Propositions are routinely invoked by philosophers, linguists, logicians, and other theorists engaged in the study of meaning, communication, and the mind. To investigate the nature of propositions is to investigate the very nature of our connection to each other, and to the world around us. As one of the only volumes of its kind, The Routledge Handbook of Propositions provides a comprehensive overview of the philosophy of propositions, from both historical and contemporary perspectives. Comprising 33 original chapters by an international team of scholars, the volume addresses both traditional and emerging questions concerning the nature of propositions, and our capacity to engage with them in thought and in communication. The chapters are clearly organized into the following three sections: I. Foundational Issues in the Theory of Propositions II. Historical Theories of Propositions III. Contemporary Theories of Propositions Essential reading for philosophers of language and mind, and for those working in neighboring areas, The Routledge Handbook of Propositions is suitable for upper-level undergraduate study, as well as graduate and professional research.

This book provides an up-to-date overview of the foundations of spacetime physics. It features original essays written by world-class experts in the physics and philosophy of spacetime. The foundational questions regarding the origin and nature of spacetime are branching into new and exciting directions. These questions are not restricted to the quantum gravity program but also arise in the context of a well-established theory like general relativity. Against the background of these quick and diverse developments, this volume features a broad range of perspectives on spacetime. Part I focuses on the nature of spacetime in non-quantum theories, such as Newtonian mechanics and relativity. Part II explores some intriguing conceptual implications of developing a quantum theory of spacetime. The Foundations of Spacetime Physics is an essential resource for scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, and scientific metaphysics.

What is mind? What is its relationship to the physical world? Is consciousness a causative agent in the physical world? With much progress being made in the neurosciences, many have thought that these questions could be answered by reducing them to questions about physical systems such as the brain. But this approach has foundered on the core problem of consciousness: Why is it that some brain processes are accompanied by conscious awareness? This anthology points out new sources and unexamined paths of consciousness research. By presenting a wide spectrum of non-reductive theories, the volume endeavours to overcome the dichotomy between dualism and monism that keeps plaguing the debate in favour of new and more differentiated positions.

From Finding to Making offers the first detailed discussion of the relationship between Marxism and pragmatism. These two philosophies of praxis are not incompatible, and an analysis of their relation helps one to better understand both. Establishing a transatlantic theoretical dialogue, this book discusses similarities and differences between these philosophies. It is an interdisciplinary study that brings together philosophy, American and European intellectual history, and literary studies. Schulenberg's book shows that if we seek to continue the unfinished project of establishing a genuinely postmetaphysical culture, the attempt to elucidate the dialectics of Marxism and pragmatism is a good starting point. The book offers detailed discussions of Sidney Hook, Georg Lukacs, Theodor W. Adorno, Fredric Jameson, W.E.B. Du Bois, John Dewey, Richard Rorty, and Jacques Ranciere.

* Fourteen scholars engage Kearney's work to plumb the depths of our experience of the lived body * Seeks to engage a form of otherness that is becoming unconcealed, problematized and integrated into current scholarly work and more broadly into our general psychological awareness and our social and political projects * First project to engage with Kearney's Touch (2021) in the broader context of his oeuvre, and engage that body of work with novel approaches that Kearney himself has not deployed.

This book examines the theoretical devices of 'Yugoslav' and 'post-Yugoslav' literature. The author analyzes selected literary examples from the region through the lens of a contemporary post-Deleuzean philosophy of time, extricating discussions of post-ism from traditional chronological framing.

The Analysis of Matter is the product of thirty years of thinking by one of the twentieth century's best-known philosophers. An inquiry into the philosophical foundations of physics, it was written against the background of stunning new developments in physics earlier in the century, above all relativity, as well as the excitement around quantum theory, which was just being developed. Concerned to place physics on a stable footing at a time of great theoretical change, Russell argues that the concept of matter itself can be replaced by a logical construction whose basic foundations are events. He is careful to point out that this does not prove that matter does not exist, but it does show that physicists can get on with their work without assuming that matter does exist. Russell argues that fundamental bits of ''matter'', such as electrons and protons, are simply groups of events connected in a certain way and their properties are all that are required for physics. This Routledge Classics edition includes the 1992 Introduction by John G. Slater.

