This edited volume explores the intersections of the human, nonhuman, transhuman, and posthuman from a phenomenological perspective. Representing perspectives from several disciplines, these investigations take a closer look at the relationship between the phenomenology of life, creative ontopoiesis, and otherness; technology and the human; art and the question of humanity; nonhumans, animals, and intentionality; and transhumanism. Ontological positioning of the human is reconsidered with regard to the nonhuman, transhuman, and posthuman within the cosmos. Further examination of the artificial and object in the lifeworld is also explored. This volume also pays tribute to Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka and her methodical contributions to phenomenology. This text appeals to students and researchers of phenomenology worldwide.

This book extends philosophy's engagement with the double beyond hierarchized binary oppositions. Brian Seitz explores the double as a necessary ontological condition or figure that gets represented, enacted, and performed repeatedly and in a myriad of configurations. Seitz suggests that the double in all of its forms is simultaneously philosophy's shadow, its nemesis, and the condition of its possibility. This book expands definitions and investigations of the double beyond the confines of philosophy, suggesting that the concept is at work in many other fields including politics, cultural narratives, literature, mythology, and psychology. Seitz approaches the double by means of a series of case studies and by engaging loosely in eidetic variation, a methodological maneuver borrowed from phenomenology. The book explores the ways in which wide-ranging instances of the double are connected by the dynamics of intersubjectivity.

Modality, morality and belief are among the most controversial topics in philosophy today, and few philosophers have shaped these debates as deeply as Ruth Barcan Marcus. Inspired by her work, a distinguished group of philosophers explore these issues, refine and sharpen arguments and develop new positions on such topics as possible worlds, moral dilemmas, essentialism, and the explanation of actions by beliefs. Together, this collection honors one of the most rigorous and iconoclastic of philosophical pioneers.

Morality has traditionally been understood to be tied to certain metaphysical beliefs: notably, in the freedom of human persons (to choose right or wrong courses of action), in a god (or gods) who serve(s) as judge(s) of moral character, and in an afterlife as the locus of a "final judgment" on individual behavior. Some scholars read the history of moral philosophy as a gradual disentangling of our moral commitments from such beliefs. Kant is often given an important place in their narratives, despite the fact that Kant himself asserts that some of such beliefs are necessary (necessary, at least, from the practical point of view). Many contemporary neo-Kantian moral philosophers have embraced these "disentangling" narratives or, at any rate, have minimized the connection of Kant's practical philosophy with controversial metaphysical commitments - even with Kant's transcendental idealism. This volume re-evaluates those interpretations. It is arguably the first collection to systematically explore the metaphysical commitments central to Kant's practical philosophy, and thus the connections between Kantian ethics, his philosophy of religion, and his epistemological claims concerning our knowledge of the supersensible.

Human beings have always been specialists, but over the past two centuries division of labor has become deeper, ubiquitous, and much more fluid. The form it now takes brings in its wake a series of problems that are simultaneously philosophical and practical, having to do with coordinating the activities of experts in different disciplines who do not understand one another. Because these problems are unrecognized, and because we do not have solutions for them, we are on the verge of an age in which decisions that depend on understanding more than one discipline at a time will be made badly. Since so many decisions do require multidisciplinary knowledge, these philosophical problems are urgent. Some of the puzzles that have traditionally been on philosophers' agendas have to do with intellectual devices developed to handle less extreme forms of specialization. Two of these, necessity and the practical `ought', are given extended treatment in Elijah Millgram's The Great Endarkenment. In this collection of essays, both peviously published and new, Millgram pays special attention to ways a focus on cognitive function reframes familiar debates in metaethics and metaphysics. Consequences of hyperspecialization for the theory of practical rationality, for our conception of agency, and for ethics are laid out and discussed. An Afterword considers whether and how philosophers can contribute to solving the very pressing problems created by contemporary division of labor. "These always interesting, often brilliant, and contentious essays focus on the question of how we need to reason practically, if we are to flourish, given Millgram's account of our human nature and of the environments that we inhabit. The originality of his thought is matched by his clarity and his wit."-Alasdair MacIntyre, University of Notre Dame

The Universal Science ('Ilm-i kulli) by Mahdi Ha'iri Yazdi, is a concise, but authoritative, outline of the fundamental discussions in Islamic metaphysics. For many years used as a textbook in Iran, this short text offers English readers a readily accessible, lucid, and yet deeply learned, guide through the Sadrian, Avicennan, and Illuminationist schools of thought, whilst also demonstrating how the 'living tradition' of Shi'i philosophy engages with central ontological, epistemological, aetiological, and psychological questions. Discussions include the primacy of existence; the proper classifications of quiddity; and the manifold properties of causality and causal explanation. This is the first of the various influential works authored by this leading Shi'ah intellectual to have been translated into English from the original Persian.

