This title offers a fresh approach to the plays that suggests they can be seen as metaphysical 'experiments' conducted in the medium of drama.Metaphysics is usually associated with that part of the philosophical tradition which asks about 'last things', questions such as: How many substances are there in the world? Which is more fundamental, quantity or quality? Are events prior to things, or do they happen to those things? While he wasn't a philosopher, Shakespeare was obviously interested in 'ultimates' of this sort. Instead of probing these issues with argument, however, he did so with plays. "Shakespearean Metaphysics" argues for Shakespeare's inclusion within a metaphysical tradition that opposes empiricism and Cartesian dualism.Through close readings of three major plays - "The Tempest", "King Lear" and "Twelfth Night" - Witmore proposes that Shakespeare's manner of depicting life on stage itself constitutes an 'answer' to metaphysical questions raised by later thinkers such as Spinoza, Bergson, and Whitehead. Each of these readings shifts the interpretative frame around the plays in radical ways; taken together they show the limits of our understanding of theatrical play as an 'illusion' generated by the physical circumstances of production."Shakespeare Now!" is a series of short books that engage imaginatively and often provocatively with the possibilities of Shakespeare's plays. It goes back to the source - the most living language imaginable - and recaptures the excitement, audacity and surprise of Shakespeare. It will return you to the plays with opened eyes.

Anticipating not only modern scientific theories of psychology but also those of cosmology, this astonishing book sets out a impressive goal for itself: to reconcile human biology with a theory of consciousness. First published in France in 1907, and translated into English in 1911, this work of wonder was esteemed at the time in scientific circles and in the popular culture alike for its profound explorations of perception and memory and its surprising conclusions about the nature and value of art. Contending that intuition is deeper than intellect and that the real consequence of evolution is a mental freedom to grow, to change, to seek and create novelty, Bergson reinvigorated the theory of evolution by refusing to see it as merely mechanistic. His expansion on Darwin remains one of the most original and important philosophical arguments for a scientific inquiry still under fire today. French philosopher HENRI BERGSON (1859-1941) was born in Paris. Among his works are Matter and Memory (1896), An Introduction to Metaphysics (1903), and The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932). He was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1927.

In this second book of the Global Healing trilogy, Vipin Mehta takes us on the sacred journey to awaken spirituality beyond organized religions so that we can consciously create global healing by using metaphysical tools. The journey shows how spirituality will lead humanity by raising the level of human consciousness from nationalism to globalism and from patriotism to humanism.

This book is about our ordinary concept of matter in the form of enduring continuants and the processes in which they are involved in the macroscopic realm. It emphasises what science rather than philosophical intuition tells us about the world, and chemistry rather than the physics that is more usually encountered in philosophical discussions. The central chapters dealing with the nature of matter pursue key steps in the historical development of scientific conceptions of chemical substance. Like many contemporary discussions of material objects, it relies heavily on mereology. The classical principles are applied to the mereological structure of regions of space, intervals of time, processes and quantities of matter. Quantities of matter, which don't gain or lose parts over time, are distinguished from individuals, which are typically constituted of different quantities of matter at different times. The proper treatment of the temporal aspect of the features of material objects is a central issue in this book, which is addressed by investigating the conditions governing the application of predicates relating time and other entities. Of particular interest here are relations between quantities of matter and times expressing substance kind, phase and mixture. Modal aspects of these features are taken up in the final chapter.

Robert Stalnaker draws together in this volume his seminal work in metaphysics. The central theme is the role of possible worlds in articulating our various metaphysical commitments. The book begins with reflections on the general idea of a possible world, and then uses the framework of possible worlds to formulate and clarify some questions about properties and individuals, reference, thought, and experience. The essays also reflect on the nature of metaphysics, and on the relation between questions about what there is and questions about how we talk and think about what there is. Two of the fourteen essays, plus an extensive introduction that sets the papers in context and draws out the essays' common threads, are published here for the first time.

