Natural kinds is a widely used and pivotal concept in philosophy - the idea being that the classifications and taxonomies employed by science correspond to the real kinds in nature. Natural kinds are often opposed to the idea of kinds in the human and social sciences, which are typically seen as social constructions, characterised by changing norms and resisting scientific reduction. Yet human beings are also a subject of scientific study.Does this mean humans fall into corresponding kinds of their own? In The Epistemology and Morality of Human Kinds Marion Godman defends the idea of human kinds. She first examines the scientific use and nature of human kinds, considering the arguments of key philosophers whose work bears upon human kinds, such as Ian Hacking, John Searle, Richard Boyd and Ruth Millikan. Using the examples of gender, ethnic minorities and Buddhism she then argues that human kinds are a result of ongoing historical reproduction, chiefly due to pre-existing cultural models and social learning. Her novel argument shifts the focus away from the reductionism characteristic of research about human kinds. Instead, sheargues that they are "multiply projectable" and deserving of scientific study not in spite of, but because of their role in explaining our identity, injusticeand the emergence of group rights.

The relationship between mind and reality is usually perceived as an event that takes place in reality and producing simultaneously an internal image in the mind. So it takes place twice, so to speak, and there is a one-to-one correspondence between the two events. Within this conception, matter is embedded in space and time, and can be designated as "container-principle". This monograph emphasizes that the well-known philosopher Immanuel Kant denied this principle and he stated that reality is principally not recognizable to a human being, and modern biological evolution seems to lead exactly to Kant's point of view. Within the theory of evolution, man's image about reality in mind does not have to be complete and true in the sense of a precise reproduction, and it is relatively easy to recognize that even space and time should not be elements of reality outside. Within this conception, only a certain part of reality, which the human being needs for mastering life, is projected onto space and time, and we come to the so-called "projection principle". Then, spacetime defines the window to reality, leading to a number of exciting and essential questions, some of which are discussed in this monograph.As is known, current physics is mainly based on the container-principle. But this monograph proposes that the projection principle is obviously more suitable and could help to solve open-ended questions as, for example, in connection with the nature of time, the particle-wave duality, the cosmological constant, etc. Regarding the statistical behavior of matter, Einstein's statement "God does not play dice" has to be seen in a new light, but also Feynman's general viewpoint on quantum theory that it cannot be understood by man. However, conventional quantum theory is obviously not a consistent framework as per the projection principle. The term "world equation" is critically probed in this monograph.

In the most rigorous articulation of his philosophical system to date, Slavoj Zizek provides nothing short of a new definition of dialectical materialism. In forging this new materialism, Zizek critiques and challenges not only the work of Alain Badiou, Robert Brandom, Joan Copjec, Quentin Meillassoux, and Julia Kristeva (to name but a few), but everything from popular science and quantum mechanics to sexual difference and analytic philosophy. Alongside striking images of the Moebius strip, the cross-cap, and the Klein bottle, Zizek brings alive the Hegelian triad of being-essence-notion. Radical new readings of Hegel, and Kant, sit side by side with characteristically lively commentaries on film, politics, and culture. Here is Zizek at his interrogative best.

Drawing on evidence from a wide range of classical Chinese texts, this book argues that xingershangxue, the study of "beyond form", constitutes the core argument and intellectual foundation of Daoist philosophy. The author presents Daoist xingershangxue as a typical concept of metaphysics distinct from that of the natural philosophy and metaphysics of ancient Greece since it focusses on understanding the world beyond perceivable objects and phenomena as well as names that are definable in their social, political, or moral structures. In comparison with other philosophical traditions in the East and West, the book discusses the ideas of dao, de, and "spontaneously self-so", which shows Daoist xingershangxue's theoretical tendency to transcendence. The author explains the differences between Daoist philosophy and ancient Greek philosophy and proposes that Daoist philosophy is the study of xingershangxue in nature, providing a valuable resource for scholars interested in Chinese philosophy, Daoism, and comparative philosophy.