Among the most profound and influential explorations of mind-expanding psychedelic drugs ever written, here are two complete classic books—The Doors of Perception and Heaven and Hell—in which Aldous Huxley, author of Brave New World, reveals the mind's remote frontiers and the unmapped areas of human consciousness.

This edition also features an additional essay, "Drugs That Shape Men's Minds," now included for the first time.

Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938) is the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School with its strong tradition in logic and its scientific approach to philosophy. Twardowski's unique way of doing philosophy, his method, is of central importance for understanding his impact as a teacher. This method can be understood as a philosophical grammar, which is also how Leibniz conceived his universal language of thought. Analytic philosophy in the twentieth century can be characterized by its opposition to psychologism, on the one hand, and its opposition to metaphysics, on the other. This is changing now, as questions within the philosophy of mind and metaphysics are raised by analytic philosophers today. Maria van der Schaar shows in her book that we can improve our analytic methods by making use of Twardowski's philosophical grammar. Twardowski's positive attitude to psychology and metaphysics may also help us to develop an analytic metaphysics and to get a better understanding of the relation between psychology and philosophy.

Truth is a pervasive feature of ordinary language, deserving of systematic study, and few theorists of truth have endeavoured to chronicle the tousled conceptual terrain forming the non-philosopher's ordinary view. In this book, the author recasts the philosophical treatment of truth in light of historical and recent work in experimental philosophy. He argues that the commonsense view of truth is deeply fragmented along two axes, across different linguistic discourses and among different demographics, termed in the book as endoxic alethic pluralism. To defend this view, four conclusions must be reached: (1) endoxic alethic pluralism should be compatible with how the everyday person uses truth, (2) the common conception of truth should be derivable from empirical data, (3) this descriptive metaphysical project is one aspect of a normative theory of truth, and (4) endoxic alethic pluralism is at least partially immune to challenges facing the ecological method in experimental philosophy and alethic pluralism.

If numbers were objects, how could there be human knowledge of number? Numbers are not physical objects: must we conclude that we have a mysterious power of perceiving the abstract realm? Or should we instead conclude that numbers are fictions? This book argues that numbers are not objects: they are magnitude properties. Properties are not fictions and we certainly have scientific knowledge of them. Much is already known about magnitude properties such as inertial mass and electric charge, and much continues to be discovered. The book says the same is true of numbers. In the theory of magnitudes, the categorial distinction between quantity and individual is of central importance, for magnitudes are properties of quantities, not properties of individuals. Quantity entails divisibility, so the logic of quantity needs mereology, the a priori logic of part and whole. The three species of quantity are pluralities, continua and series, and the book presents three variants of mereology, one for each species of quantity. Given Euclid's axioms of equality, it is possible without the use of set theory to deduce the axioms of the natural, real and ordinal numbers from the respective mereologies of pluralities, continua and series. Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number carries out these deductions, arriving at a metaphysics of number that makes room for our a priori knowledge of mathematical reality.

This book brings together the debate concerning personal identity (in metaphysics) and central topics in biomedical ethics (conception of birth and death; autonomy, living wills and paternalism). Based on a metaphysical account of personal identity in the sense of persistence and conditions for human beings, conceptions for beginning of life, and death are developed. Based on a biographical account of personality, normative questions concerning autonomy, euthanasia, living wills and medical paternalism are dealt with. By these means the book shows that "personal identity" has different meanings which have to be distinguished so that human persistence and personality can be used to deal with central questions in biomedical ethics.

A comprehensive collection which contains essays from thirteen international contributors. Provides a fresh engagement with the ideas of two figureheads in philosophy - Kant and Wittgenstein - by putting them in touch with contemporary debates that are shaped by their legacy. The contributors draw upon ideas in phenomenology, dialetheism, and metamathematics to interrogate the ideas of two of the most important thinkers in modern philosophy.

The Open Access version of this book, available at http://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781003146698, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license. This book explores the ways in which social relations are profoundly changing modern society, arguing that, constituting a reality of their own, social relations will ultimately lead to a new form of society: an aftermodern or relational society. Drawing on the thought of Simmel, it extends the idea that society consists essentially of social relations, in order to make sense of the operation of dichotomous forces in society and to examine the emergence of a "third" in the morphogenetic processes. Through a realist and critical relational sociology, which allows for the fact that human beings are both internal and external to social relations, and therefore to society, the author shows how we are moving towards a new, trans-modern society - one that calls into question the guiding ideas of Western modernity, such as the notion of linear progression, that science and technology are the decisive factors of human development, and that culture can entirely supplant nature. As such, it will appeal to sociologists, social theorists, economists, political scientists, and social philosophers with interests in relational thought, critical realism, and social transformation.