Superb insight into the development of Russell's thinking by the master himself Clearly and engaging written, charting his intellectual development from young idealist to celebrated sceptic This Routledge Classics edition includes a new foreword by Nicholas Griffin Ideal companion to Russell's own Autobiography, which is concerned with his incredibly colourful life rather than philosophy

About Aquinas: St Thomas Aquinas lived from 1224/5 to 1274, mostly in his native Italy but for a time in France. He was the greatest of the medieval philosopher/theologians, and one of the most important of all Western thinkers. His most famous books are the two summaries of his teachings, the Summa contra gentiles and the Summa theologiae. About this book: Norman Kretzmann expounds and criticizes Aquinas's natural theology of creation, which is `natural' (or philosophical) in virtue of Aquinas's having developed it without depending on the data of Scripture. The Metaphysics of Creation is a continuation of the project Kretzmann began in The Metaphysics of Theism, moving the focus from the first to the second book of Aquinas's Summa contra gentiles. Here we find Aquinas building upon his account of the existence and nature of God, arguing that the existence of things other than God must be explained by divine creation out of nothing. He develops arguments to identify God's motivation for creating, to defend the possibility of a beginningless created universe, and to explain the origin of species. He then focuses exclusively on creatures with intellects, with the result that more than half of his natural theology of creation constitutes a philosophy of mind. Kretzmann gives a masterful guide through all these arguments. As before, he not only expounds Aquinas's natural theology, but advocates it as the best historical instance available to us.

Adorno's lectures on ontology and dialectics from 1960-61 comprise his most sustained and systematic analysis of Heidegger's philosophy. They also represent a continuation of a project that he shared with Walter Benjamin - 'to demolish Heidegger'. Following the publication of the latter's magnum opus Being and Time, and long before his notorious endorsement of Nazism at Freiburg University, both Adorno and Benjamin had already rejected Heidegger's fundamental ontology. After his return to Germany from his exile in the United States, Adorno became Heidegger's principal intellectual adversary, engaging more intensively with his work than with that of any other contemporary philosopher. Adorno regarded Heidegger as an extremely limited thinker and for that reason all the more dangerous. In these lectures, he highlights Heidegger's increasing fixation with the concept of ontology to show that the doctrine of being can only truly be understood through a process of dialectical thinking. Rather than exploiting overt political denunciation, Adorno deftly highlights the connections between Heidegger's philosophy and his political views and, in doing so, offers an alternative plea for enlightenment and rationality. These seminal lectures, in which Adorno dissects the thought of one of the most influential twentieth-century philosophers, will appeal to students and scholars in philosophy and critical theory and throughout the humanities and social sciences.

The world is populated with many different objects, to which we often attribute properties: we say, for example, that grass is green, that the earth is spherical, that humans are animals, and that murder is wrong. We also take it that these properties are things in their own right: there is something in which being green, or spherical, or an animal, or wrong, consists, and that certain scientific or normative projects are engaged in uncovering the essences of such properties. In light of this, an important question arises: what kind of things should we take properties themselves to be? In Properties, Douglas Edwards gives an engaging, accessible, and up-to-date introduction to the many theories of properties available. Edwards charts the central positions in the debate over properties, including the views that properties are universals, that properties are constructed from tropes, and that properties are classes of objects, and assesses the benefits and disadvantages of each. Attempts to deny the existence of properties are also considered, along with pluralist proposals, which aim to accommodate the different kinds of properties that are found in various philosophical debates. Properties is the ideal introduction to this topic and will be an invaluable resource for scholars and students wishing to learn more about the important roles that properties have played, and continue to play, in contemporary philosophy.

This book offers a comprehensive critique of the Kantian principle that 'objects conform to our cognition' from the perspective of a Copernican world-view which stands diametrically opposed to Kant's because founded on the principle that our cognition conforms to objects. Concerning both Kant's ontological denial in respect of space and time and his equivalence thesis in respect of 'experience' and 'objectivity', Ryall argues that Kant's transcendental idealism signally fails to account for the one thing that is essential for Copernicus and the only thing that would validate a comparison between his and Kant's critical philosophy, namely the subject as 'revolving object'. It is only by presupposing - in a transcendentally realistic sense - that human beings exist as physical things in themselves, therefore, that the 'observer motion' of Copernican theory is vindicated and the distorted nature of our empirical observations explained. In broadly accessible prose and by directly challenging the arguments of many stalwart defenders of Kant including Norman Kemp Smith, Henry E. Allison and Michael Friedman, Ryall's book will be of interest to both scholars and students of Kant's philosophy alike.

