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Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Metaphysics & ontology
Drawing on evidence from a wide range of classical Chinese texts,
this book argues that xingershangxue, the study of "beyond form",
constitutes the core argument and intellectual foundation of Daoist
philosophy. The author presents Daoist xingershangxue as a typical
concept of metaphysics distinct from that of the natural philosophy
and metaphysics of ancient Greece since it focusses on
understanding the world beyond perceivable objects and phenomena as
well as names that are definable in their social, political, or
moral structures. In comparison with other philosophical traditions
in the East and West, the book discusses the ideas of dao, de, and
"spontaneously self-so", which shows Daoist xingershangxue's
theoretical tendency to transcendence. The author explains the
differences between Daoist philosophy and ancient Greek philosophy
and proposes that Daoist philosophy is the study of xingershangxue
in nature, providing a valuable resource for scholars interested in
Chinese philosophy, Daoism, and comparative philosophy.
In this book Christopher Belshaw draws on earlier work concerning
death, identity, animals, immortality, and extinction, and builds a
large-scale argument dealing with questions of both value and
meaning. Rejecting suggestions that life is sacred or intrinsically
valuable, he argues instead that its value varies, and varies
considerably, both within and between different kinds of things. So
in some cases we might have reason to improve or save a life, while
in others that reason will be lacking. What about starting lives?
The book's central section takes this as its focus, and asks
whether we ever have reason to start lives, just for the sake of
the one whose life it is. Not only is it denied that there is any
such reason, but some sympathy is afforded to the anti-natalist
contention that there is always reason against. The final chapters
deal with meaning. There is support here for the sober and familiar
view that meaning derives from an enthusiasm for, and some success
with, the pursuit of worthwhile projects. Now suppose we are
immortal. Or suppose, in contrast, that we face imminent
extinction. Would either of these threaten meaning? The claim is
made that the force of such threats is often exaggerated. The Value
and Meaning of Life is essential reading for students and
researchers in philosophy, ethics, and religion, and will be of
interest to all those concerned with how to live, and how to think
about the lives of others.
Phenomenology has primarily been concerned with questions about
knowledge and ontology. However, in recent years the rise of
interest and research in phenomenology and embodiment, the emotions
and cognitive science has seen the concept of agency move to a
central place in the study of phenomenology generally. The
Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency is an outstanding
reference source to this topic and the first volume of its kind. It
comprises twenty-seven chapters written by leading international
contributors. Organised into two parts, the following key topics
are covered: * major figures * the metaphysics of agency *
rationality * voluntary and involuntary action * moral experience *
deliberation and choice * phenomenology of agency and the cognitive
sciences * phenomenology of freedom * embodied agency Essential
reading for students and researchers in phenomenology, philosophy
of mind, metaphysics and philosophy of cognitive science The
Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency will also be of
interest to those in closely related subjects such as sociology and
psychology.
In this book Christopher Belshaw draws on earlier work concerning
death, identity, animals, immortality, and extinction, and builds a
large-scale argument dealing with questions of both value and
meaning. Rejecting suggestions that life is sacred or intrinsically
valuable, he argues instead that its value varies, and varies
considerably, both within and between different kinds of things. So
in some cases we might have reason to improve or save a life, while
in others that reason will be lacking. What about starting lives?
The book's central section takes this as its focus, and asks
whether we ever have reason to start lives, just for the sake of
the one whose life it is. Not only is it denied that there is any
such reason, but some sympathy is afforded to the anti-natalist
contention that there is always reason against. The final chapters
deal with meaning. There is support here for the sober and familiar
view that meaning derives from an enthusiasm for, and some success
with, the pursuit of worthwhile projects. Now suppose we are
immortal. Or suppose, in contrast, that we face imminent
extinction. Would either of these threaten meaning? The claim is
made that the force of such threats is often exaggerated. The Value
and Meaning of Life is essential reading for students and
researchers in philosophy, ethics, and religion, and will be of
interest to all those concerned with how to live, and how to think
about the lives of others.
