This book is a sequel to Heaven and Earth in Ancient Greek Cosmology (Springer 2011). With the help of many pictures, the reader is introduced into the way of thinking of ancient believers in a flat earth. The first part offers new interpretations of several Presocratic cosmologists and a critical discussion of Aristotle's proofs that the earth is spherical. The second part explains and discusses the ancient Chinese system called gai tian. The last chapter shows that, inadvertently, ancient arguments and ideas return in the curious modern flat earth cosmologies.

This book explores the thought of Alexius Meinong, a philosopher known for his unconventional theory of reference and predication. The chapters cover a natural progression of topics, beginning with the origins of Gegenstandstheorie, Meinong's theory of objects, and his discovery of assumptions as a fourth category of mental states to supplement his teacher Franz Brentano's references to presentations, feelings, and judgments. The chapters explore further the meaning and metaphysics of fictional and other nonexistent intended objects, fine points in Meinongian object theory are considered and new and previously unanticipated problems are addressed. The author traces being and non-being and aspects of beingless objects including objects in fiction, ideal objects in scientific theory, objects ostensibly referred to in false science and false history and intentional imaginative projection of future states of affairs. The chapters focus on an essential choice of conceptual, logical, semantic, ontic and more generally metaphysical problems and an argument is progressively developed from the first to the final chapter, as key ideas are introduced and refined. Meinong studies have come a long way from Bertrand Russell's off-target criticisms and recent times have seen a rise of interest in a Meinongian approach to logic and the theory of meaning. New thinkers see Meinong as a bridge figure between analytic and continental thought, thanks to the need for an adequate semantics of meaning in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, making this book a particularly timely publication.

The purpose of this work is to critically assess Errol E. Harris's process philosophy in the face of contemporary research in the special sciences. Harris devoted his life to grappling with the big questions concerning the relationships between nature, mind, and knowledge. His 70-plus year career was distinguished, his texts on the history of philosophy, philosophy of science, political philosophy, philosophy of religion, and consciousness were widely published, and yet his metaphysics has until now remained excluded from mainstream discussions. This book's contention is that Harris's work reveals as yet unnoticed connections between theories in numerous scientific disciplines ranging from psychology to cosmology and that an examination of certain theories within these disciplines may serve to strengthen his original arguments. This work maintains that the resulting metaphysics frames a transdisciplinary paradigm shift and provides a viable solution to the hard problem of consciousness.

This book investigates the central metaphysics and epistemology of Advaita. Although the vastness of Advaita literature has grown to immense proportions, there has been a glaring lacuna in unraveling its philosophical, theological and religious implications. This volume undertakes a thematic search on the conception of Atman in an all-important Advaitic text, the Vivekacudamani , and other supportive texts of the same genre. Walter Menezes aims to revive Advaita as a sound philosophical system by driving away the cloud of negativity associated with it, thereby opening a new chapter in the history of Advaita philosophy.

John Foster presents a clear and powerful discussion of a range of topics relating to our understanding of the universe: induction, laws of nature, and the existence of God. He begins by developing a solution to the problem of induction - a solution whose key idea is that the regularities in the workings of nature that have held in our experience hitherto are to be explained by appeal to the controlling influence of laws, as forms of natural necessity. His second line of argument focuses on the issue of what we should take such necessitational laws to be, and whether we can even make sense of them at all. Having considered and rejected various alternatives, Foster puts forward his own proposal: the obtaining of a law consists in the causal imposing of a regularity on the universe as a regularity. With this causal account of laws in place, he is now equipped to offer an argument for theism. His claim is that natural regularities call for explanation, and that, whatever explanatory role we may initially assign to laws, the only plausible ultimate explanation is in terms of the agency of God. Finally, he argues that, once we accept the existence of God, we need to think of him as creating the universe by a method which imposes regularities on it in the relevant law-yielding way. In this new perspective, the original nomological-explanatory solution to the problem of induction becomes a theological-explanatory solution. The Divine Lawmaker is bold and original in its approach, and rich in argument. The issues on which it focuses are among the most important in the whole epistemological and metaphysical spectrum.

Often called Kant's "first critique," this is a foundational work of modern philosophy, one that attempts to define the very nature of reason, and to join the two schools of thought dominant in the late 18th century: that of Empiricism and Rationalism. At the border between thinking subject to religion and realities as the burgeoning sciences were demonstrating at the time, Kant explores ethics, the limits of human knowledge, logic, deduction, observation, and intuition, and in the process laid the groundwork for the modern intellect. First published in 1781, this is required reading for anyone wishing to be considered well educated. German metaphysician IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804) served as a librarian of the Royal Library, a prestigious government position, and as a professor at Knigsberg University. His other works include Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), and Critique of Practical Reason (1788).

