Faced with severe budgetary constraints, a radically reduced
force structure, and a crippling intellectual dogmatism, the
American Infantry struggled throughout the interwar years to
modernize its doctrine. Finlayson examines these difficulties,
beginning with an overview of the experiences of the primary
combatants of the First World War, comparing their battlefield
doctrines with that of the American Expeditionary Force. The brief
American appearance on the battlefield did much to shape the
convictions of those men assigned the task of developing doctrine
after the war.
The findings of the post-World War I Superior Board provide
valuable insight into how institutional conservatism and the
dogmatic approach to new ideas that existed among senior Army
leaders stymied possible doctrinal advances. The Army would suffer
greatly in the post-war demobilization and the subsequent ravages
of the Great Depression. With little money and few soldiers spread
around far-flung posts, little advancement in terms of doctrinal
development was possible. As the likelihood of war became more
imminent in the 1930s, a concerted effort to modernize was made;
however, the magnitude of the task made success virtually
impossible-a situation that was evident in the Infantry's poor
performance in the early battles of the war. The U.S. entry into
World war II would, unfortunately, find the infantry branch only
partially prepared for the battle field of 1942.
General
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