This book reassesses Gadamer's hermeneutics by bringing it into a
dialogue with John McDowell's minimal empiricism. It employs the
resources of McDowell's minimal empiricism to address the
transcendental and ontological presuppositions for objective
experience and understanding, while retaining Gadamer's emphasis on
the historicity of understanding. By means of the dialogue with
McDowell, the book develops a hermeneutical conception of
objectivity and perceptual experience, which also entails
reinterpretations of Gadamer's notions of tradition, practical
wisdom and meaning. The book explores the philosophical space
beyond the analytic-Continental divide and demonstrates that
hermeneutics is not limited to a reflection on understanding as it
is practiced in the human sciences, but can be revived as a
distinct and cogent philosophical approach with a transcendental
and ontological dimension. Thaning's book is a richly detailed,
well-argued and coherent presentation of a defensible, and
potentially very important, philosophical position. It demonstrates
an impressively deep understanding of the literature both from the
phenomenological tradition and from the part of the analytical
tradition, inspired by Wilfred Sellars, to which John McDowell
belongs. Being a substantial philosophical achievement in its own
right, the book raises far-reaching questions that will be of
interest to a wide audience. Dr. Steven Crowell, Rice University,
Houston (USA) Morten Thaning's book is an important contribution to
the discourse of philosophical hermeneutics. Thaning extensively
discusses a topic, which recent debates have touched upon, but
which up to now has not been the subject matter of concentrated
scholarly work: the relation between Gadamer's hermeneutics and
McDowell's empiricism. With Thaning's interpretation Gadamer' work
can be read anew as concerning the problem of hermeneutical
objectivity. Prof. Dr. Gunter Figal, University of Freiburg
(Germany)
The American University Publications In From its inception
Philosophy has continued the direction stated in the sub-title of
the initial volume that of probing new directions in philosophy. As
the series has developed these probings of new directions have
taken the two fold direction of exploring the relationships between
the disparate traditions of twentieth century philosophy and with
developing new insights into the foundations of some enduring
philosophic problems. This present volume continues both of these
directions. The interaction between twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon
and Continental philosophy which was an implicit theme of our first
and third volumes and the explicit subject of our second volume is
here continued in a series of studies on major figures and topics
in each tradition. In the context of these interpretative studies,
Professor Durfee returns again and again to the question of the
relationships between the will and the reason, and explores the
conflicting goals of creativity and objectivity in formulating a
philosophic position. In so doing he raises the issue as his title
suggests - of the foundations of philosophy itself. He seriously
challenges the belief common to both pheomenology and analytic
philosophy that philosophizing can be a presuppositionless
activity, objectively persued independent of the personal (and,
perhaps, arbitrary) commitments of the philosopher. This issue,
critical as it is to all forms of philosophy, is surely a worthy
one for a series such as ours."
The importance of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in the
history of philosophy is matched only by its difficulty. In
particular, readers are often frustrated by how difficult it is to
extract Kant's arguments from his dense prose. This book
reconstructs, using the tools of propositional logic, the central
arguments of the Critique. In all, the book reconstructs thirty-six
of Kant's arguments spanning the Transcendental Aesthetic,
Transcendental Analytic, and Transcendental Dialectic. For each
argument, they begin with a quote from Kant's text followed by a
synopsis that explains the argument informally. Finally, each
synopsis is followed by a formal reconstruction of the argument.
The synopses offer examples, metaphors, historical background, and
objections/responses to aid the reader in appreciating Kant's
arguments. Even though many readers who approach Kant for the first
time have a good philosophical vocabulary, few will understand
Kant's unique lexicon. In addition to formally reconstructing
Kant's arguments, the book also includes a glossary that defines
the technical terms that Kant uses in his arguments. Finally, since
this book is directed largely at students, Bryan Hall enlisted two
of his own students to ensure that the book is maximally student
friendly. In contrast to most pedagogical philosophical literature,
the content of this book has been tailored by students for
students.