Borders enclose and separate us. We assign to them tremendous significance. Along them we draw supposedly uncrossable boundaries within which we believe our individual identities begin and end, erecting the metaphysical dividing walls that enclose each one of us into numerically identical, numerically distinct, entities: persons. Do the borders between us - physical, psychological, neurological, causal, spatial, temporal, etc. - merit the metaphysical significance ordinarily accorded them? The central thesis of I Am You is that our borders do not signify boundaries between persons. We are all the same person. Variations on this heretical theme have been voiced periodically throughout the ages (the Upanishads, Averroes, Giordano Bruno, Josiah Royce, Schrodinger, Fred Hoyle, Freeman Dyson). In presenting his arguments, the author relies on detailed analyses of recent formal work on personal identity, especially that of Derek Parfit, Sydney Shoemaker, Robert Nozick, David Wiggins, Daniel C. Dennett and Thomas Nagel, while incorporating the views of Descartes, Leibniz, Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer, Kant, Husserl and Brouwer. His development of the implied moral theory is inspired by, and draws on, Rawls, Sidgwick, Kant and again Parfit. The traditional, commonsense view that we are each a separate person numerically identical to ourselves over time, i.e., that personal identity is closed under known individuating and identifying borders - what the author calls Closed Individualism - is shown to be incoherent. The demonstration that personal identity is not closed but open points collectively in one of two new directions: either there are no continuously existing, self-identical persons over time in the sense ordinarily understood - the sort of view developed by philosophers as diverse as Buddha, Hume and most recently Derek Parfit, what the author calls Empty Individualism - or else you are everyone, i.e., personal identity is not closed under known individuating and identifying borders, what the author calls Open Individualism. In making his case, the author:

- offers a new explanation both of consciousness and of self-consciousness

- constructs a new theory of Self

- explains psychopathologies (e.g. multiple personality disorder, schizophrenia)

- shows Open Individualism to be the best competing explanation of who we are

- provides the metaphysical foundations for global ethics.

The book is intended for philosophers and the philosophically inclined - physicists, mathematicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, linguists, computer scientists, economists, and communication theorists. It is accessible to graduate students and advanced undergraduates."

I Know myself, I know myself, I am One With God -From the Pert Em Heru "The Ru Pert em Heru" or "Ancient Egyptian Book of The Dead," or "Book of Coming Forth By Day" as it is more popularly known, has fascinated the world since the successful translation of Ancient Egyptian hieroglyphic scripture over 150 years ago. The astonishing writings in it reveal that the Ancient Egyptians believed in life after death and in an ultimate destiny to discover the Divine. The elegance and aesthetic beauty of the hieroglyphic text itself has inspired many see it as an art form in and of itself. But is there more to it than that? Did the Ancient Egyptian wisdom contain more than just aphorisms and hopes of eternal life beyond death? In this volume Dr. Muata Ashby, the author of over 25 books on Ancient Egyptian Yoga Philosophy has produced a new translation of the original texts which uncovers a mystical teaching underlying the sayings and rituals instituted by the Ancient Egyptian Sages and Saints. "Once the philosophy of Ancient Egypt is understood as a mystical tradition instead of as a religion or primitive mythology, it reveals its secrets which if practiced today will lead anyone to discover the glory of spiritual self-discovery. The Pert em Heru is in every way comparable to the Indian Upanishads or the Tibetan Book of the Dead."  $28.95 ISBN# 1-884564-28-3 Size: 81/2" X

Defining an "emphatic" as an intrusion that alters the import of what it intrudes on, Weiss sets the stage for an exquisitely systematic, speculative study of the major themes confronting modern metaphysics. The idea of an emphatic has its roots in Weiss's long-developed pluralistic ontology, with special focus on what we experience as an "emphasis." The most obvious examples are grammatical devices such as changed pitch in speech or exclamation and question marks in writing. Weiss also analyzes emphatics in etiquette, social status, nature, art, conventional behavior, encyclopedias, psychiatry, and religion.

Brilliant in every respect, "Emphatics" rewrites Weiss's systematic ontology in new terms. Not only are the lineaments of the system reexamined, but this book floods the reader with new perspectives and insights on relationship, signs, truth, particularity, space-time causality, education, mind-body issues, Being and other ultimate philosophical categories, and good and evil.

Weiss engages the various objections to his position in a series of question-and-answer epilogues at the end of each chapter that allow the reader to follow step-by-step a great philosophical mind at work. He takes his critics seriously, grapples with their objections, and answers them honestly. His discourse creatively revisits age-old questions and in reimagining new answers establishes the continuing relevance of philosophy as an academic discipline.

Although the importance of Francisco Suarez has been, for some time already, generally recognized even outside the circles of historians of scholasticism, the wider context of his thought - i.e., the rich and diverse Renaissance and Baroque scholasticism - remains largely unexplored. This book is an attempt to contribute to the quest of putting Suarez's metaphysics (a mere fragment of the whole of his intellectual legacy) into context, historical and systematic. Being the fruit of an international conference held in Prague in October 2008, it puts together a systematically ordered selection of papers devoted to general and specific topics of Suarezian metaphysics, with special respect to its sources and further impact. Part One explores in the first place the notion of being and the nature of metaphysics in general; Part Two then deals with more specific metaphysical topics such as the problem of universals, causality, relations, and God. The book will be of value not just to Suarez-scholars, but to anyone interested in the history of ideas in general and in the the intricacies of metaphysical thought at the verge of modernity in particular.

