This volume gathers together new essays on deception and self-deception by leading thinkers on the subject. The contributors discuss topics including the nature and the definition of deception; whether deception is morally blameworthy or not; attacks against and defenses of self-deception; and the most famous philosophical account of lying by Immanuel Kant. Deception of others and self-deception share many more interconnections than is normally recognized, and these essays reveal the benefits of considering them together.
he Philosophy of Deceptionill be of interest to philosophers across the spectrum including those interested in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and metaphysics.

Humanness supposes innate and profound reflexivity. This volume approaches the concept of reflexivity on two different yet related analytical planes. Whether implicitly or explicitly, both planes of thought bear critically on reflexivity in relation to the nature of selfhood and the very idea of the autonomous individual, ethics, and humanness, science as such and social science, ontological dualism and fundamental ambiguity. On the one plane, a collection of original and innovative ethnographically based essays is offered, each of which is devoted to ways in which reflexivity plays a fundamental role in human social life and the study of it; on the other-anthropo-philosophical and developed in the volume's Preface, Introduction, and Postscript-it is argued that reflexivity distinguishes-definitively, albeit relatively-the being and becoming of the human.

How do mental events such as choices and decisions lead to physical action? The problem of mental causation is one of the most important and intriguing philosophical issues of our time and has been at the centre of debates in the philosophy of mind for the past fifty years. In opposition to the recent wave of reductionist theories, this book argues that it is possible to account for mental causation within a nonreductive framework as it adopts a broadly Davidsonian approach to mental causation: reasons cause actions because they are identical to physical events. This work then defends this approach from the frequently raised criticism that it entails epiphenomenalism - the inefficacy of the mental. Moreover, Mental Causation moves beyond Davidson's views by reconsidering the question of whether reasons causally explain actions, arguing in opposition to Davidson, that explanations appealing to reasons represent a distinct category of explanation from causal explanation. Essential reading for anyone interested in debates about mental causation, this is an excellent text for senior undergraduates, graduate students, and professional philosophers.

Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, and the Politics of Dwelling explores the ethical and political implications of the debate between Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas on the question of Place. Throughout his philosophical career, Heidegger exhibited concern about the uprooting of man that accompanies the modern oblivion of Being and vividly described the consequences of modern deracination as manifest in everything from everyday inauthenticity to the growth of world technology. In response to this perceived crisis, Heidegger propounds a series on ontological models that illuminate the manner in which man is ensconced in the house of Being. As it stands, Heidegger's homecoming project is rife with political implications, as it led him to embrace a variety of political stances that run the gamut from an emphasis on the "site" of politics to volkisch nationalism to solitary quietism. No thinker was more disturbed by Heidegger's homecoming project than Levinas. In various writings, Levinas levels an incisive critique of Heidegger's place-bound ontology. More specifically, Levinas accuses Heideggerian ontology of being averse to transcendence and conductive to tyranny, of failing to recognize the inherent dignity of the human person, and of being a manifestation of latter-day paganism. Additionally, Levinas also advances an alternative manner of thinking about the home. For Levinas, the home is a place where wanderers find refuge; and it rises to the fullness of its ethical potentiality when used an instrument of hospitality to the other person. By considering the Heidegger-Levinas debate, this book illustrates the concern that animated their perspective projects and the dangers of chauvinism and rootlessness inherent in the attempt to construct a contemporary politics of place. In the end, Heidegger and Levinas point toward the necessity of politics of place that is both ontological and ethical, and which successfully navigates between the twin extremes of narrow tribalism and rootless cosmo

Why should there be anything at all? Why, in particular, should a material world exist? Bede Rundle advances clear, non-technical answers to these perplexing questions. If, as the theist maintains, God is a being who cannot but exist, his existence explains why there is something rather than nothing. However, this can also be explained on the basis of a weaker claim. Not that there is some particular being that has to be, but simply that there has to be something or other. Rundle proffers arguments for thinking that that is indeed how the question is to be put to rest. Traditionally, the existence of the physical universe is held to depend on God, but the theist faces a major difficulty in making clear how a being outside space and time, as God is customarily conceived to be, could stand in an intelligible relation to the world, whether as its creator or as the author of events within it. Rundle argues that a creator of physical reality is not required, since there is no alternative to its existence. There has to be something, and a physical universe is the only real possibility. He supports this claim by eliminating rival contenders; he dismisses the supernatural, and argues that, while other forms of being, notably the abstract and the mental, are not reducible to the physical, they presuppose its existence. The question whether ultimate explanations can ever be given is forever in the background, and the book concludes with an investigation of this issue and of the possibility that the universe could have existed for an infinite time. Other topics discussed include causality, space, verifiability, essence, existence, necessity, spirit, fine tuning, and laws of Nature. Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing offers an explanation of fundamental facts of existence in purely philosophical terms, without appeal either to theology or cosmology. It will provoke and intrigue anyone who wonders about these questions.

