The last two decades changed the post-Soviet legal orders both quantitatively and qualitatively in such a manner, which can rarely be experienced in history. Though some of its aspects have already been analyzed, a comprehensive study of one of these legal orders in English is still missing. This volume attempts to fill this gap by analyzing the transformation of the Hungarian legal order between 1985 and 2005. It attempts to present the transformation of the Hungarian legal order from three different aspects. Firstly, it analyzes concrete legal questions, like the constitutional problems of accession to the European Union, dealing with the past, the status law, the development of minority protection, and the relationship between international and municipal law. Secondly, it tries to give a general theoretical overview on the last 20 years -- in the issues of law and politics, law and economy, legitimacy of the Constitution, law importation, culture and European integration, changes in legal thinking, and sociological and criminological characteristics of the transitions. Thirdly, it takes account of changes in the established areas of Hungarian legal science -- like constitutional law, agricultural law, criminal law, criminal procedure, consumer protection, environmental law, administrative law, financial law, civil law, civil procedure and social law.

Since America's founding, the U.S. Supreme Court had issued a vast number of decisions on a staggeringly wide variety of subjects. And hundreds of judges have occupied the bench. Yet as Cass R. Sunstein, the eminent legal scholar and bestselling co-author of Nudge, points out, almost every one of the Justices fits into a very small number of types regardless of ideology: the hero, the soldier, the minimalist, and the mute. Heroes are willing to invoke the Constitution to invalidate state laws, federal legislation, and prior Court decisions. They loudly embrace first principles and are prone to flair, employing dramatic language to fundamentally reshape the law. Soldiers, on the other hand, are skeptical of judicial power, and typically defer to decisions made by the political branches. Minimalists favor small steps and only incremental change. They worry that bold reversals of long-established traditions may be counterproductive, producing a backlash that only leads to another reversal. Mutes would rather say nothing at all about the big constitutional issues, and instead tend to decide cases on narrow grounds or keep controversial cases out of the Court altogether by denying standing. As Sunstein shows, many of the most important constitutional debates are in fact contests between the four Personae. Whether the issue involves slavery, gender equality, same-sex marriage, executive power, surveillance, or freedom of speech, debates have turned on choices made among the four Personae-choices that derive as much from psychology as constitutional theory. Sunstein himself defends a form of minimalism, arguing that it is the best approach in a self-governing society of free people. More broadly, he casts a genuinely novel light on longstanding disputes over the proper way to interpret the constitution, demonstrating that behind virtually every decision and beneath all of the abstract theory lurk the four Personae. By emphasizing the centrality of character types, Sunstein forces us to rethink everything we know about how the Supreme Court works.

This is a useful introduction to Roman law with a level of detail that falls midway between an outline and a textbook. Carefully organized, it is also an excellent reference guide, and includes marriage and family law, slavery, adoption, successions, ownership. "To begin with, it is quite comprehensive, for there is not a single principle of Roman law, sufficiently important to be included in first-year study, which the author has omitted.... L]egal principles and definitions are very concisely stated, and a lecturer on the subject will be glad to find an important rule given in such brief, almost epigrammatic form, that it can be readily committed to memory. (...) Another good feature is the practice of frequently citing the original Latin phrases and sentences.... Lastly, the translator has provided a good index, which is a valuable addition to the original work. We are sure that many teachers of Roman law will welcome this book as a manual to be placed in the hands of their students." Columbia Law Review 7 (1907) 377-378. ABRIDGED CONTENTS BOOK I. History of the Roman Law Division Title I. First Period - Legendary Period Title II. Second Period - Historic Republican Period Title III. Third Period - The Imperial Duarchy Title IV. Fourth Period - The True Monarchy Title V. Fifth Period - The Later Empire - Justinian BOOK II. Persons Title I. Preliminary Conceptions Title II. Status Libertatis Title III. Status Civitatis Title IV. Status Familiae V. Incapacities of Fact BOOK III. Things Title I. Division of Things Title II. Summary Notions as to Obligations BOOK IV. Actions Title I. General and Historical Notions - The Courts Title II. Systems of Procedure BOOK V. Ownership Title I. Attributes and Evolution of Ownership Title II. Possession Title III. Different Kinds of Ownership Title IV. Sanction for the Right of Ownership Title V. Modes of Acquiring Ownership Title VI. Extinction of the Right of Ownership Title VII. Civil and Praetorian Dismemberments of the Right of Ownership BOOK VI. Successions Title I. Succession in General - Instruction of the Heir Title II. Conditions for the Validity of Wills Title III. Intestate Succession Title IV. Acceptance and Disclaimer of the Inheritance Title V. Fideicommissa Hereditatis Title VI. Actions Concerning the Hereditas BOOK VII. Donationes Inter Vivos and Mortis Causa Division

