Despite the fact that over the last twenty years philosophies of the event have become more prevalent, their overall relation to the ontological paradigm remains largely unthought. This collection explores ways in which events destabilize this paradigm, producing powerful tremors that shake Being to its core. "Being Shaken" considers the personal, ethical, theological, aesthetic, and political dimensions of such disquietude, offering a multifaceted approach to the relation of ontology and the event.

The essays in this volume, first presented at an international conference held at the University of Urbino, Italy, in 2011, explore the different senses of realism, arguing both for and against its distinctive theses and considering these senses from a historical point of view. The first sense is the metaphysical thesis that whatever exists does so, and has the properties it has, independently of whether it is the object of a person's thought or perception. The second sense of realism is epistemological, wherein realism claims that, in some cases, it is possible to know the world as it exists in and of itself. A third sense, which has become known as ontological realism, states that universals exist as well as individuals. The essays collected here make new contributions to these fundamental philosophical issues, which have largely defined western analytic philosophy, from Plato and Aristotle to the present day.

This volume responds to and reassesses the work of Hector-Neri Castaneda (1924-1991). The essays collected here, written by his students, followers, and opponents, examine Castaneda s seminal views on deontic logic, metaethics, indedicality, praticitions, fictions, and metaphysics, utilizing the critical viewpoint afforded by time, as well as new data, to offer insights on his theories and methodology."

" 'Nothing' is the force
That renovates the World."
--EMILY DICKINSON
"I love talking about nothing....It is the only thing I know anything about." -OSCAR WILDE
"Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being--like a worm." --JEAN-PAUL SARTRE
"Who in this world has not felt the power of this: a nothing "--VICTOR HUGO
Whether a subject of dread or of fascination, nothing (often spelled with a capital "N") has intrigued writers, philosophers, and scientists since ancient times. In this sound-bite history of the concept of nothing, distinguished journalist Joan Konner--author of the bestselling The Atheist's Bible--has created a unique anthology devoted to, well, ... nothing. The collection brings together, in one portable volume, the thoughts of well-known writers and philosophers, artists and musicians, poets and playwrights, geniuses and jokers, demonstrating that some of the finest minds explored, feared, confronted, experienced, and played with the real or imagined presence of nothing in their lives. Paradoxical? Yes, indeed. You Don't Have to Be Buddhist to Know Nothing shows that, like many Eastern sages, deep thinkers in the West also recognized and pondered nonexistence as an essential component and complement of existence itself. Organized in short topical chapters from "Knowing Nothing" to the "Joy of Unknowing" and "Nothing is Sacred," the verbal snapshots captured in this collection create a coherent work of insight, wisdom, humor and wonder. You Don't Have to Be Buddhist to Know Nothing is compelling enough to be read all at once or in short bursts, as the spirit moves.

This volume covers a wide range of topics that fall under the 'philosophy of quantifiers', a philosophy that spans across multiple areas such as logic, metaphysics, epistemology and even the history of philosophy. It discusses the import of quantifier variance in the model theory of mathematics. It advances an argument for the uniqueness of quantifier meaning in terms of Evert Beth's notion of implicit definition and clarifies the oldest explicit formulation of quantifier variance: the one proposed by Rudolf Carnap. The volume further examines what it means that a quantifier can have multiple meanings and addresses how existential vagueness can induce vagueness in our modal notions. Finally, the book explores the role played by quantifiers with respect to various kinds of semantic paradoxes, the logicality issue, ontological commitment, and the behavior of quantifiers in intensional contexts.

Janaway provides a detailed and critical account of Schopenhauer's central philosophical achievement: his account of the self and its relation to the world of objects. The author's approach to this theme is historical, yet is designed to show the philosophical interest of such an approach. He explores in unusual depth Schopenhauer's often ambivalent relation to Kant, and highlights the influence of Schopenhauer's view of self and world on Wittgenstein and Nietzsche, as well as tracing the many points of contact between Schopenhauer's thought and current philosophical debates about the self.

Are human beings born with a moral character, or does our character form and change as we experience life? In The Will's Harmonic Motion, author Fadel Sabry sheds light on this age-old question.

An extension of Arthur Schopenhauer's work, philosophy, and discussion, The Will's Harmonic Motion puts forth an extensive discussion of how moral character is obtained and on what basis. It provides an overview of Schopenhauer's treatment of metaphysics and introduces the concept of the will. It also explains the nature of morality and intelligible and empirical characters and investigates movements in nature, especially harmonic motion, and reviews the scientific laws that govern it. The study extends the concepts of moral characters and curves to animals, explains the mysterious qualities of creative power and healing power, explores the topic of pleasure, and addresses the mystery of existence.

This study approaching metaphysical subjects scientifically, seeking to apply rational thinking to all topics considered, including morality, death, and religion. Bringing new ideas to philosophy, Sabry considers these themes and more in his search for the truth about moral character.

