents and terrorists operating across large number of countries and only loosely affiliated with each other.

During the brutal and destructive King Philip's War, the New England Indians combined new European weaponry with their traditional use of stealth, surprise, and mobility.