Beatific Enjoyment in Medieval Scholastic Debates examines the religious concept of enjoyment as discussed by scholastic theologians in the Latin Middle Ages. Severin Kitanov argues that central to the concept of beatific enjoyment (fruitio beatifica) is the distinction between the terms enjoyment and use (frui et uti) found in Saint Augustine's treatise On Christian Learning. Peter Lombard, a twelfth-century Italian theologian, chose the enjoyment of God to serve as an opening topic of his Sentences and thereby set in motion an enduring scholastic discourse. Kitanov examines the nature of volition and the relationship between volition and cognition. He also explores theological debates on the definition of enjoyment: whether there are different kinds and degrees of enjoyment, whether natural reason unassisted by divine revelation can demonstrate that beatific enjoyment is possible, whether beatific enjoyment is the same as pleasure, whether it has an intrinsic cognitive character, and whether the enjoyment of God in heaven is a free or un-free act. Even though the concept of beatific enjoyment is essentially religious and theological, medieval scholastic authors discussed this concept by means of Aristotle's logical and scientific apparatus and through the lens of metaphysics, physics, psychology, and virtue ethics. Bringing together Christian theological and Aristotelian scientific and philosophical approaches to enjoyment, Kitanov exposes the intricacy of the discourse and makes it intelligible for both students and scholars.

Every Thing Must Go aruges that the only kind of metaphysics that can contribute to objective knowledge is one based specifically on contemporary science as it really is, and not on philosophers' a priori intuitions, common sense, or simplifications of science. In addition to showing how recent metaphysics has drifted away from connection with all other serious scholarly inquiry as a result of not heeding this restriction, they demonstrate how to build a metaphysics compatible with current fundamental phsyics ("ontic structural realism"), which, when combined with their metaphysics of the special sciences ("rainforet realism"), can be used to unify physics with the other sciences without reducing these sciences to physics intself. Taking science metaphysically seriously, Ladyman and Ross argue, means that metaphysicians must abandon the picture of the world as composed of self-subsistent individual objects, and the paradigm of causation as the collision of such objects.
Every Thing Must Go also assesses the role of information theory and complex systems theory in attempts to explain the relationship between the special sciences and physics, treading a middle road between the grand synthesis of thermodynamics and information, and eliminativism about information. The consequences of the author's metaphysical theory for central issues in the philosophy of science are explored, including the implications for the realism vs. empiricism debate, the role of causation in scientific explanations, the nature of causation and laws, the status of abstract and virtual objects, and the objective reality of natural kinds

This is an original exploration of the philosophical arguments for and against the possibility of other worlds. "Actuality, Possibility and Worlds" is an exploration of the Aristotelian account that sees possibilities as grounded in causal powers. On his way to that account, Pruss surveys a number of historical approaches and argues that logicist approaches to possibility are implausible. The notion of possible worlds appears to be useful for many purposes, such as the analysis of counterfactuals or elucidating the nature of propositions and properties. This usefulness of possible worlds makes for a second general question: Are there any possible worlds and, if so, what are they? Are they concrete universes as David Lewis thinks, Platonic abstracta as per Robert M. Adams and Alvin Plantinga, or maybe linguistic or mathematical constructs such as Heller thinks? Or is perhaps Leibniz right in thinking that possibilia are not on par with actualities and that abstracta can only exist in a mind, so that possible worlds are ideas in the mind of God? "Continuum Studies in Philosophy of Religion" presents scholarly monographs offering cutting-edge research and debate to students and scholars in philosophy of religion. The series engages with the central questions and issues within the field, including the problem of evil, the cosmological, teleological, moral, and ontological arguments for the existence of God, divine foreknowledge, and the coherence of theism. It also incorporates volumes on the following metaphysical issues as and when they directly impact on the philosophy of religion: the existence and nature of the soul, the existence and nature of free will, natural law, the meaning of life, and science and religion.