Philosophical naturalism, according to which philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences, has dominated the Western academy for well over a century; but Michael Rea claims that it is without rational foundation, and that the costs of embracing it are surprisingly high. Rea argues compellingly to the surprising conclusion that naturalists are committed to rejecting realism about material objects, materialism, and perhaps realism about other minds. That is surely a price that naturalists are unwilling to pay: this philosophical orthodoxy should be rejected.

This book introduces a radically spatialised approach to knowledge creation and innovation. Reflecting on an array of European urban and regional developments, it offers an updated notion of milieu as the conceptual and material space of knowledge and innovation in line with the interpretative turn in social sciences and humanities. In view of the unwillingness of mainstream economics to accommodate such a trend, the authors pursue a broadly understood hermeneutic approach that expands on the triad of knowledge-space-innovation. The book's main findings are that space is an essential intermediary in the connection between knowledge and innovation, and that a renewed notion of milieu provides the knowledge-space-innovation triad with both an analytical basis and operational power. It also offers fresh insights into the significance and potential of the knowledge economy. A number of empirical European case studies on various scales (organisations, cities and territories) support the findings and suggest new policy directions.

The content of the volume is divided as follows: after presenting two rival approaches to substantiality and causality: a traditional (ontological) view vs. a transcendental one (Rosiak) there follow two sections: the first presents studies of substance as showing some causal aspects (Buchheim, Keinanen, Kovac, Piwowarczyk), whereas the other contains investigations of causality showing in a way its reference to the category of substance (Kobiela, Meixner, Mitscherling, Wronski). The last, short section contains two studies of extension (Leszczynski and Skowron) which can be regarded as a conceptual background of both substantiality and causality. The book gives a very colourful picture of the discussions connected with substantiality and causality which may be of potential interest for the readers.

Robert Hanna argues for the importance of Kant's theories of the epistemological, metaphysical, and practical foundations of the 'exact sciences'-- relegated to the dustbin of the history of philosophy for most of the 20th century. Hanna's earlier book Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy (OUP 2001), explores basic conceptual and historical connections between Immanuel Kant's 18th-century Critical Philosophy and the tradition of mainstream analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine. The central topics of the analytic tradition in its early and middle periods were meaning and necessity. But the central theme of mainstream analytic philosophy after 1950 is scientific naturalism, which holds--to use Wilfrid Sellars's apt phrase--that 'science is the measure of all things'. This type of naturalism is explicitly reductive. Kant, Science, and Human Nature has two aims, one negative and one positive. Its negative aim is to develop a Kantian critique of scientific naturalism. But its positive and more fundamental aim is to work out the elements of a humane, realistic, and nonreductive Kantian account of the foundations of the exact sciences. According to this account, the essential properties of the natural world are directly knowable through human sense perception (empirical realism), and practical reason is both explanatorily and ontologically prior to theoretical reason (the primacy of the practical).

In 1945 Alonzo Church issued a pair of referee reports in which he anonymously conveyed to Frederic Fitch a surprising proof showing that wherever there is (empirical) ignorance there is also logically unknowable truth. Fitch published this and a generalization of the result in 1963. Ever since, philosophers have been attempting to understand the significance and address the counter-intuitiveness of this, the so-called paradox of knowability.
This collection assembles Church's referee reports, Fitch's 1963 paper, and nineteen new papers on the knowability paradox. The contributors include logicians and philosophers from three continents, many of whom have already made important contributions to the discussion of the problem. The volume contains a general introduction to the paradox and the background literature, and is divided into seven sections that roughly mark the central points of debate. The sections include the history of the paradox, Michael Dummett's constructivism, issues of paraconsistency, developments of modal and temporal logics, Cartesian restricted theories of truth, modal and mathematical fictionalism, and reconsiderations about how, and whether, we ought to construe an anti-realist theory of truth.