Metaphysics: The Basics is a concise and engaging introduction to the philosophical study of some of the most important and foundational aspects of the world in which we live. Concerned with questions about existence, time, identity, change, and other basic elements of our common-sense and scientific ways of thinking about the world, metaphysics has long fascinated people. But to the uninitiated, many of the issues and problems can appear bewilderingly complex and intractable. In this lively and lucid book, Michael Rea examines and explains the core questions in the study of metaphysics-questions such as: What is the relationship between an object and its properties, or between an object and its parts? What is time, and is time travel possible? Are human beings free? What is it for an object or person to persist over time? This second edition has been thoroughly revised and includes a new chapter on the metaphysics of gender. With suggestions for further reading and a glossary of key terms, Metaphysics: The Basics is an ideal introduction for those coming to the subject for the first time.

The relationship between mind and reality is usually perceived as an event that takes place in reality and producing simultaneously an internal image in the mind. So it takes place twice, so to speak, and there is a one-to-one correspondence between the two events. Within this conception, matter is embedded in space and time, and can be designated as "container-principle". This monograph emphasizes that the well-known philosopher Immanuel Kant denied this principle and he stated that reality is principally not recognizable to a human being, and modern biological evolution seems to lead exactly to Kant's point of view. Within the theory of evolution, man's image about reality in mind does not have to be complete and true in the sense of a precise reproduction, and it is relatively easy to recognize that even space and time should not be elements of reality outside. Within this conception, only a certain part of reality, which the human being needs for mastering life, is projected onto space and time, and we come to the so-called "projection principle". Then, spacetime defines the window to reality, leading to a number of exciting and essential questions, some of which are discussed in this monograph.As is known, current physics is mainly based on the container-principle. But this monograph proposes that the projection principle is obviously more suitable and could help to solve open-ended questions as, for example, in connection with the nature of time, the particle-wave duality, the cosmological constant, etc. Regarding the statistical behavior of matter, Einstein's statement "God does not play dice" has to be seen in a new light, but also Feynman's general viewpoint on quantum theory that it cannot be understood by man. However, conventional quantum theory is obviously not a consistent framework as per the projection principle. The term "world equation" is critically probed in this monograph.

There has been a resurgence of interest in the problem of realism, the idea that the world exists in the way it does independently of the mind, within contemporary Continental philosophy. Many, if not most, of those writing on the topic demonstrates attitudes that range from mild skepticism to outright hostility. Richard Sebold argues that the problem with this is that realism is correct and that the question should then become: what happens to Continental philosophy if it is committed to the denial of a true doctrine? Sebold outlines the reasons why realism is superior to anti-realism and shows how Continental philosophical arguments against realism fail. Focusing on the work of four important philosophers, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Husserl, all of who have had a profound influence on more recent thinkers, he provides alternative ways of interpreting their apparently anti-realist sentiments and demonstrates that the insights of these Continental philosophers are nevertheless valuable, despite their problematic metaphysical beliefs.

In this book Christopher Belshaw draws on earlier work concerning death, identity, animals, immortality, and extinction, and builds a large-scale argument dealing with questions of both value and meaning. Rejecting suggestions that life is sacred or intrinsically valuable, he argues instead that its value varies, and varies considerably, both within and between different kinds of things. So in some cases we might have reason to improve or save a life, while in others that reason will be lacking. What about starting lives? The book's central section takes this as its focus, and asks whether we ever have reason to start lives, just for the sake of the one whose life it is. Not only is it denied that there is any such reason, but some sympathy is afforded to the anti-natalist contention that there is always reason against. The final chapters deal with meaning. There is support here for the sober and familiar view that meaning derives from an enthusiasm for, and some success with, the pursuit of worthwhile projects. Now suppose we are immortal. Or suppose, in contrast, that we face imminent extinction. Would either of these threaten meaning? The claim is made that the force of such threats is often exaggerated. The Value and Meaning of Life is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy, ethics, and religion, and will be of interest to all those concerned with how to live, and how to think about the lives of others.