This book, provides a critical approach to all major logical paradoxes: from ancient to contemporary ones. There are four key aims of the book: 1. Providing systematic and historical survey of different approaches - solutions of the most prominent paradoxes discussed in the logical and philosophical literature. 2. Introducing original solutions of major paradoxes like: Liar paradox, Protagoras paradox, an unexpected examination paradox, stone paradox, crocodile, Newcomb paradox. 3. Explaining the far-reaching significance of paradoxes of vagueness and change for philosophy and ontology. 4. Proposing a novel, well justified and, as it seems, natural classification of paradoxes. "

Evolutionary theory has long been debated, not only on religious grounds, but in terms of its usefulness as a scientific model. A common objection is that the theory does not fit the hypothetical-deductive standard used in the physical sciences and is therefore not good science. In this study, Lloyd contends with the scientific and philosophical critics of evolutionary theory. Employing the same type of semantic analysis that has been applied to physical theory, she offers an alternative view of evolutionary theory that shows biological and physical theories to be structurally similar. The author begins by reviewing recent debates concerning the existence or non-existence of evolutionary laws and the possibility of axiomizing evolutionary theory. The central discussion of Lloyd's work revolves around several problems that have not been resolved by other methods. These are, first, the problem of which units or entities are selected in nature; second, the problem of reductionism in genetics; and third, the problem of confirmation. Developing a view of evolutionary theory based on mathematical models, she uses this framework to describe a wide variety of evolutionary subtheories. She tests her analysis by comparing it with other approaches and applying it to problematic cases. Finally, she presents a view of confirmation appropriate to a model-oriented conception of theories. This original study explores some significant connections between science and philosophy and adds to our understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge.

This anthology is about the signal change in Leibniz's metaphysics with his explicit adoption of substantial forms in 1678-79. This change can either be seen as a moment of discontinuity with his metaphysics of maturity or as a moment of continuity, such as a passage to the metaphysics from his last years. Between the end of his sejour at Paris (November 1676) and the first part of the Hanover period, Leibniz reformed his dynamics and began to use the theory of corporeal substance. This book explores a very important part of the philosophical work of the young Leibniz. Expertise from around the globe is collated here, including Daniel Garber's work based on the recent publication of Leibniz's correspondence from the late 1690s, examining how the theory of monads developed during these crucial years. Richard Arthur argues that the introduction of substantial forms, reinterpreted as enduring primitive forces of action in each corporeal substance, allows Leibniz to found the reality of the phenomena of motion in force and thus avoid reducing motion to a mere appearance. Amongst other themes covered in this book, Pauline Phemister's paper investigates Leibniz's views on animals and plants, highlighting changes, modifications and elaborations over time of Leibniz's views and supporting arguments and paying particular attention to his claim that the future is already contained in the seeds of living things. The editor, Adrian Nita, contributes a paper on the continuity or discontinuity of Leibniz's work on the question of the unity and identity of substance from the perspective of the relation with soul (anima) and mind (mens).

This original book enters the undeveloped territory of feminist metaphysics and offers a bold and unusual contribution to debates about identity, essence and self. Using a diverse range of theories - from Kant to chaos theory, from Kierkegaard to Deleuze, Irigaray, Butler and Oliver Sachs - this book challenges the assumption that metaphysics can remain unchanged by issues of sexual difference.

Nicolai Hartmann's Possibility and Actuality is the second volume of a four-part investigation of ontology. It deals with such questions as: How do we know that something is really possible? Is the possible only the actual? Is the actual only the possible? What is the difference between ideal and real possibility? This groundbreaking work of modal analysis describes the logical relations between possibility, actuality, and necessity, and it provides insight into the relations between modes of knowledge and modes of being. Hartmann reviews the history of philosophical concepts of possibility and necessity, from ancient Megarian philosophy to Aristotle, to Medieval Scholasticism, to Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. He explains the importance of modal analysis as a basic investigative tool, and he proposes an approach to understanding the nature of human existence that unifies the fields of ontology, modal logic, metaphysics, and epistemology. This brilliant and fascinating work is relevant to many topics of debate in contemporary philosophy, including the ontology of possible worlds, the metaphysics of modality, the logic of counterfactual conditionals, and modal epistemology. It illuminates the nature of real, ideal, logical, and epistemic possibility.