Nietzsche's strengths as a critic are widely acknowledged, but his peculiar style of critique is usually ignored as rhetoric, or dismissed as violent or simply incoherent. In this book, Nietzsche's concept of the agon or Wettkampf, a measured and productive form of conflict inspired by ancient Greek culture, is advanced as the dynamic and organising principle of his philosophical practice, enabling us to make sense of his critical confrontations and the much disputed concept of transvaluation or Umwertung. Agonal perspectives are cast on number of key problems in his thought across a broad range of texts. Topics and problems treated include: critical history and the need for a limit in the negation of the past; Nietzsche contra Socrates and the problem of closure; Nietzsche contra humanism and the problem of humanity; Nietzsche contra Kant on genius and legislation; the problem of self-legislation in relation to life and temporality; Nietzsche's sense of community in its articulation with law, and the normativity of taste; ressentiment and the question of therapy in Nietzsche and Freud; and the problem of total affirmation in relation to critique. These studies have a broad appeal, from MA level to advanced Nietzsche research.

This intelligible yet challenging survey aims to introduce the student to central metaphysical issues while at the same time pursuing a coherent metaphysical view. The range of topics discussed is refreshingly different from the average metaphysics introduction, thereby making it ideal for upper-division undergraduates and beginning graduate students. The author sets the scene by taking the student through general theoretical matters, including discussions on the nature of metaphysics and the nature of concepts, and offering a general conception of the nature of philosophy. He then proceeds to address a diversity of metaphysical issues, ranging from color to modality to the nature of physical objects through to the question of truth in fiction. Exercises designed to stimulate further talking and to indicate further dimensions of the topics are posed throughout the book to encourage a more advanced study of the discipline.

Through original speculations on the surprisingly complementary concepts of simultaneity and delay, and new interpretations of the great philosophers of time, this book proposes an innovative theory of staggered time. In the early 20th Century, Bergson and Husserl (following Einstein) made Simultaneity-what it means for events to occur at the same time-a central motif in philosophy.In the late 20th Century, Derrida and Deleuze instead emphasized Delay-events staggered over distant times.This struggle between convergent and staggered time also plays out in 20th Century aesthetics (especially music), politics, and the sciences. Despite their importance in the history of philosophy, this is the first book to comprehensively examine the concepts of simultaneity and delay.By putting simultaneity and delay into a dialectical relation, this book argues that time in general is organized by elastic rhythms. Lampert's concepts describe the time-structures of such diverse phenomena as atonal music, political decision-making, neuronal delays, leaps of memory and the boredom of waiting; and simultaneities and delays in everyday experience and behaviour.

Responding to growing interest in the Kantian tradition and in issues concerning space and time, this volume offers an insightful and original contribution to the literature by bringing together analytical and phenomenological approaches in a productive exchange on topical issues such as action, perception, the body, and cognition and its limits.

This collection of essays explores the philosophy of human knowledge from a multitude of perspectives, with a particular emphasis upon the justification component of the classical analysis of knowledge and with an excursion along the way to explore the role of knowledge in Texas Hold 'Em poker. An important theme of the collection is the role of knowledge in religion, including a detailed argument for agnosticism. A number of the essays touch upon issues in philosophical logic, among them a fascinating new counter-example to Modus Ponens. The collection is rounded out with essays on causality and the philosophy of mind. The author's perspective on the philosophy of human knowledge is fresh and challenging, as evidenced by essays entitled "On Epistemic Preferability;" "On Being Unjustified;" "The Logic of 'Unless'" and "Is 'This sentence is true.' True?" An interesting feature of The Logic of Philosophy: Pesky Essays is the inclusion of responses to several of its key essays, contributed by such prominent contemporary philosophers as Roderick Chisholm, Ted Sider and Tomas Kapitan.

This volume, the second in the Springer series Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, contains selected papers from the workshops organised by the ESF Research Networking Programme PSE (The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective) in 2009. Five general topics are addressed: 1. Formal Methods in the Philosophy of Science; 2. Philosophy of the Natural and Life Sciences; 3. Philosophy of the Cultural and Social Sciences; 4. Philosophy of the Physical Sciences; 5. History of the Philosophy of Science. This volume is accordingly divided in five sections, each section containing papers coming from the meetings focussing on one of these five themes. However, these sections are not completely independent and detached from each other. For example, an important connecting thread running through a substantial number of papers in this volume is the concept of probability: probability plays a central role in present-day discussions in formal epistemology, in the philosophy of the physical sciences, and in general methodological debates---it is central in discussions concerning explanation, prediction and confirmation. The volume thus also attempts to represent the intellectual exchange between the various fields in the philosophy of science that was central in the ESF workshops.