During the seventies, there was a revival of systematic philosophy in general and of ontology in particular. At the same time, especially in Anglo-Saxon thinking, systematic philosophy interacted very creatively with the history of medieval philosophy. It seems to us that the work of John Duns Scotus (1266-1308) could substantially benefit these develop ments. Not only this, but his works cries out to be developed across the whole spectrum of theology -that science which, in the Middle Ages, ruled all others ('regina scientiarum'). This book is the outcome of several years of scholarship and friend ship during which, guided by Dr. A. Vos, we have studied the work of Scotus. Our research group is connected to the Theological Faculty of Utrecht and to the Dutch Franciscan Study Centre (Stichting Francis caans Studiecentrum). This study presents a translation and commentary of Lectura I 39, which, in our view, is noteable as one of the key texts in the history of systematic theology and philosophy. In this book we have used specialist language and argumentation, but at the same time have taken pains to make it useful to a circle of in terested readers wider than simply that of those well-versed in medieval scholasticism. In this way, we hope to present the difficult but instruc tive work of the 'subtle master' ('doctor subtilis') in such a way as to make it attractive to other scholars and students in theology and philoso phy."

When it is taught today, metaphysics is often presented as a fragmented view of philosophy that ignores the fundamental issues of its classical precedents. Eschewing these postmodern approaches, W. Norris Clark finds an integrated vision of reality in the wisdom of Aquinas and here offers a contemporary version of systematic metaphysics in the Thomistic tradition.

The One and the Many presents metaphysics as an integrated whole which draws on Aquinas' themes, structure, and insight without attempting to summarize his work. Although its primary inspiration is the philosophy of St. Thomas himself, it also takes into account significant contributions not only of later philosophers but also of those developments in modern science that have philosophical bearing, from the Big Bang to evolution.

Norris pursues two central themes in his explication of Thomistic metaphysics. He uncovers the unity and diversity found at all levels of the universe, with all beings held together in harmony rather than disconnected chaos. He also proposes the act of existence as the core of the positive attributes of all real beings, which in its pure unlimited state is the very nature of God. In the end, he offers a final synthetic overview of being both emanating from and returning to God in the Great Circle of Being -- a journey in which each of us is a traveler.

Through Aquinas' metaphysics, Clarke helps the reader develop a holistic view of the meaningfulness of our universe and of human life. His work rescues the essence of Aquinas' metaphysics, making this body of thought accessible to students and interested readers not trained in Thomistic terminology and contributing to a revival of this fundamentalcomponent of philosophy.

D.M. Armstrong is an eminent Australian philosopher whose work over many years has dealt with such subjects as: the nature of possibility, concepts of the particular and the general, causes and laws of nature, and the nature of human consciousness. This collection of essays, all specially written for this volume, explore the many facets of Armstrong's work, concentrating on his more recent interests. There are four sections to the book: possibility and identity, universals, laws and causality, philosophy of mind. The contributors comprise an international group of philosophers from the United States, England, and Australia. An interesting feature of the volume is that Armstrong himself has written responses to each of the essays. There is also a complete bibliography of Armstrong's writings.

Accessible and wide-ranging, this introduction to contemporary Philosophy of Action guides the reader through the major views and arguments. The topics addressed include the nature of intentional action and its explanation, the nature of reasons, the role of desire and intention in action, the nature of autonomy and the possibility of group agents.

This book provides a radical alternative to naturalistic theories of content, and offers a new conception of the place of mind in the world. Confronting head-on the scientific conception of the nature of reality that has dominated the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, Michael Morris here presents a detailed analysis of content and propositional attitudes, based on the idea that truth is a value. In the course of this analysis, he rejects the causal theory of the explanation of behaviour and replaces it with an alternative which depends upon a rich conception of the behaviour we explain with reference to states of mind. According to the theory presented here, our understanding of other people is inextricably involved with our evaluation of what they do, and the objectivity of truth depends on the objectivity of moral goodness. Dr Morris's lucid and detailed exposition of his controversial argument sounds an emphatic challenge to the naturalistic orthodoxy in areas as diverse as metaphysics, ethics, and cognitive science.

