This volume provides a comprehensive, learned and lively presentation of the whole range of Plato's thought but with a particular emphasis upon how Plato developed his metaphysics with a view to supporting his deepest educational convictions. The author explores the relation of Plato's metaphysics to the epistemological, ethical and political aspects of Plato's theory of education and shows how Plato's basic positions bear directly on the most fundamental questions faced by contemporary education.

A rival to Isaac Newton in mathematics and physics, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz believed that our world-the best of all possible worlds-must be governed by a principle of optimality. This book explores Leibniz's pursuit of optimality in five of his most important works in natural philosophy and shows how his principle of optimality bridges his scientific and philosophical studies. The first chapter explores Leibniz's work on the laws of optics and its implications for his defense of natural teleology. The second chapter examines Leibniz's work on the breaking strength of rigid beams and its implications for his thinking about the metaphysical foundations of the material world. The third chapter revisits Leibniz's famous defense of the conservation of vis viva and proposes a novel account of the origin of Leibniz's mature natural philosophy. The fourth chapter takes up Leibniz's efforts to determine the shape of freely hanging chains-the so-called problem of the catenary-and shows how that work provides an illuminating model for his thinking about the teleological structure of wills. Finally, the fifth chapter uses Leibniz's derivation of the path of quickest descent-his solution to the so-called problem of the Brachistochrone-and its historical context as a springboard for an exploration of the legacy of Leibniz's physics. The book closes with a brief discussion of the systematicity of Leibniz's thinking in philosophy and the natural sciences.

This volume presents fourteen original essays which explore the philosophy of Simon Blackburn, one of the UK's most influential contemporary philosophers. Blackburn is best known to the general public for his attempts to make philosophy accessible to those with little or no formal training, but in professional circles his reputation is based on a lifetime pursuit of his distinctive version of a projectivist and anti-realist research program. As he sees things, we must always try first to understand and explain what we are doing when we think and talk as we do. This research program reaches into nearly all of the main areas of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and moral psychology. The books and articles he has written provide us with perhaps the most comprehensive statement and defense of projectivism and anti-realism since Hume. The essays collected here document the range and influence of Blackburn's work. They reveal, among other things, the resourcefulness of his distinctive brand of philosophical pragmatism.

Metaphysics and Music in Adorno and Heidegger explains how two notoriously opposed German philosophers share a rethinking of the possibility of metaphysics via notions of music and waiting. This is connected to the historical materialist project of social change by way of the radical Italian composer Luigi Nono.

Thought, to be thought at all, must be about a world independent of us. But thinking takes capacities for thought, which inevitably shape thought's objects. What would count as something being green is, somehow, fixed by what we, who have being green in mind, are prepared to recognize. So it can seem that what is true, and what is not, is not independent of us. So our thought cannot really be about an independent world. We are confronted with an apparent paradox. Much philosophy, from Locke to Kant to Frege to Wittgenstein, to Hilary Putnam and John McDowell today, is a reaction to this paradox. Charles Travis presents a set of eleven essays, each working in its own way towards dissolving this air of paradox. The key to his account of thought and world is the idea of the parochial: features of our thought which need not belong to all thought.