* Fourteen scholars engage Kearney's work to plumb the depths of our experience of the lived body * Seeks to engage a form of otherness that is becoming unconcealed, problematized and integrated into current scholarly work and more broadly into our general psychological awareness and our social and political projects * First project to engage with Kearney's Touch (2021) in the broader context of his oeuvre, and engage that body of work with novel approaches that Kearney himself has not deployed.

One of the most difficult problems challenging the human mind is knowledge of the world in its human, natural, and supra-natural dimensions: what is the nature of this multidimensional reality? How do we know and verify the truth of our knowledge claims of this reality? A contemporary Polish philosopher, Malgorzata Czarnocka, has advanced one of the most comprehensive and insightful studies of the cognitive act and the conditions under which it takes place. The proposition explicated in this book is that Czarnocka's analysis of perception functions as a model of explanation in our attempt to know the nature of the being that underlies the universe. This analysis becomes the basis of the author's discussion of symbolic truth as a model of explanation and its other applications.

This book presents a new nominalistic philosophy of mathematics: semantic conventionalism. Its central thesis is that mathematics should be founded on the human ability to create language - and specifically, the ability to institute conventions for the truth conditions of sentences. This philosophical stance leads to an alternative way of practicing mathematics: instead of "building" objects out of sets, a mathematician should introduce new syntactical sentence types, together with their truth conditions, as he or she develops a theory. Semantic conventionalism is justified first through criticism of Cantorian set theory, intuitionism, logicism, and predicativism; then on its own terms; and finally, exemplified by a detailed reconstruction of arithmetic and real analysis. Also included is a simple solution to the liar paradox and the other paradoxes that have traditionally been recognized as semantic. And since it is argued that mathematics is semantics, this solution also applies to Russell's paradox and the other mathematical paradoxes of self-reference. In addition to philosophers who care about the metaphysics and epistemology of mathematics or the paradoxes of self-reference, this book should appeal to mathematicians interested in alternative approaches.

Susanne Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most important intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She reconstructs the theory and discusses how the Stoics (third century BC to second century AD) justified it, and how it relates to their views on possibility, action, freedom, moral responsibility, and many other topics. She demonstrates the considerable philosophical richness and power that these ideas retain today.

Tracing the notion of 'the gift' in Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Emilio Corriero provides a new interpretation of this essential text, alongside 'the gift's' evolution as a key concept in the history of western philosophy and Christianity. The last phase of Nietzsche's thought, including his writings on the death of God, The Will to Power, the Overman, and eternal recurrence are analysed anew in Corriero's reading of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. From Nietzsche's Prologue, in which Zarathustra presents the idea of the Overman as a gift of love and wisdom, up to the fourth and final book, in which the theme of hospitality and sacrifice are inextricably linked to the concept of donation, highlighting the novelty and exceptionality of Zarathustra's gift. Building on these ideas, this book reveals how the gift of Zarathustra put forward by Nietzsche rethinks the relationships between individuals based on Christian doctrine, enabling new forms of coexistence and sociality to thrive.

All except three of the papers in this volume were presented at the colloquium on "L'Ontologie formelle aujourd'hui," Geneva, 3-5 June 1988. The three exceptions, the papers by David Armstrong, Uwe Meixner and Wolfgang Lenzen, were presented at the colloquium on "Properties," Zinal, June 1-3, 1990. It was, incidentally, at the second of these two colloquia that the European Society for Analytic Philosophy came into being. The fathers of analytic philosophy - Moore and Russell - were in no doubt that ontology or metaphysics as well as the topics oflanguage, truth and logic constituted the core subject-matter of their "analytic realism," 1 for the task of metaphysics as they conceived things was the description of 2 the world. And logic and ontology are indissolubly linked in the system of the grandfather of analytic philosophy, Frege. After the Golden Age of analytic philosophy - in Cambridge and Austria - opposition to realism as well as the "linguistic turn" contributed for a long time to the eclipse of ontology. 3 Thanks in large measure to the work of some of the senior contributors to the present volume - Roderick Chisholm, Herbert Hochberg, David Armstrong and Karel Lambert - ontology and metaphysics now enjoy once again the central position they occupied some eighty years ago in the heyday of analytic philosophy.