In this book Christopher Belshaw draws on earlier work concerning death, identity, animals, immortality, and extinction, and builds a large-scale argument dealing with questions of both value and meaning. Rejecting suggestions that life is sacred or intrinsically valuable, he argues instead that its value varies, and varies considerably, both within and between different kinds of things. So in some cases we might have reason to improve or save a life, while in others that reason will be lacking. What about starting lives? The book's central section takes this as its focus, and asks whether we ever have reason to start lives, just for the sake of the one whose life it is. Not only is it denied that there is any such reason, but some sympathy is afforded to the anti-natalist contention that there is always reason against. The final chapters deal with meaning. There is support here for the sober and familiar view that meaning derives from an enthusiasm for, and some success with, the pursuit of worthwhile projects. Now suppose we are immortal. Or suppose, in contrast, that we face imminent extinction. Would either of these threaten meaning? The claim is made that the force of such threats is often exaggerated. The Value and Meaning of Life is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy, ethics, and religion, and will be of interest to all those concerned with how to live, and how to think about the lives of others.

Believing that humanity would be better off if it simply dropped its traditional religious and metaphysical beliefs, Richard Rorty proposes an alternative approach, drawn from the American pragmatist tradition, where things get their significance against a background of broad human interests, and knowledge is regarded as part of the active pursuit of a better world. Rorty, Religion, and Metaphysics argues that while Rorty's case is clearly and robustly made, it is fundamentally challenged by the phenomenon of human recognition, the relationship that arises between people when they talk to one another. John Owens demonstrates that recognition, so central to human life, cannot be accommodated within Rorty's proposals, given that it precisely attributes a reality to others that goes beyond anything a pragmatist framework can offer. It follows that there is more to human interaction than can be explained by Rorty's pragmatism.

Roman Ingarden (1893-1970) belonged to those phenomenologists who never accepted Husserl's transcendental idealism. He devoted a great part of his intellectual energy to the "preparatory" analytical studies in which he hoped to develop an ontological framework suitable for an ultimate refutation of Husserl's idealistic doctrine. In these works we find a rich arsenal of ontological tools which is interesting even for those philosophers who are not interested in the subtleties of the Husserlian tradition or esoteric dialectics of the idealism / realism debate. Contributors: Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (Szczecin and Salzburg), Gregor Haefliger (Fribourg), Guido Kung (Fribourg), Jeff Mitscherling (Guelph), Andrzej Poltawski (Cracow), Peter Simons (Leeds), Edward Swiderski (Fribourg), Amie L. Thomasson (Miami), Daniel von Wachter (Munich)."

Philosophical genealogy is a distinct method of historical and philosophical inquiry that was developed by the nineteenth-century philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, and subsequently adopted and extended by the twentieth-century philosopher, Michel Foucault. In brief, genealogies critically examine the historical origin of philosophical concepts, ideas and practices. They challenge the value of traditional methods of philosophical inquiry along with the results that these inquiries produce. Philosophical Genealogy Volume I: An Epistemological Reconstruction of the Genealogical Method explored the three axes of the genealogical method: power, truth and the ethical. In addition, various ontological and epistemic problems pertaining to each of these axes were examined. In Philosophical Genealogy Volume II: An Epistemological Reconstruction of the Genealogical Method, these problems are now resolved. Volume II establishes what requisite ontological underpinnings are required in order to provide a successful, epistemic reconstruction of the genealogical method. Problems regarding the nature of the body, the relation between power and resistance as well as the justification of Nietzschean perspectivism, are now all clearly answered. It is shown that genealogy is a profound, fecund and, most importantly, coherent method of philosophical and historical investigation which may produce many new discoveries in the fields of ethics and moral inquiry provided it is correctly employed.