The writings of Greek philosopher ARISTOTLE (384BC322Bestudent of Plato, teacher of Alexander the Greatare among the most influential on Western thought, and indeed upon Western civilization itself. From theology and logic to ethics and even biology, there is no area of human knowledge that has not been touched by his thinking. In The Metaphysicsconsidered by many the greatest works not just of Aristotle but of the entire discipline of philosophythe philosopher explores the most fundamental of questions: What is existence? Why does anything exist? How can we comprehend being? What is infinity? Is there a god? With these questions, and the answers he found, Aristotle exerted a powerful sway on thinkers, scientists, artists, and writers for centuries, and continues to do so today. Students and armchair philosophers will find this a demanding but satisfying read.

This book models and simulates metaphysics by presenting the metaphysics of a model. The small size of the model makes it possible to treat metaphysical matters with a more than usual systematicity and comprehensiveness. In the mirror of sustained analogy, simulation-metaphysics offers a wealth of insights on the real thing: on the doctrines, the methods, and the epistemology of metaphysics.

In this book, setting aside his consideration of specifically ethical topics, I try to provide a comprehensive interpretation of Moore's thought. Against the background of this general interpretation I examine in detail his work on some of the central problems of metaphysics and, because Moore's being able to sustain a consistent anti-skepticism is essential to the survival of the base from which he works on those problems, of epistemology too. The interpretation of which I speak involves my taking as the centerpiece of Moore's philosophical work his book, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, written in 1910 as the text of a lecture series but left unpublished for over forty years thereafter. That book is aptly titled, for the issues with which Moore deals in it are indeed among the main problems of philosophy. Not least of these are the problems of formulating a general categorial deSCription of the world and then of defending that formulation. However, while I will discuss Moore's work in light of its contribution to this project of taking metaphysical inventory, it is important to note that he, in common with many other major figures in contemporary analytical philosophy, did not approach specific philosophical puzzles with a view to possibly integrating solutions to them into a comprehensive theory about reality as a whole, that is, into what might be called a metaphysical system.

The volume collects essays by an international team of philosophers aimed at elucidating three fundamental and interconnected themes in ontology. In the first instance, there is the issue of the kind of thing that, in the primary sense, is or exists: must the primitive terms be particular or universal? Any reply will itself raise the question of how to treat discourse that appears to refer to things that cannot be met with in time and space: what difference is there between saying that someone is not sad and saying that something does not exist? If we can speak meaningfully about fictions, what makes those statements true (or false) and how can the entities in question be identified? Assessment of the options that have been opened up in these fields since the work of Bertrand Russell and Alexius Meinong at the beginning of the twentieth century remains an important testing-ground for metaphysical principles and intuitions.

This book offers an examination of Levinas 's philosophy of religion in light of his ethics and anthropology. It provides critical perspectives on Levinas by relating his work to that of Heidegger, Ricoeur, Rorty, Derrida and Vattimo. The focus of interpretation is the hermeneutics of kenosis: the subject 's ability to be open towards the other to the point where man can be seen as a place of God.

From the time of Locke, discussions of personal identity have often ignored the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we human people are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. The result of this neglect has been centuries of wild proposals and clashing intuitions.
What Are We? is the first general study of this important question. It beings by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as questions of personal identity and the mind-body problem. It then examines in some depth the main possible accounts of our metaphysical nature, detailing both their theoretical virtues and the often grave difficulties they face.
The book does not endorse any particular account of what we are, but argues that the matter turns on more general issues in the ontology of material things. If composition is universal--if any material things whatever make up something bigger--then we are temporal parts of organisms. If things never compose anything bigger, so that there are only mereological simples, then we too are simples--perhaps the immaterial substances of Descartes--or else we do not exist at all (a view Olson takes very seriously). The intermediate view that some things compose bigger things and others do not leads almost inevitably to the conclusion that we are organisms. So we can discover what we are by working out when composition occurs.