This edited collection presents the latest cutting-edge research in the philosophy and cognitive science of temporal illusions. Illusion and error have long been important points of entry for both philosophical and psychological approaches to understanding the mind. Temporal illusions, specifically, concern a fundamental feature of lived experience, temporality, and its relation to a fundamental feature of the world, time, thus providing invaluable insight into investigations of the mind and its relationship with the world. The existence of temporal illusions crucially challenges the naive assumption that we can simply infer the temporal nature of the world from experience. This anthology gathers eighteen original papers from current leading researchers in this subject, covering four broad and interdisciplinary topics: illusions of temporal passage, illusions and duration, illusions of temporal order and simultaneity, and the relationship between temporal illusions and the cognitive representation of time.

This book defends the controversial view that Nietzsche is a metaphysician against a long-standing tendency to sever Nietzsche from metaphysical philosophy. Remhof presents a metametaphysical treatment of Nietzsche's writings to show that for Nietzsche the questions, answers, methods, and subject matters of metaphysical philosophy are not only perfectly legitimate, but also crucial for understanding the world and our place within it. The book examines aspects of Nietzsche's thought that have received little attention in the literature, including his view of what makes metaphysics possible; his metaphysics of science; his naturalized metaphysics; how he appeals to the intuitions of readers; how he employs a priori reasoning; how he uses metaphysical grounding explanations; and how metaphysics is intertwined with topics central to his philosophical thinking, including his understanding of becoming, ethics, nihilism, life, perspective, amor fati, and eternal recurrence. Nietzsche as Metaphysician will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Nietzsche and the history of metaphysics.

Theories about the ontological structure of the world have generally been described in informal, intuitive terms, and the arguments for and against them, including their consistency and adequacy as explanatory frameworks, have generally been given in even more informal terms. The goal of formal ontology is to correct for these deficiencies. By formally reconstructing an intuitive, informal ontological scheme as a formal ontology we can better determine the consistency and adequacy of that scheme; and then by comparing different reconstructed schemes with one another we can much better evaluate the arguments for and against them and come to a decision as to which system it is best to adopt. Conceptual realism, which is defended here as the best system to adopt, contains both an intensional and a natural realism as well as an Aristotelian essentialism based on a logic of natural kinds.

This lucid and original book offers a detailed and critical exposition of German metaphysics and philosophy of logic during the past century. Julian Roberts sets his argument in the context of the current debate between "analytical" and "continental" philosophers. the book centers on the problem of reflection-exploration of the boundaries of rationality, or (in analytical terms) of the "limits of thought"-which Roberts claims lies at the heart of both traditions. Roberts concentrates on the work of Frege, Wittengenstein, Husserl, the Erlangen School, and Habermas. In the course of his examination, however, he also considers philosophers ranging from Russell and Quine to Putnam and Heidegger. Roberts argues that the technical advances of modern logic have not, as is sometimes believed by analytical thinkers, generated uniquely modern problems that can only be dealt with by a correspondingly modernist philosophy, for the problem of reflection was already at the heart of Kant's critical project and of his confrontation with Leibniz. If we recover this earlier debate, says Roberts, we can develop a more adequate understanding not merely of its echoes in the twentieth century, but of the role and contribution of metaphysics and of philosophy in general.

Given the pain, discomfort, anxiety, heartbreak, and boredom that most humans experience in their lives, is it morally permissible to create them? Some philosophers lately have answered 'No', contending that it is wrong to create a new human life when one could avoid doing so, because it would be bad for the one created. This view is known as 'anti-natalism'. Some contributors to this volume argue that anti-natalism is true because: agents have a prima facie duty to prevent suffering; it is immoral to violate another's right not to be harmed without having consented to it; and it is a serious wrong to exploit the weakness of a poorly off being to become a biological parent. Others here argue against anti-natalism on the ground, for instance, that many of our lives are not so bad and in fact are quite good and that the logic of anti-natalism absurdly entails pro-mortalism, the view that we should kill off as many people as possible. This book explores these and related issues concerning the evaluative question of how to judge the worthwhileness of lives and the normative question of what basic duties entail for the creation of new lives. Excepting one, all the chapters in this book were originally published in the South African Journal of Philosophy.

Philosophers have met with many problems in discussing the interconnected concepts being, identity, and truth, and have advanced many theories to deal with them. Professor Williams argues that most of these problems and theories result from an inadequate appreciation of the ways in which the words `be', `same', and `true' work. By means of linguistic analysis he shows that being and truth are not properties, and identity is not a relation. He is thus able to demystify a number of metaphysical issues concerning the meaning of the word `I', the relation between the mental and the physical, objects of thought, times and places, and the nature of reality. Williams presents his views clearly, with a minimum of technicality, and with rich and apt examples, so that they will be accessible to readers not versed in symbolic logic.