Wolfgang Ernst has demonstrated that the knowledge of time-giving ('chrono-poetical') media and their temporal essence enriches the tradition of philosophical inquiry into the nature of 'time'. This book, a translated and abridged edition of Ernst's two major volumes, Chronopoetik and Gleichursprunglichkeit, undertakes this on three levels: a close analysis of time-critical moments within media technologies; descriptions of how media temporalities affect and disrupt the traditional human sense of time; and questioning the traditional position of media time within cultural history. The book brings together two fields of inquiry: the technological analysis of media time processes and the venerable tradition of philosophical inquiry into the nature of time. Ernst argues that the scientific inquiry into the nature of time is enriched by the media-technological context. The book exposes a media theoretical approach to contemporary media culture that derives from the combination of philosophical reflection on the essence of technology and a close analysis of technological devices themselves. Ultimately Ernst addresses a fundamental concern of past, contemporary and future media culture: the position of technology in culture under the focused perspective of its tempor(e)alities.

In Hegel was right the author demonstrates that the tradition of the grand philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant and Hegel) made the gift of some key theses of crucial importance for the humanity. These theses widely resist the positivism and skepticism attack. The demonstrative key consists in making realize that the key concepts have not empirical meaning, so self consciousness is the only possible origin of concepts. By the way this explains how human beings from different cultures are capable to understand each other. The demonstrative route of all fundamental concepts (including those of the so called "empirical sciences"), are in the "Science of Logic" of Hegel, and in his "History of Philosophy". This book makes the balance.

What can wonder engender in terms of religious, political, and broader social practice? Thinkers from Plato to Martin Heidegger and Cornelius Castoriadis; surrealists such as Andre Breton and Pierre Mabille; and most recently the religious philosopher Mary-Jane Rubenstein have all explored the ways that wonder is not articulated once and for all, but continuously worked upon. This book engages with anthropological explorations of wonder, responding to recent work by Michael W. Scott in order to bring the weight, colour, scent and sound of real ethnographic encounters to new ways of thinking about wonder. The question for contributors is how wonder works as an index of challenges to the known, the moral, the true, and the real. The case studies reveal how probing wonder can bring us closer to understanding the formation of social institutions as various 'modalities of wonder' destabilize old forms and articulate new ones. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Journal of Religious and Political Practice.

Fundamental Causation addresses issues in the metaphysics of deterministic singular causation, the metaphysics of events, property instances, facts, preventions, and omissions, as well as the debate between causal reductionists and causal anti-reductionists. The book also pays special attention to causation and causal structure in physics. Weaver argues that causation is a multigrade obtaining relation that is transitive, irreflexive, and asymmetric. When causation is singular, deterministic and such that it relates purely contingent events, the relation is also universal, intrinsic, and well-founded. He shows that proper causal relata are events understood as states of substances at ontological indices. He then proves that causation cannot be reduced to some non-causal base, and that the best account of that relation should be unashamedly primitivist about the dependence relation that underwrites its very nature. The book demonstrates a distinctive realist and anti-reductionist account of causation by detailing precisely how the account outperforms reductionist and competing anti-reductionist accounts in that it handles all of the difficult cases while overcoming all of the general objections to anti-reductionism upon which other anti-reductionist accounts falter. This book offers an original and interesting view of causation and will appeal to scholars and advanced students in the areas of metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of physics.

This book explores the important yet neglected relationship between the philosophy of time and the temporal structure of perceptual experience. It examines how time structures perceptual experience and, through that structuring, the ways in which time makes perceptual experience trustworthy or erroneous. Sean Power argues that our understanding of time can determine our understanding of perceptual experience in relation to perceptual structure and perceptual error. He examines the general conditions under which an experience may be sorted into different kinds of error such as illusions, hallucinations, and anosognosia. Power also argues that some theories of time are better than others at giving an account of the structure and errors of perceptual experience. He makes the case that tenseless theory and eternalism more closely correspond to experience than tense theory and presentism. Finally, the book includes a discussion of the perceptual experience of space and how tenseless theory and eternalism can better support the problematic theory of naive realism. Philosophy of Time and Perceptual Experience originally illustrates how the metaphysics of time can be usefully applied to thinking about experience in general. It will appeal to those interested in the philosophy of time and debates about the trustworthiness of experience.