David Malet Armstrong (8 July 1926-13 May 2014) has been one of the most influential contemporary metaphysicians working in the analytic tradition and surely the greatest 20th century Australian philosopher. His main merit is to have reestablished metaphysics as a respectable branch of philosophy placing it at the centre of the philosophical debate, and giving it the status of an authoritative and competent interlocutor of both rational and empirical sciences. By means of a rigorously argumentative approach and a sharp prose, Armstrong has built a whole metaphysical system, that is, a comprehensive and unified picture of the fundamental structure of the world. The various chapters of the book address the key issues concerning Armstrong' view about the problem of universals, the nature of states of affairs, the ontological ground of possibility, nomic necessity, and dispositions, the truthmaker theory, and the theory of mind. This volume aims to celebrate Armstrong's memory bringing new understanding, and hopefully stimulating more work, on his philosophy, with the conviction that it constitutes an invaluable heritage for contemporary research in metaphysics.

Instance ontology, or particularism - the doctrine that asserts the individuality of properties and relations - has been a persistent topic in Western philosophy, discussed in works by Plato and Aristotle, by Muslim and Christian scholastics, and by philosophers of both realist and nominalist positions. This book by D. W. Mertz is the first sustained analysis that applies the rules and systems of mathematics and logic to instance ontology in order to argue for its validity and for its problem-solving capacities and to associate it with a version of the realist position that Mertz calls "moderate realism". Mertz surveys the history of instance ontology in writings from Plato and Aristotle through Leibniz, followed by modern philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and D. M. Armstrong, among others. He also includes a thorough critique of the recent work of Keith Campbell and other contemporary nominalists. Building on the insights gained through this historical overview, he delves deeper into the logic of instance ontology and uncovers some of its extraordinary problem-solving features: distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate impredicative reasoning; uniformly diagnosing the self-referential paradoxes; being free from the limitation theorems of Godel and Tarski; providing a basis for the derivation of arithmetic construed intensionally; and formally distinguishing identity and indiscernibility.

This volume gathers together new essays on deception and self-deception by leading thinkers on the subject. The contributors discuss topics including the nature and the definition of deception; whether deception is morally blameworthy or not; attacks against and defenses of self-deception; and the most famous philosophical account of lying by Immanuel Kant. Deception of others and self-deception share many more interconnections than is normally recognized, and these essays reveal the benefits of considering them together.
he Philosophy of Deceptionill be of interest to philosophers across the spectrum including those interested in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and metaphysics.

Richard Gaskin presents a work in the philosophy of language. He analyses what is distinctive about sentences and the propositions they express--what marks them off from mere lists of words and mere aggregates of word-meanings respectively. Since he identifies the world with all the true and false propositions, his account of the unity of the proposition has significant implications for our understanding of the nature of reality. He argues that the unity of the proposition is constituted by a certain infinitistic structure known in the tradition as "Bradley's regress." Usually, Bradley's regress has been regarded as vicious, but Gaskin argues that it is the metaphysical ground of the propositional unity, and gives us an important insight into the fundamental make-up of the world.

Since the publication of the companion volume Researching Learning in Virtual Worlds in 2010, there has been a growth not only in the range and number of educational initiatives taking place in virtual worlds, but also in the depth of analysis of the nature of that education. Understanding Learning in Virtual Worlds reflects those changes through a collection of chapters that are extended versions of research presented at the second Researching Learning in Virtual Environments conference (ReLIVE 11), an international conference hosted by the Open University UK. Included in this book are chapters that explore the philosophical and methodological underpinnings of understanding learning in virtual worlds, identify and analyse the factors that support learning in these environments, and present case studies that demonstrate some of the various ways in which virtual worlds can be applied to facilitate learning and teaching. The links between learning in a virtual world and learning in the physical world are made apparent throughout, and the authors reveal how understanding learning in one informs the other. Understanding Learning in Virtual Worlds is an important book not only to those who teach in virtual worlds, but to anyone for whom understanding learning, in all its forms, is of interest.

Widely used in philosophy courses, this succinct study explores the problem of determining the relation between the body and mind. In that philosophy seeks to elucidate man's place and action in nature, Campbell asserts that our assessment of the body-mind problem affects our perspectives on metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and the natural sciences. After discussing how the body-mind problem developed, Campbell sets forth four incompatible propositions that serve as the framework for evaluating different philosophical approaches to the problem. Among competing perspectives, he examines dualism, behaviorist theories, the causal theory of mind, and central-state epiphenomenalism. This second edition includes a chapter on functionalism and an expanded bibliography.

Ron Mallon explores how thinking and talking about kinds of person can bring those kinds into being. Social constructionist explanations of human kinds like race, gender, and homosexuality are commonplace in the social sciences and humanities, but what do they mean and what are their implications? This book synthesizes recent work in evolutionary, cognitive, and social psychology as well as social theory and the philosophy of science, in order to offer a naturalistic account of the social construction of human kinds. Mallon begins by qualifying social constructionist accounts of representations of human kinds by appealing to evidence suggesting canalized dispositions towards certain ways of representing human groups, using race as a case study. He then turns to interpret constructionist accounts of categories as attempts to explain causally powerful human kinds by appealling to our practices of representing them, and he articulates a view in which widespread representations produce entrenched social roles that could vindicate such attempts. Mallon goes on to explore constructionist concerns with the social consequences of our representations, focusing especially on the way human kind representations can alter our behaviour and undermine our self understandings and our agency. Mallon understands socially constructed kinds as the real, sometimes stable products of our cognitive and representational practices, and he suggests that reference to such kinds can figure in our everyday and scientific practices of representing the social world. The result is a realistic, naturalistic account of how human representations might contribute to making up the parts of the social world that they represent.