First Published in 2012. The Philosophy of MetaReality: creativity, love and freedom is the third of three books elaborating Roy Bhaskar's philosophy of metaReality, which appeared in rapid succession in 2002. A big, rich book teaming with ideas, The Philosophy of MetaReality is undoubtedly the magnum opus of Bhaskar's spiritual turn. Building on a radical new analysis of the self, human agency and society, Roy Bhaskar shows how the world of alienation and crisis we currently inhabit is sustained by the ground-state qualities of intelligence, creativity, love, a capacity for right-action and a potential for human self-realisation or fulfilment. A new introduction to this edition by Mervyn Hartwig, founding editor of Journal of Critical Realism and editor of A Dictionary of Critical Realism (Routledge, 2007), describes the context, significance and impact of the philosophy of metaReality, and supplies an expert guide to its content. This book is essential reading for students and practitioners of both philosophy and the human sciences.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) stands among the greatest thinkers of the Western world. There is hardly an area of thought, at least of philosophical thought, to which he did not make significant and lasting contributions. Particularly noteworthy are his writings on the foundations and limits of human knowledge, the bidimensional nature of perceptual or "natural" objects (including human beings), the basic principles and ends of morality, the character of a just society and of a world at peace, the movement and direction of human history, the nature of beauty, the end or purpose of all creation, the proper education of young people, the true conception of religion, and on and on. Though Kant was a life-long resident of Konigsberg, Prussia - child, student, tutor, and then professor of philosophy (and other subjects) - his thought ranged over nearly all the world and even beyond. Reports reveal that he (a bachelor) was an amiable man, highly respected by his students and colleagues, and even loved by his several close friends. He was apparently a man of integrity, both in his personal relations and in his pursuit of knowledge and truth. Despite his somewhat pessimistic attitude toward the moral progress of mankind - judging from past history and contemporary events - he never wavered from a deep-seated faith in the goodness of the human heart, in man's "splendid disposition toward the good.

Minimal Semantics asks what a theory of literal linguistic meaning is for--if you were to be given a working theory of meaning for a language right now, what would you be able to do with it? Emma Borg sets out to defend a formal approach to semantic theorizing from a relatively new type of opponent--advocates of what she calls "dual pragmatics." According to dual pragmatists, rich pragmatic processes play two distinct roles in linguistic comprehension: as well as operating in a post-semantic capacity to determine the implicatures of an utterance, they also operate prior to the determination of truth-conditional content for a sentence. That is to say, they have an integral role to play within what is usually thought of as the semantic realm.
Borg believes dual pragmatic accounts constitute the strongest contemporary challenge to standard formal approaches to semantics since they challenge the formal theorist to show not merely that there is some role for formal processes on route to determination of semantic content, but that such processes are sufficient for determining content. Minimal Semantics provides a detailed examination of this school of thought, introducing readers who are unfamiliar with the topic to key ideas like relevance theory and contextualism, and looking in detail at where these accounts diverge from the formal approach.
Borg's defense of formal semantics has two main parts: first, she argues that the formal approach is most naturally compatible with an important and well-grounded psychological theory, namely the Fodorian modular picture of the mind. Then she argues that the main arguments adduced by dual pragmatists against formal semantics--concerning apparent contextual intrusions into semantic content--can in fact be countered by a formal theory. The defense holds, however, only if we are sensitive to the proper conditions of success for a semantic theory. Specifically, we should reject a range of onerous constraints on semantic theorizing (e.g., that it answer epistemic or metaphysical questions, or that it explain our communicative skills) and instead adopt a quite minimal picture of semantics.

Richard Tieszen presents an analysis, development, and defense of a number of central ideas in Kurt Goedel's writings on the philosophy and foundations of mathematics and logic. Tieszen structures the argument around Goedel's three philosophical heroes - Plato, Leibniz, and Husserl - and his engagement with Kant, and supplements close readings of Goedel's texts on foundations with materials from Goedel's Nachlass and from Hao Wang's discussions with Goedel. As well as providing discussions of Goedel's views on the philosophical significance of his technical results on completeness, incompleteness, undecidability, consistency proofs, speed-up theorems, and independence proofs, Tieszen furnishes a detailed analysis of Goedel's critique of Hilbert and Carnap, and of his subsequent turn to Husserl's transcendental philosophy in 1959. On this basis, a new type of platonic rationalism that requires rational intuition, called 'constituted platonism', is developed and defended. Tieszen shows how constituted platonism addresses the problem of the objectivity of mathematics and of the knowledge of abstract mathematical objects. Finally, he considers the implications of this position for the claim that human minds ('monads') are machines, and discusses the issues of pragmatic holism and rationalism.