Originally published in 1937. This book addresses the importance of the theory of values that rests on a general metaphysical understanding founded on a comprehensive view of all aspects of the world. The author speaks against the absolutist theories with a realistic one encompassing a theory of space and time and considering value as an object of immediate intuition. These great philosophical questions feed into discussions of the philosophy of religion and of science. Garnett distinguishes between spiritual and other values on the ground that the spiritual values are not subjective to satiety, while other values are. He contends that our knowledge of mind is as direct and reliable as our knowledge of the physical world. This is an important early book by an influential 20th Century thinker.

Originally published in 1989. In this interdisciplinary study, Dr Levin offers an account of personal growth and self-fulfilment based on the development of our capacity for listening. This book should be of interest to advanced students of critical theory, psychology, cultural studies, ethics, continental philosophy, ontology, metaphysics.

Originally published in 1947. This book looks at contemporary conundrums in philosophical tendencies, bringing the reader a first-principles review of the purpose of such enquiries in relation to modern life. It presents the importance of the history of the development of philosophical thought, beginning in Part 1 with perception. Significant definitions and theories are identified and later refinements discussed - in particular conceptualism and its development from the Greeks through Berkeley to modern realism and its limitations and critiques. Part 2 brings problems identified by past thinkersto the fore, from Plato's forms to Christian theology, in an examination of the apparent dichotomy between metaphysics and scientific methods. Part 3 examines the Rationalist and the Empiricist attacks on Scepticism and Kant's reconciliation of the differences of both. This provides the context and structure for discussion of the works of Hegel, and ultimate refutation thereof as a confusion between metaphysics and theology. Part 4 identifies the developments in thinking of Positivism, both Modern and Logical, and the New Synthesis of Alexander and Whitehead as the most recent approach.

Originally published in 1987. This book comprises a critical exposition of the thoughts on metaphysics of the major philosophers of the tradition. It introduces the ideas of these philosophers to students but is of interest to teachers as well. The author begins with a survey of the metaphysical writings of Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley, Leibniz and Bradley, clarifying throughout the relation of their methods and results to those of science. He follows this with a careful study of the critical attitudes to metaphysics espoused by Kant, Wittgenstein and the Logical Positivists. In the final section he scrutinizes the attempts by Collingwood, Wisdom and Lazerowitz to rehabilitate metaphysics.

Originally published in 1950. For those interested in the fundamental problems of philosophy but not familiar with its technicalities, this book introduces the main type of theory in metaphysics, not by a catalogue of philosophers' opinions but by a continuous train of reasoning. The central theme is the problem of the relation between Mind and Matter, and in the course of the argument there are discussions of mechanistic materialism, of idealism and our knowledge of the external world, and of the arguments for the existence of God. The problems are presented lucidly but without over-simplification.

This volume is a collection of papers that advance our understanding of the metaphysics of powers - properties such as fragility and electric charge. The metaphysics of powers is a fast developing research field with fundamental questions at the forefront of current research, such as Can there be a world of only powers? What is the manifestation of a power? Are powers and their manifestations related by necessity? What are the prospects for dispositional accounts of causation? The papers focus on questions concerning the metaphysics of powers that cut across any particular subject-specific ontological domain -- whether philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, ethics, epistemology - investigating the metaphysical structure of powers, the nature of the manifestation of powers, the necessity or contingency of a power's relation to its manifestations, and powers and causation. A number of authors also engage in discussion with Humean and neo-Humean treatments of causation, thereby making contributions to a larger metaphysical debate beyond powers. Additionally, the authors engage critically with the latest contributions to the debate on powers in the literature, thereby bringing together in a wholesome and analytical way the most recent and noteworthy theoretical developments in this research field.

This volume investigates the neglected topic of mental action, and shows its importance for the metaphysics, epistemology, and phenomenology of mind. Twelve specially written essays address such questions as the following: Which phenomena should we count as mental actions--imagining, remembering, judging, for instance? How should we explain our knowledge of our mental actions, and what light does that throw on self-knowledge in general? What contributions do mental actions make to our consciousness? What is the relationship between the voluntary and the active, in the mental sphere? What are the similarities and differences between mental and physical action, and what can we learn about each from the other?