Nietzsche's metaphor of the spider that spins its cobweb expresses his critique of the metaphysical use of language - but it also suggests that we, spiders , are able to spin different, life-affirming, healthier, non-metaphysical cobwebs. This book is a collection of 12 essays that focus not only on Nietzsche's critique of the metaphysical assumptions of language, but also on his effort to use language in a different way, i.e., to create a new language . It is from this viewpoint that the book considers such themes as consciousness, the self, metaphor, instinct, affectivity, style, morality, truth, and knowledge. The authors invited to contribute to this volume are Nietzsche scholars who belong to some of the most important research centers of the European Nietzsche-Research: Centro Colli-Montinari (Italy), GIRN (Europhilosphie), SEDEN (Spain), Greifswald Research Group (Germany), NIL (Portugal). In 2011 Joao Constancio and Maria Joao Mayer Branco edited Nietzsche on Instinct and Language, also published by Walter de Gruyter. The two books complement each other.

A doctrine of intelligent design through evolution is not going to find many friends. It is destined to encounter opposition on all sides. Among scientists the backlog of evolution will have little patience for intelligent design. Among religiousists, many who form intelligent design have their doubts about evolution. In the general public s mind there is a diametrical opposition between evolution and intelligent design: one excludes the other. This book will argue that this view of the matter is not correct, and that in actuality one can regard evolution itself as a pathway to intelligent design. We would do well to go beyond The Origin of Species and taking as our guide such works as W. Wentworth Thomson s On Growth and Form acknowledging that evolutionary adaptation can result in solutions of a sort that intelligence could readily ratify. Accordingly, what the present book seeks is a naturalization of Intelligent Design that sees such design as itself the result of natural and evolutionary processes."

Building from foundations of modern science and cosmic evolution, as well as psychological and philosophical perspectives of value and meaning, this book explores some of humanity's biggest questions: * Is the Universe "about something"? * What might be roles for life and intelligence in cosmic evolution? * How might we think about value, meaning, purpose, and ethics in a cosmic evolutionary context? The author explores how the sciences of relativity and quantum theory, combined with cosmic evolution and philosophical traditions such as process philosophy, contribute to the development of a broad "relationalist framework". That framework helps inform perspectives such as "scientific minimalism" and "cosmological theories of value". Cosmological Reverence, Cosmocultural Evolution, and the Connection-Action Principle are explored as examples of cosmological theories of value, all of which help inform how we might think about ethics, value, and meaning in a cosmic context - including application to the search for extraterrestrial life and the future of intelligence in the universe. This book will benefit a diverse range of practitioners in philosophy, science, and policy, including interdisciplinary fields such as Science and Society and cultural evolution studies. From the Foreword: "This volume ranges from the sciences of cosmic evolution, relativity, and quantum mechanics, to value theory and process philosophy, all with the goal of exploring how they relate to humanity in the sense of worldviews and meaning. With his three cosmological theories of value, Lupisella goes beyond the bounds of most books on naturalism, and into fundamental questions about the nature of the universe and our relation to it. To read Lupisella is to have a mind-boggling experience, to want to race to references, to want to know more." Steven J. Dick Former Baruch S. Blumberg NASA/ Library of Congress Chair in Astrobiology Former NASA Chief Historian

Every form of life is coded by the genetic code. Life continually changes and evolves. However, the language of the Code does not change. A billion years ago, the primitive life forms on Earth spoke the same body language as they do today. They used the same Code. Nothing has changed. Is this Code eternal? What are the principles of its design? Of course, some will even ask, who designed it? In order to respond to these questions, the book takes an unexpected tack. It develops the proposition that "two takes" are necessary in order to understand reality, a left side take, and a right side take. All of present day sciences, including mathematics are based on the left side take on reality. All of the languages of present day science, including conventional mathematics, are "left side" languages. The book develops the foundations for another kind of science, the "right side" science. We call it the First Science. The book argues that the language for this right side unifying science is none other than the Code. It is here that the story becomes quite extravagant. This Code is so generic that it can code literally anything, not just the biological. In this perspective, the life principle permeates just about everything that exists. The origin of the First Science goes back to Aristotle, and even before. According to Aristotle, the First Science was even supposed to provide knowledge of God. The book explores this ancient territory with modern eyes and ends up revealing a new science and a new kind of geometry. The science is proposed as the unifying science, not only of matter and mathematics, but of consciousness and the generic form of things.

Kant is probably the philosopher who best typifies the thought and ideals of the Enlightenment. He was influenced by the modern physics of Newton, the rationalist perfectionism of Leibniz and Wolff, the critical empiricism of Locke and Hume, and Rousseau's celebration of liberty and individualism, and his work can be seen partly as an attempt to combine and synthesize these various ideas. In moral philosophy, he developed a radical and radically new conception of the unconditional value of human autonomy, which he opposed to both theological and utilitarian conceptions of moral value. He first expounded his moral vision in the "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals" (1785), the seminal work of modern moral philosophy in which he introduced his infamous 'categorical imperative'. Paul Guyer's Reader's Guide will help readers find their way in this brilliant but dense and sometimes baffling work.