Explores the link between mathematics and ontology.

This book tackles some of the deepest problems in Berkeley's philosophy by providing a fresh interpretation of Berkeley's core ontological doctrines and their relationship to his views about self-consciousness. Berkeley, the author argues, is led to adopt a new model of self-consciousness because he rejects the basic metaphysics of many of his predecessors. This new model of self-consciousness provides the foundation for Berkeley's own ontological framework. Bettcher's interpretation provides answers to long-standing questions about Berkeley's traditionally derided views about mind, offers an elegant treatment of Berkeley's core metaphysical views more generally, and illuminates Berkeley's innovative attempt to address the important philosophical and theological issues of his day. Moreover, Bettcher shows the importance of Berkeley's philosophy of spirit to the perplexing thesis that the subject of experience is somehow mysteriously elusive. She argues that Berkeley can be seen as a transitional figure with respect to the older philosophical concept of 'subject' (as a metaphysical supporter of properties) and the more modern philosophical concept of 'subject (as opposed to 'object'). She provides a re-reading of Hume's famous claim that when he turned reflection upon himself, he could perceive only perceptions and sheds new light on the notion of a 'subject of experience'. The book will be of substantial interest both to Berkeley scholars and to philosophers concerned with contemporary discussions of self-consciousness.

Brian Leftow offers a theory of the possible and the necessary in which God plays the chief role, and a new sort of argument for God's existence. It has become usual to say that a proposition is possible just in case it is true in some 'possible world' (roughly, some complete history a universe might have) and necessary just if it is true in all. Thus much discussion of possibility and necessity since the 1960s has focussed on the nature and existence (or not) of possible worlds. God and Necessity holds that there are no such things, nor any sort of abstract entity. It assigns the metaphysical 'work' such items usually do to God and events in God's mind, and reduces 'broadly logical' modalities to causal modalities, replacing possible worlds in the semantics of modal logic with God and His mental events. Leftow argues that theists are committed to theist modal theories, and that the merits of a theist modal theory provide an argument for God's existence. Historically, almost all theist modal theories base all necessary truth on God's nature. Leftow disagrees: he argues that necessary truths about possible creatures and kinds of creatures are due ultimately to God's unconstrained imagination and choice. On his theory, it is in no sense part of the nature of God that normal zebras have stripes (if that is a necessary truth). Stripy zebras are simply things God thought up, and they have the nature they do simply because that is how God thought of them. Thus Leftow's essay in metaphysics takes a half-step toward Descartes' view of modal truth, and presents a compelling theist theory of necessity and possibility.

This volume is devoted to problems within analytic metaphysics. It defends an ontology and theory of categories inspired by Aristotle, but revised in such a way as to be compatible with modern science. The ontology of both natural and social reality is addressed, starting out from the view that universals exist but only in the spatiotemporal world (immanent realism). In attempting to bring Aristotle's ontology up-to-date, the author relies very much on the thinking of Edmund Husserl, conceiving the cement of the universe as Husserlian relations of existential dependence and regarding intentionality as a non-reducible category in the ontology of mind. The work is thoroughly realistic in spirit, but large parts of it should nonetheless be of interest to conceptualists and nominalists, too.

In "The Nature of Evil, "Daryl Koehn takes us on a sweeping tour of different interpretations of evil. In this timely and serious discussion she argues that evil is not intentional malice, but rather violence that stems from a false sense of self. Violence is not true evil but a symptom of the underlying evil of our failure to really know who we are. Koehn examines situations in which good intentions can have horrific results. She explores such works as "The Talented Mr. Ripley," Dante's" Inferno," and "The Turn of the Screw" to illustrate the origins of evil and suffering. "The Nature of Evil" offers an insightful and engaging exploration at a time when we are all struggling to understand the roots of violence and suffering.

Ethical Personalism proposes to reflect on the person from at least three levels: ontology, epistemology, and ethics. Articulating from various philosophical and religious angles and traditions the ontological and inalienable value of the human person, i.e., her dignity, the contributors to this volume show not just what it means to be a human person, but also what it takes to live accordingly. Hence, beyond the purely theoretical elaboration on ethical personalism that reposes the crucial debates between relativism and realism on the one hand, and consequentialism and deontology on the other hand, this volume offers a range of insights useful for addressing concrete and practical matters that we, as humans, are confronted in our everyday life. With the call "back to the person!" which takes roots from a deep conviction to bring into light the value of the person, Ethical Personalism unequivocally affirms the necessity of (re)placing the person in the centre of our project of society, economic plans, political settings, and environment policies.