Emma Borg examines the relation between semantics (roughly, features of the literal meaning of linguistic items) and pragmatics (features emerging from the context within which such items are being used), and assesses recent answers to the fundamental questions of how and where to draw the divide between the two. In particular, she offers a defence of what is commonly known as 'minimal semantics'. Minimal semantics, as the name suggests, wants to offer a minimal account of the interrelation between semantics and pragmatics. Specifically, it holds that while context can affect literal semantic content in the case of genuine (i.e. lexically or syntactically marked) context-sensitive expressions, this is the limit of pragmatic input to semantic content. On all other occasions where context of utterance appears to affect content, the minimalist claims that what it affects is not literal, semantic content but what the speaker conveys by the use of this literal content-it affects what a speaker says but not what a sentence means. As Borg makes clear, the minimalist must allow some contextual influence on semantic content, but her claim is that this influence can be limited to 'tame' pragmatics-the kind of rule-governed appeals to context which won't scare formally minded horses. Pursuing Meaning aims to make good on this claim. The book also contains an overview of all the main positions in the area, clarification of its often complex terminology, and an exploration of key themes such as word meaning, mindreading, and the relationship between semantics and psychology.

Dustin McWherter defends the possibility of critical ontology by pitting Roy Bhaskar's attempt to rehabilitate ontology in the philosophy of science against Kant's attempt to replace traditional ontology with an account of cognitive experience.

Systemics of Emergence: Research and Development is a volume devoted to exploring the core theoretical and disciplinary research problems of emergence processes from which systems are established. It focuses on emergence as the key point of any systemic process. This topic is dealt with within different disciplinary approaches, indicated by the organization in sections: 1) Applications; 2) Biology and human care; 3) Cognitive Science; 4) Emergence; 5) General Systems; 6) Learning; 7) Management; 8) Social Systems; 9) Systemic Approach and Information Science; 10) Theoretical issues in Systemics.

The Editors and contributing authors have produced this volume to help, encourage and widen the work in this area of General Systems Research.

This title offers a fresh approach to the plays that suggests they can be seen as metaphysical 'experiments' conducted in the medium of drama.Metaphysics is usually associated with that part of the philosophical tradition which asks about 'last things', questions such as: How many substances are there in the world? Which is more fundamental, quantity or quality? Are events prior to things, or do they happen to those things? While he wasn't a philosopher, Shakespeare was obviously interested in 'ultimates' of this sort. Instead of probing these issues with argument, however, he did so with plays. "Shakespearean Metaphysics" argues for Shakespeare's inclusion within a metaphysical tradition that opposes empiricism and Cartesian dualism.Through close readings of three major plays - "The Tempest", "King Lear" and "Twelfth Night" - Witmore proposes that Shakespeare's manner of depicting life on stage itself constitutes an 'answer' to metaphysical questions raised by later thinkers such as Spinoza, Bergson, and Whitehead. Each of these readings shifts the interpretative frame around the plays in radical ways; taken together they show the limits of our understanding of theatrical play as an 'illusion' generated by the physical circumstances of production."Shakespeare Now!" is a series of short books that engage imaginatively and often provocatively with the possibilities of Shakespeare's plays. It goes back to the source - the most living language imaginable - and recaptures the excitement, audacity and surprise of Shakespeare. It will return you to the plays with opened eyes.

John Cleary here explores the role which the mathematical sciences play in Aristotle's philosophical thought, especially in his cosmology, metaphysics, and epistemology. He also thematizes the aporetic method by means of which he deals with philosophical questions about the foundations of mathematics. The first two chapters consider Plato's mathematical cosmology in the light of Aristotle's critical distinction between physics and mathematics. Subsequent chapters examine three basic aporiae about mathematical objects which Aristotle himself develops in his science of first philosophy. What emerges from this dialectical inquiry is a different conception of substance and of order in the universe, which gives priority to physics over mathematics as the cosmological science. Within this different world-view, we can better understand what we now call Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics.