Heidegger holds that our age is dominated by the ambition of reason to possess the world. And he sees in Leibniz the man who formulated the theorem of our modern age: nothing happens without a reason. He calls this attitude `calculating thought' and opposes to it a kind of thought aimed at preserving the essence of things, which he calls `meditating thought'. Cristin's book ascribes great importance to this polarity of thinking for the future of contemporary philosophy, and thus compares the basic ideas of the two thinkers. Leibniz announces the conquest of reason; Heidegger denounces the dangers of reason. Their diversity becomes manifest in the difference between the idea of reason and the image of the path. But is Leibniz's thought really only `calculating'? And do we not perhaps also encounter the traces of reason along Heidegger's path? With these questions in mind we may begin to redefine the relation between the two thinkers and between two different conceptions of reason and philosophy. The hypothesis is advanced that Heidegger's harsh judgment of Leibniz may be mitigated, but it also becomes clear that Heidegger's rewriting of the code of reason is an integral part of our age, in which many signs point to new loci of rationality. With his original interpretation, aware of the risks he is taking, Renato Cristin offers a new guide to the understanding of reason: he shows forth Leibniz as one who defends the thought of being in the unity of monadology, and Heidegger as a thinker who preserves the sign of reason in his meditating thought.

This volume explores key aspects of the transmission of learning and the transformation of thought from the late Middle Ages to the early modern period. The topics dealt with include metaphysics as a science, the rise of probabilistic modality, freedom of the human will, as well as the role and validity of logical reasoning in speculative theology. The volume will be of interest to scholars who work on medieval and early modern philosophy, theology, and intellectual history.

In Philosophy of Mind: The Metaphysics of Consciousness, Dale Jacquette provides students and professionals with a concise and accessible overview of this fascinating subject. The book covers all the key topics and debates in the philosophy of mind and introduces the full range of choices available in approaching the mind-body problem. Exploring classical and contemporary texts, the book surveys the subject's historical background and current applications. Crucially, Jacquette offers a defence of property dualism as an alternative solution to the mind-body problem, instead of the mainstream eliminativist and reductivist strategies. Clearly structured and featuring useful diagrams, a glossary of key terms, and advice on further reading, the book is ideal for classroom use. Fully revised, updated and expanded to meet the needs of a new generation of philosophy students, this second edition is the ideal companion to the study of the philosophy of mind.

'To thine own self be true.' From Polonius's words in Hamlet right up to Oprah, we are constantly urged to look within. Why is being authentic the ultimate aim in life for so many people, and why does it mean looking inside rather than out? Is it about finding the 'real' me, or something greater than me, even God? And should we welcome what we find?
Thought-provoking and with an astonishing range of references, On Being Authentic is a gripping journey into the self that begins with Socrates and Augustine. Charles Guignon asks why being authentic ceased to mean being part of some bigger, cosmic picture and with Rousseau, Wordsworth and the Romantic movement, took the strong inward turn alive in today's self-help culture.
He also plumbs the darker depths of authenticity, with the help of Freud, Joseph Conrad and Alice Miller and reflects on the future of being authentic in a postmodern, global age. He argues ultimately that if we are to rescue the ideal of being authentic, we have to see ourselves as fundamentally social creatures, embedded in relationships and communities, and that being authentic is not about what is owed to me but how I depend on others.

Contents:
Chapter 1: Aristotle's Metaphysics Chapter 2: Metaphysics as the science of the Ultimate explanations of all things Chapter 3: Metaphysics as the science of being Qua being, Primary being and Non-Primary being Chapter 4: The Principle of Non-contradiction Chapter 5: The search for primary being Chaper 6: The first cause of change, God Chapter 7: The criticism of Plato's theory of forms

Evil has long fascinated psychologists, philosophers, novelists and playwrights but remains an incredibly difficult concept to talk about.
"On Evil" is a compelling and at times disturbing tour of the many faces of evil. What is evil, and what makes people do awful things? If we can explain evil, do we explain it away? Can we imagine the mind of a serial killer, or does such evil defy description? Does evil depend on a contrast with good, as religion tells us, or can there be evil for evil's sake?
Adam Morton argues that any account of evil must help us understand three things: why evil occurs; why evil often arises out of banal or everyday situations; and how "we" can be seen as evil. Drawing on fascinating examples as diverse as Augustine, Buffy the Vampire Slayer, psychological studies of deviant behavior and profiles of serial killers, Adam Morton argues that evil occurs when internal, mental barriers against it simply break down. Adam Morton also introduces us to some nightmare people, such as Adolf Eichmann and Hannibal Lecter, reminding us that understanding their actions as humans brings us closer to understanding evil.
Exciting and thought-provoking, "On Evil" is essential reading for anyone interested in a topic that attracts and repels us in equal measure.