Rae Langton offers a new interpretation and defence of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. Kant distinguishes things in themselves from phenomena, and in so doing he makes a metaphysical distinction between intrinsic and relational properties of substances. Kant says that phenomena-things as we know them-consist 'entirely of relations', by which he means forces. His claim that we have no knowledge of things in themselves is not idealism, but epistemic humility: we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of substances. This humility has its roots in some plausible philosophical beliefs: an empiricist belief in the receptivity of human knowledge and a metaphysical belief in the irreducibility of relational properties. Langton's interpretation vindicates Kant's scientific realism, and shows his primary/secondary quality distinction to be superior even to modern-day competitors. And it answers the famous charge that Kant's tale of things in themselves is one that makes itself untellable.

If numbers were objects, how could there be human knowledge of number? Numbers are not physical objects: must we conclude that we have a mysterious power of perceiving the abstract realm? Or should we instead conclude that numbers are fictions? This book argues that numbers are not objects: they are magnitude properties. Properties are not fictions and we certainly have scientific knowledge of them. Much is already known about magnitude properties such as inertial mass and electric charge, and much continues to be discovered. The book says the same is true of numbers. In the theory of magnitudes, the categorial distinction between quantity and individual is of central importance, for magnitudes are properties of quantities, not properties of individuals. Quantity entails divisibility, so the logic of quantity needs mereology, the a priori logic of part and whole. The three species of quantity are pluralities, continua and series, and the book presents three variants of mereology, one for each species of quantity. Given Euclid's axioms of equality, it is possible without the use of set theory to deduce the axioms of the natural, real and ordinal numbers from the respective mereologies of pluralities, continua and series. Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number carries out these deductions, arriving at a metaphysics of number that makes room for our a priori knowledge of mathematical reality.

A wide-ranging and important collection of Broad's unpublished writings, shedding new light on his work Includes writings on topics that are not found in any of Broad's published work Broad is increasingly recognized as having made important contributions to philosophy of science, philosophy of mind and metaphysics that were overlooked in his own time Helpful introductions to each section set Broad's thought in context and includes a new foreword by Simon Blackburn

This book explores how one measures and analyzes human alterity and difference in an interconnected and ever-globalizing world. This book critically assesses the impact of what has often been dubbed 'the ontological turn' within anthropology in order to provide some answers to these questions. In doing so, the book explores the turn's empirical and theoretical limits, accomplishments, and potential. The book distinguishes between three central strands of the ontological turn, namely worldviews, materialities, and politics. It presents empirically rich case studies, which help to elaborate on the potentiality and challenges which the ontological turn's perspectives and approaches may have to offer.

Oxford Cognitive Science Series General Editors: Martin Davies, Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy, University of Oxford, UK, James Higginbotham , Professor of General Linguistics, University of Oxford, UK, John O'Keefe, Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College, London, UK, Christopher Peacocke, Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy, University of Oxford, UK, and Kim Plunkett, University Lecturer in Psychology, University of Oxford, UK The Oxford Cognitive Science series is a forum for the best contemporary work in this flourishing field, where various disciplines-cognitive psychology, philosophy, linguistics, cognitive neuroscience, and computational theory-join forces in the investigation of thought, awareness, understanding, and associated workings of the mind. Each book will represent an original contribution to its subject, but will be accessible beyond the ranks of specialists, so as to reach a broad interdisciplinary readership. The series will be carefully shaped and steered by the general editors, with the aim of representing the most important developments in the field and bringing together its constituent disciplines. About this book The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, who has been a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years, and suggests that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. This lively, conversational, accessible book is the first volume in the Oxford Cognitive Science Series, where the best original work in this field will be presented to a broad readership. Concepts will fascinate anyone interested in contemporary work on mind and language. Cognitive science will never be the same again.

Real Essentialism presents a comprehensive defence of neo-Aristotelian essentialism. Do objects have essences? Must they be the kinds of things they are in spite of the changes they undergo? Can we know what things are really like - can we define and classify reality? Many, if not most, philosophers doubt this, influenced by centuries of empiricism, and by the anti-essentialism of Wittgenstein, Quine, Popper, and other thinkers. Real Essentialism reinvigorates the tradition of realist, essentialist metaphysics, defending the reality and knowability of essence, the possibility of objective, immutable definition, and its relevance to contemporary scientific and metaphysical issues such as whether essence transcends physics and chemistry, the essence of life, the nature of biological species, and the nature of the person.