Truth, Time and History investigates the reality of the past by connecting arguments across areas which are conventionally discussed in isolation from each other. Breaking the impasse within the narrower analytic debate between Dummett's semantic anti-realists and the truth value link realists as to whether the past exists independently of our methods of verification, the book argues, through an examination of the puzzles concerning identity over time, that only the present exists. Drawing on Lewis's analogy between times and possible worlds, and work by Collingwood and Oakeshott, and the continental philosopher, Barthes, the author advances a wholly novel proposal, as to how aspects of ersatz presentism may be combined with historical coherentism to uphold the legitimacy of discourse about the past. In highlighting the role of historians in the creation and construction of temporality, Truth, Time and History offers a convincing philosophical argument for the inherence of an unreal past in the real present.

This volume documents the 17th Munster Lectures in Philosophy with Susan Haack, the prominent contemporary philosopher. It contains an original, programmatic article by Haack on her overall philosophical approach, entitled 'The Fragmentation of Philosophy, the Road to Reintegration'. In addition, the volume includes seven papers on various aspects of Haack's philosophical work as well as her replies to the papers. Susan Haack has deeply influenced many of the debates in contemporary philosophy. In her vivid and accessible way, she has made ground-breaking contributions covering a wide range of topics, from logic, metaphysics and epistemology, to pragmatism and the philosophy of science and law. In her work, Haack has always been very sensitive in detecting subtle differences. The distinctions she has introduced reveal what lies at the core of philosophical controversies, and show the problems that exist with established views. In order to resolve these problems, Haack has developed some 'middle-course approaches'. One example of this is her famous 'Foundherentism', a theory of justification that includes elements from both the rival theories of Foundationalism and Coherentism. Haack herself has offered the best description of her work calling herself a 'passionate moderate'.

This monograph presents Azzouni's new approach to the rule-following paradox. His solution leaves intact an isolated individual's capacity to follow rules, and it simultaneously avoids replacing the truth conditions for meaning-talk with mere assertability conditions for that talk. Kripke's influential version of Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox-and Wittgenstein's views more generally-on the contrary, make rule-following practices and assertions about those practices subject to community norms without which they lose their cogency. Azzouni summarizes and develops Kripke's original version of Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox to make salient the linchpin assumptions of the paradox. By doing so, Azzouni reveals how compelling Kripke's earlier work on the paradox was. Objections raised over the years by Fodor, Forbes Ginsborg, Goldfarb, Tait, Wright, and many others, are all shown to fail. No straight solution (a solution that denies an assumption of the paradox) can be made to work. Azzouni illustrates this in detail by showing that a popular family of straight solutions due to Lewis and refined by Williams, "reference magnetism," fail as well. And yet an overlooked sceptical solution is still available in logical space. Azzouni describes a series of "disposition-meaning" private languages that he shows can be successfully used by a population of speakers to communicate with one another despite their ideolectical character. The same sorts of languages enable solitary "Robinson Crusoes" to survive and flourish in their island habitats. These languages-sufficiently refined-have the same properties normal human languages have; and this is the key to solving the rule-following paradox without sacrificing the individual's authority over her self-imposed rules or her ability to follow those rules. Azzouni concludes this unusual monograph by uncovering a striking resemblance between the rule-following paradox and Hume's problem of induction: he shows the rule-following paradox to be a corollary of Hume's problem that arises when the problem of induction is applied to an individual's own abilities to follow rules. "The book is clearly and engagingly written, and the conclusions are well-argued-for. (Depressingly well-argued-for in the case of Chapter 3, as I've always been partial to Lewisian responses to Putnam's model-theoretic argument--I'm rethinking that now.) And the proposed solution to the rule-following paradox really is novel." Joshua Brown - Gustavus Adolphus College

Truth, Language, and History is the much-anticipated final volume of Donald Davidson's philosophical writings. In four groups of essays, Davidson continues to explore the themes that occupied him for more than fifty years: the relations between language and the world; speaker intention and linguistic meaning; language and mind; mind and body; mind and world; mind and other minds. He asks: what is the role of the concept of truth in these explorations? And, can a scientific world view make room for human thought without reducing it to something material and mechanistic? Including a new introduction by his widow, Marcia Cavell, this volume completes Donald Davidson's colossal intellectual legacy.