As the third in a musicological trilogy that seeks objective answers to physical and metaphysical questions by way of musical ratios and proportions, this book may start with the acoustical properties of vibrating strings, but it certainly does not stop there. Rather, it goes on to attack some of the thorniest issues facing quantum physics today, including why string theory, as it is presently conceived, doesn't work; what is missing in the physicists' understanding of 'missing information"; and how the real cause underlying the perceived inflation of the universe is, in fact, due to the power laws inherent in vibrating strings. The surprising answers are neither wholly mathematical nor totally philosophical, but result from the reconciling perspective of music theory, the 'real" M-theory. Moving beyond the sterile and secular world-view of the physicists, the author introduces into the equation the sacred metaphysical soul principle, now viewed as the holographic 'membrane" whose sole function is to gather and store information and thus serve as the anti-entropic force within the universe. The properties of the soul, being movement and expansion, have long been associated with the figure called the lambdoma, and with the ancient diatonic scale that naturally forms within it, known as 'The Scale of the Soul of the World and Nature." With uncanny insight, the author shows how there is not one, but three musical scales-diatonic, chromatic, and enharmonic-which form of their own accord within the expanding lambdoma. These 'informing" musical scales become the obvious links to the three 'branes" of the quantum physicists, at the same time providing substantive evidence for why a 'three brain system" is absolutely essential for the completion of the soul of man-an idea that students of the Gurdjieff Work will find very familiar, and perhaps very intriguing.

It is widely known that Buddhists deny the existence of the self. However, Buddhist philosophers defend interesting positions on a variety of other issues in fundamental ontology. In particular, they have important things to say about ontological reduction and the nature of the causal relation. Amidst the prolonged debate over global anti-realism, Buddhist philosophers devised an innovative approach to the radical nominalist denial of all universals and real resemblances. While some defend presentism, others propound eternalism. In How Things Are, Mark Siderits presents the arguments that Buddhist philosophers developed on these and other issues. Those with an interest in metaphysics may find new and interesting insights into what the Buddhists had to say about their ideas. This work is designed to introduce some of the more important fruits of Buddhist metaphysical inquiry to philosophers with little or no prior knowledge of that tradition. While there is plenty of scholarship on the Indian Buddhist philosophical tradition, it is primarily concerned with the historical details, often presupposes background knowledge of the major schools and figures, and makes ample use of untranslated Sanskrit technical terms. What has been missing from this area of philosophical inquiry, are studies that make the Buddhist tradition accessible to philosophers who are interested in solving metaphysical problems. This work fills that gap by focusing not on history and texts but on the metaphysical puzzles themselves, and on ways of trying to solve them.

This first comparative study of philosophers and literary theorists Mikhail Bakhtin and Walter Benjamin examines the relationship between the experience of the modern world and the forms that we use to make sense of that experience. Analyzing their views on art, habit, tradition, and language, this comparative study results in a radical reconsideration of received views about thinkers as well as in a reconsideration of the modernity that Bakhtin and Benjamin lived in and that we continue to inhabit now.

Epistemology has traditionally been motivated by a desire to respond to skeptical challenges. The skeptic presents an argument for the view that knowledge is impossible, and the theorist of knowledge is called upon to explain why we should think, contrary to the skeptic, that it is genuinely possible to gain knowledge. Traditional theories of knowledge offer responses to the skeptic which fail to draw on the resources of the sciences. This is no simple oversight; there are principled reasons why such resources are thought to be unavailable to the theorist of knowledge. This book takes a different approach. After arguing that appeals to science are not illegitimate in responding to skepticism, this book shows how the sciences offer an illuminating perspective on traditional questions about the nature and possibility of knowledge. This book serves as an introduction to a scientifically informed approach to the theory of knowledge. This book is a vital resource for students and scholars interested in epistemology and its connections to recent development in cognitive science.