Facsimile edition. Volume II.

WITH one important exception the three volumes here published practically represent the whole mass of Maitland's scattered writing. A few very short notices have been omitted, but wherever an article, however brief, contains a new grain of historical knowledge or reveals Maitland's original thought upon some problem of law or history, it has been included in this collection.

We begin with a philosophical dissertation submitted by a young Cambridge graduate to the examiners for a Trinity Fellowship and end with the tribute to the memory of a pupil composed only a few days before his last illness by a great master of history, by one of the greatest scholars in the annals of English scholarship.

These papers cover a wide surface. Some are philosophical, others biographical, but for the most part they belong to Maitland's special sphere of legal and social history. Some pieces are confessedly popular, such as the brilliant outline of English legal history which concludes the second volume; others, and of such is the bulk of the collection, are concerned with problems the simplest terms of which are not apprehended without special study.

The Decretum Gratiani is the cornerstone of medieval canon law, and the manuscript St Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, 673 an essential witness to its evolution. The studies in this volume focus on that manuscript, providing critical insights into its genesis, linguistic features, and use of Roman Law, while evaluating its attraction to medieval readers and modern scholars. Together, these studies offer a fascinating view on the evolution of the Decretum Gratiani, as well as granting new insights on the complex dynamics and processes by which legal knowledge was first created and then transferred in medieval jurisprudence. Contributors are Enrique de Leon, Stephan Dusil, Melodie H. Eichbauer, Atria A. Larson, Titus Lenherr, Philipp Lenz, Kenneth Pennington, Andreas Thier, Jose Miguel Viejo-Ximenez, John C. Wei, and Anders Winroth.

In a stinging dissent to a 1961 Supreme Court decision that allowed the Illinois state bar to deny admission to prospective lawyers if they refused to answer political questions, Justice Hugo Black closed with the memorable line, "We must not be afraid to be free." Black saw the First Amendment as the foundation of American freedom--the guarantor of all other Constitutional rights. Yet since free speech is by nature unruly, people fear it. The impulse to curb or limit it has been a constant danger throughout American history.
In We Must Not Be Afraid to Be Free, Ron Collins and Sam Chaltain, two noted free speech scholars and activists, provide authoritative and vivid portraits of free speech in modern America. The authors offer a series of engaging accounts of landmark First Amendment cases, including bitterly contested cases concerning loyalty oaths, hate speech, flag burning, student anti-war protests, and McCarthy-era prosecutions. The book also describes the colorful people involved in each case--the judges, attorneys, and defendants--and the issues at stake. Tracing the development of free speech rights from a more restrictive era--the early twentieth century--through the Warren Court revolution of the 1960s and beyond, Collins and Chaltain not only cover the history of a cherished ideal, but also explain in accessible language how the law surrounding this ideal has changed over time.
Essential for anyone interested in this most fundamental of our rights, We Must Not Be Afraid to Be Free provides a definitive and lively account of our First Amendment and the price courageous Americans have paid to secure them.