This book presents a philosophical study of the idea of
reenchantment and its merits in the interrelated fields of
philosophical anthropology, ethics, and ontology. It features
chapters from leading contributors to the debate about
reenchantment, including Charles Taylor, John Cottingham, Akeel
Bilgrami, and Jane Bennett. The chapters examine neglected and
contested notions such as enchantment, transcendence,
interpretation, attention, resonance, and the sacred or
reverence-worthy-notions that are crucial to human
self-understanding but have no place in a scientific worldview.
They also explore the significance of adopting a reenchanting
perspective for debates on major concepts such as nature,
naturalism, God, ontology, and disenchantment. Taken together, they
demonstrate that there is much to be gained from working with a
more substantial and affirmative concept of reenchantment,
understood as a fundamental existential orientation towards what is
seen as meaningful and of value. The Philosophy of Reenchantment
will be of interest to scholars and advanced students in
philosophy-especially those working in moral philosophy,
metaphysics, philosophy of religion, theology, religious studies,
and sociology.
This book explores the important yet neglected relationship between
the philosophy of time and the temporal structure of perceptual
experience. It examines how time structures perceptual experience
and, through that structuring, the ways in which time makes
perceptual experience trustworthy or erroneous. Sean Power argues
that our understanding of time can determine our understanding of
perceptual experience in relation to perceptual structure and
perceptual error. He examines the general conditions under which an
experience may be sorted into different kinds of error such as
illusions, hallucinations, and anosognosia. Power also argues that
some theories of time are better than others at giving an account
of the structure and errors of perceptual experience. He makes the
case that tenseless theory and eternalism more closely correspond
to experience than tense theory and presentism. Finally, the book
includes a discussion of the perceptual experience of space and how
tenseless theory and eternalism can better support the problematic
theory of naive realism. Philosophy of Time and Perceptual
Experience originally illustrates how the metaphysics of time can
be usefully applied to thinking about experience in general. It
will appeal to those interested in the philosophy of time and
debates about the trustworthiness of experience.
Originally published in 1937. This book addresses the importance of
the theory of values that rests on a general metaphysical
understanding founded on a comprehensive view of all aspects of the
world. The author speaks against the absolutist theories with a
realistic one encompassing a theory of space and time and
considering value as an object of immediate intuition. These great
philosophical questions feed into discussions of the philosophy of
religion and of science. Garnett distinguishes between spiritual
and other values on the ground that the spiritual values are not
subjective to satiety, while other values are. He contends that our
knowledge of mind is as direct and reliable as our knowledge of the
physical world. This is an important early book by an influential
20th Century thinker.
Originally published in 1989. In this interdisciplinary study, Dr
Levin offers an account of personal growth and self-fulfilment
based on the development of our capacity for listening. This book
should be of interest to advanced students of critical theory,
psychology, cultural studies, ethics, continental philosophy,
ontology, metaphysics.
Originally published in 1947. This book looks at contemporary
conundrums in philosophical tendencies, bringing the reader a
first-principles review of the purpose of such enquiries in
relation to modern life. It presents the importance of the history
of the development of philosophical thought, beginning in Part 1
with perception. Significant definitions and theories are
identified and later refinements discussed - in particular
conceptualism and its development from the Greeks through Berkeley
to modern realism and its limitations and critiques. Part 2 brings
problems identified by past thinkersto the fore, from Plato's forms
to Christian theology, in an examination of the apparent dichotomy
between metaphysics and scientific methods. Part 3 examines the
Rationalist and the Empiricist attacks on Scepticism and Kant's
reconciliation of the differences of both. This provides the
context and structure for discussion of the works of Hegel, and
ultimate refutation thereof as a confusion between metaphysics and
theology. Part 4 identifies the developments in thinking of
Positivism, both Modern and Logical, and the New Synthesis of
Alexander and Whitehead as the most recent approach.
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