This book takes you to the "classical academy of shamanism," Siberian tribal spirituality that gave birth to the expression "shamanism." For the first time, in this volume Znamenski has rendered in readable English more than one hundred books and articles that describe all aspects of Siberian shamanism: ideology, ritual, mythology, spiritual pantheon, and paraphernalia. It will prove valuable to anthropologists, historians of religion, psychologists and practitioners of shamanism.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Including two new essays, this remarkable volume is an updated edition of Davidson's classic Essays on Actions and Events (1980). A superb work on the nature of human action, it features influential discussions of numerous topics. These include the freedom to act; weakness of the will; the logical form of talk about actions, intentions, and causality; the logic of practical reasoning; Hume's theory of the indirect passions; and the nature and limits of decision theory.

This is a work in Kantian conceptual geography. It explores issues in analytic epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics in particular by appealing to theses drawn from Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Those issues include the nature of the subjective, objective, and empirical; potential scopes of the subjective; what can (and cannot) be said about a subject-independent reality; analyticity, syntheticity, apriority, and aposteriority; constitutive principles, acquisitive principles, and empirical claims; meaning, indeterminacy, and incommensurability; logically possible versus subjectively empirical worlds; and the nature of empirical truth. Part One introduces two theses drawn from the Critique. The first, Empirical Dualism, concerns the subjective, objective, and empirical. The second, Subjective Principlism, concerns principles that might bear on the empirical. Part Two examines work of influential analytic philosophers to reveal how conceptually expansive the territory formed by Empirical Dualism and Subjective Principlism is. Part Three defends that territory by defending Empirical Dualism and Subjective Principlism themselves. Part Four discloses two new lands within the territory that have so far remained uncharted. The first is a Kantian account of meaning, which is shown to be superior to other accounts of meaning in the analytic literature. The second are Kantian thoughts on truth, which illuminate the nature of empirical truth itself. Finally Part Five shows how engaging in Kantian conceptual geography enriches epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics generally.

This is the first English translation of Causalite' et Lois de La Nature, and is an important contribution to the theory of causation. Max Kistler reconstructs a unified concept of causation that is general enough to adequately deal with both elementary physical processes, and the macroscopic level of phenomena we encounter in everyday life. This book will be of great interest to philosophers of science and metaphysics, and also to students and scholars of philosophy of mind where concepts of causation and law play a prominent role. Contents1. What is a Causal Relation? 2. Laws of Nature and Universal Generalisations 3. Applicability Conditions and the Concept of "Strict Law" 4. Consequences 5. The Nomological Theory of Causation and Causal Responsibility 6. Efficacious Properties and the Instantiation of Laws 7. Causal Responsibility and its Applications Conclusion.

The papers in this volume are in honor of Bowman L. Clarke. Bowman Clarke earned degrees from Millsaps College, the University of Mississippi, and Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, including the PhD in philosophy from Emory in 1961. He spent most of his academic career, a total of twenty-nine years, as a member of the Philosophy Department of the University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, from which he retired in 1990. He also served as Head of the Department for several years. He has held many positions of distinction in professional societies, including President of the Georgia Philosophical Society, President of the Society for the Philosophy of Religion, and President of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. He also served as Editor-in Chief of the International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion from 1975-1989. Professor Clarke is the author of Language and Natural Theology (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1966) as well as numerous articles in professional journals. He has made major contributions in the areas of the philosophy of religion, the study of the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, and the development of the calculus of individuals. ix J. F. Harris (ed. ), Logic, God and Metaphysics, ix. (c) 1992 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Introduction The title for this volume, Logic, God, and Metaphysics, was chosen very carefully and deliberately. The papers in this volume are directed at the issues and problems which lie in the domain of the juncture of these three different areas of philosophical inquiry."

Areas covered in this text include: tense and tenselessness; periods and instants; the measurement of time; and time, change and causation. The author attempts to show how considerations in the philosophy of logic and language are needed to settle many of the issues here. For example, the debate about tenselessness turns out to hinge on whether a genuinely tense-free language is conceivable; and the possibility of time without change is grounded in what makes duration-statements have the sense they do.