Anticipating not only modern scientific theories of psychology but also those of cosmology, this astonishing book sets out a impressive goal for itself: to reconcile human biology with a theory of consciousness. First published in France in 1907, and translated into English in 1911, this work of wonder was esteemed at the time in scientific circles and in the popular culture alike for its profound explorations of perception and memory and its surprising conclusions about the nature and value of art. Contending that intuition is deeper than intellect and that the real consequence of evolution is a mental freedom to grow, to change, to seek and create novelty, Bergson reinvigorated the theory of evolution by refusing to see it as merely mechanistic. His expansion on Darwin remains one of the most original and important philosophical arguments for a scientific inquiry still under fire today. French philosopher HENRI BERGSON (1859-1941) was born in Paris. Among his works are Matter and Memory (1896), An Introduction to Metaphysics (1903), and The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932). He was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1927.

In this second book of the Global Healing trilogy, Vipin Mehta takes us on the sacred journey to awaken spirituality beyond organized religions so that we can consciously create global healing by using metaphysical tools. The journey shows how spirituality will lead humanity by raising the level of human consciousness from nationalism to globalism and from patriotism to humanism.

This book is about our ordinary concept of matter in the form of enduring continuants and the processes in which they are involved in the macroscopic realm. It emphasises what science rather than philosophical intuition tells us about the world, and chemistry rather than the physics that is more usually encountered in philosophical discussions. The central chapters dealing with the nature of matter pursue key steps in the historical development of scientific conceptions of chemical substance. Like many contemporary discussions of material objects, it relies heavily on mereology. The classical principles are applied to the mereological structure of regions of space, intervals of time, processes and quantities of matter. Quantities of matter, which don't gain or lose parts over time, are distinguished from individuals, which are typically constituted of different quantities of matter at different times. The proper treatment of the temporal aspect of the features of material objects is a central issue in this book, which is addressed by investigating the conditions governing the application of predicates relating time and other entities. Of particular interest here are relations between quantities of matter and times expressing substance kind, phase and mixture. Modal aspects of these features are taken up in the final chapter.

Robert Stalnaker draws together in this volume his seminal work in metaphysics. The central theme is the role of possible worlds in articulating our various metaphysical commitments. The book begins with reflections on the general idea of a possible world, and then uses the framework of possible worlds to formulate and clarify some questions about properties and individuals, reference, thought, and experience. The essays also reflect on the nature of metaphysics, and on the relation between questions about what there is and questions about how we talk and think about what there is. Two of the fourteen essays, plus an extensive introduction that sets the papers in context and draws out the essays' common threads, are published here for the first time.

Borders enclose and separate us. We assign to them tremendous significance. Along them we draw supposedly uncrossable boundaries within which we believe our individual identities begin and end, erecting the metaphysical dividing walls that enclose each one of us into numerically identical, numerically distinct, entities: persons. Do the borders between us - physical, psychological, neurological, causal, spatial, temporal, etc. - merit the metaphysical significance ordinarily accorded them? The central thesis of I Am You is that our borders do not signify boundaries between persons. We are all the same person. Variations on this heretical theme have been voiced periodically throughout the ages (the Upanishads, Averroes, Giordano Bruno, Josiah Royce, Schrodinger, Fred Hoyle, Freeman Dyson). In presenting his arguments, the author relies on detailed analyses of recent formal work on personal identity, especially that of Derek Parfit, Sydney Shoemaker, Robert Nozick, David Wiggins, Daniel C. Dennett and Thomas Nagel, while incorporating the views of Descartes, Leibniz, Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer, Kant, Husserl and Brouwer. His development of the implied moral theory is inspired by, and draws on, Rawls, Sidgwick, Kant and again Parfit. The traditional, commonsense view that we are each a separate person numerically identical to ourselves over time, i.e., that personal identity is closed under known individuating and identifying borders - what the author calls Closed Individualism - is shown to be incoherent. The demonstration that personal identity is not closed but open points collectively in one of two new directions: either there are no continuously existing, self-identical persons over time in the sense ordinarily understood - the sort of view developed by philosophers as diverse as Buddha, Hume and most recently Derek Parfit, what the author calls Empty Individualism - or else you are everyone, i.e., personal identity is not closed under known individuating and identifying borders, what the author calls Open Individualism. In making his case, the author:

- offers a new explanation both of consciousness and of self-consciousness

- constructs a new theory of Self

- explains psychopathologies (e.g. multiple personality disorder, schizophrenia)

- shows Open Individualism to be the best competing explanation of who we are

- provides the metaphysical foundations for global ethics.

The book is intended for philosophers and the philosophically inclined - physicists, mathematicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, linguists, computer scientists, economists, and communication theorists. It is accessible to graduate students and advanced undergraduates."