Khadduri presents a lucid analysis of classical Islamic doctrine concerning war and peace and its adaptation to modern conditions. Working primarily with original Muslim sources, he examines the nature of the Islamic state, Islamic law and the influence of Western law.Other chapters consider classical Muslim attitudes toward foreign policy, international trade, warfare, treaties and how these have developed during the twentieth century. Majid Khadduri 1909-2007] was a Professor of Middle East Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University and Director of Research and Education at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D. C. He was the author of several books in English and Arabic on Middle Eastern affairs. Contents: Fundamental Concepts of Muslim Law I Theory of the State II Nature and Sources of Law III The Muslim Law of Nations The Law of War IV Introduction V The Doctrine of the Jihad VI Types of Jihad VII Military Methods VIII The Initiation of War IX Land Warfare X Maritime Warfare XI Spoils of War XII Termination of Fighting The Law of Peace XIII Introduction XIV Jurisdiction XV Foreigners in Muslim Territory: Harbis and Musta'mins XVI Muslims in Non-Muslim Territory XVII Status of the Dhimmis XVIII Treaties XIX Commercial Relations XX Arbitration XXI Diplomacy XXII Neutrality XXIII Epilogue Glossary of Terms Bibliography Index

From the Celebrated Four-language Edition of the Nakaz. A major document of the Enlightenment, the Nakaz, or Instruction, composed by Catherine the Great served to guide the assembly summoned in 1766 to draft a new code of laws for the Russian Empire. Drawn from Montesquieu, Rousseau, and other Enlightenment thinkers, the Nakaz condemned torture and capital punishment and endorsed such principles as the equality of all before the law. Published in the principal European tongues, it proved to be a statement to the world as much as a practical legal text. The present edition contains the Russian, French, German, Latin, and two contemporary English translations, biographical notes, and a bibliography. William E. Butler is the John Edward Fowler Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of the Vinogradoff Institute at the Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law and Emeritus Professor of Comparative Law at University College London; Academician of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences. Vladimir A. Tomsinov is the Head of the Chair of the History of State and Law, Moscow Lomonosov State University.

In this provocative new study, Iain McLean argues that the traditional story of the British constitution does not make sense. It purports to be both positive and normative: that is, to describe both how people actually behave and how they ought to behave. In fact, it fails to do either; it is not a correct description and it has no persuasive force. The book goes on to offer a reasoned alternative.
The position that still dominates the field of constitutional law is that of parliamentary sovereignty (or supremacy). According to this view, the supreme lawgiver in the United Kingdom is Parliament. Some writers in this tradition go on to insist that Parliament in turn derives its authority from the people, because the people elect Parliament. An obvious problem with this view is that Parliament, to a lawyer, comprises three houses: monarch, Lords, and Commons. The people elect only one of those three houses.
This book aims to show, contrary to the prevailing view, that the UK exists by virtue of a constitutional contract between two previously independent states. Professor McLean argues that the work of the influential constitutional theorist A.V. Dicey has little to offer those who really want to understand the nature of the constitution. Instead, greater understanding can be gleaned from considering the 'veto plays' and 'credible threats' available to politicians since 1707. He suggests that the idea that the people are sovereign dates back to the 17th century (maybe the 14th in Scotland), but has gone underground in English constitutional writing. He goes on to show that devolution and the UK's relationship with the rest of Europe have taken the UK along a constitutionalist road since 1972, and perhaps since 1920. He concludes that no intellectually defensible case can be made for retaining an unelected house of Parliament, an unelected head of state, or an established church.
The book will be essential reading for political scientists, constitutional lawyers, historians, and politicians alike.

Norms beyond Empire seeks to rethink the relationship between law and empire by emphasizing the role of local normative production. While European imperialism is often viewed as being able to shape colonial law and government to its image, this volume argues that early modern empires could never monolithically control how these processes unfolded. Examining the Iberian empires in Asia, it seeks to look at norms as a means of escaping the often too narrow concept of law and look beyond empire to highlight the ways in which law-making and local normativities frequently acted beyond colonial rule. The ten chapters explore normative production from this perspective by focusing on case studies from China, India, Japan, and the Philippines. Contributors are: Manuel Bastias Saavedra, Marya Svetlana T. Camacho, Luisa Stella de Oliveira Coutinho Silva, Romulo da Silva Ehalt, Patricia Souza de Faria, Fupeng Li, Miguel Rodrigues Lourenco, Abisai Perez Zamarripa, Marina Torres Trimallez, and Angela Barreto Xavier.

How did people solve their disputes over debt, compensation, inheritance and other civil matters in early China? Did they go to court? How did the authorities view those problems? Using recently excavated early Chinese legal materials, Zhang Zhaoyang makes the compelling argument that civil law was not only developed, but also acquired a certain degree of sophistication during the Qin and Han dynasties. The state promulgated detailed regulations to deal with economic and personal relationships between individuals. The authorities formed an integral part of the formal justice system, and heard civil cases on a regular basis.