Featuring contributions by leading academics this collection is a companion to one of the most intricate of Deleuze's philosophical texts, articulating Leibnizian thought within the context of Baroque expressionism, characterized by its interdisciplinary approach to philosophy. This reader offers an incisive critical overview of its key themes

Christopher Hookway presents a series of essays on the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1913), the 'founder of pragmatism' and one of the most important and original American philosophers. Peirce made significant contributions to the development of formal logic and to the study of the normative standards we should follow in carrying out inquiries and enhancing our knowledge in science and mathematics. In The Pragmatic Maxim, Hookway explores Peirce's writings on truth, science, and the nature of meaning, which have become steadily more influential over recent decades. He demonstrates how Peirce's ideas can contribute to and inform philosophical understanding in debates that continue today. The first seven chapters explore the framework of Peirce's thought, especially his fallibilism and his rejection of scepticism, and his contributions to the pragmatist understanding of truth and reality. Like Frege and Husserl, among others, Peirce rejected psychologism and used phenomenological foundations to defend the system of categories. The final three chapters are concerned with 'the pragmatic maxim', a rule for clarifying the contents of concepts and ideas. Hookway explores the different strategies Peirce employed to demonstrate the correctness of the maxim, and thus of pragmatism. As well as studying and evaluating Peirce's views, The Pragmatic Maxim discusses the relations between the views of Peirce and other pragmatist philosophers such as William James, C. I. Lewis, and Richard Rorty.

Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, and the Politics of Dwelling explores the ethical and political implications of the debate between Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas on the question of Place. Throughout his philosophical career, Heidegger exhibited concern about the uprooting of man that accompanies the modern oblivion of Being and vividly described the consequences of modern deracination as manifest in everything from everyday inauthenticity to the growth of world technology. In response to this perceived crisis, Heidegger propounds a series on ontological models that illuminate the manner in which man is ensconced in the house of Being. As it stands, Heidegger's homecoming project is rife with political implications, as it led him to embrace a variety of political stances that run the gamut from an emphasis on the "site" of politics to volkisch nationalism to solitary quietism. No thinker was more disturbed by Heidegger's homecoming project than Levinas. In various writings, Levinas levels an incisive critique of Heidegger's place-bound ontology. More specifically, Levinas accuses Heideggerian ontology of being averse to transcendence and conductive to tyranny, of failing to recognize the inherent dignity of the human person, and of being a manifestation of latter-day paganism. Additionally, Levinas also advances an alternative manner of thinking about the home. For Levinas, the home is a place where wanderers find refuge; and it rises to the fullness of its ethical potentiality when used an instrument of hospitality to the other person. By considering the Heidegger-Levinas debate, this book illustrates the concern that animated their perspective projects and the dangers of chauvinism and rootlessness inherent in the attempt to construct a contemporary politics of place. In the end, Heidegger and Levinas point toward the necessity of politics of place that is both ontological and ethical, and which successfully navigates between the twin extremes of narrow tribalism and rootless cosmo

Through original speculations on the surprisingly complementary concepts of simultaneity and delay, and new interpretations of the great philosophers of time, this book proposes an innovative theory of staggered time. In the early 20th Century, Bergson and Husserl (following Einstein) made Simultaneity-what it means for events to occur at the same time-a central motif in philosophy.In the late 20th Century, Derrida and Deleuze instead emphasized Delay-events staggered over distant times.This struggle between convergent and staggered time also plays out in 20th Century aesthetics (especially music), politics, and the sciences. Despite their importance in the history of philosophy, this is the first book to comprehensively examine the concepts of simultaneity and delay.By putting simultaneity and delay into a dialectical relation, this book argues that time in general is organized by elastic rhythms. Lampert's concepts describe the time-structures of such diverse phenomena as atonal music, political decision-making, neuronal delays, leaps of memory and the boredom of waiting; and simultaneities and delays in everyday experience and behaviour.

Humanness supposes innate and profound reflexivity. This volume approaches the concept of reflexivity on two different yet related analytical planes. Whether implicitly or explicitly, both planes of thought bear critically on reflexivity in relation to the nature of selfhood and the very idea of the autonomous individual, ethics, and humanness, science as such and social science, ontological dualism and fundamental ambiguity. On the one plane, a collection of original and innovative ethnographically based essays is offered, each of which is devoted to ways in which reflexivity plays a fundamental role in human social life and the study of it; on the other-anthropo-philosophical and developed in the volume's Preface, Introduction, and Postscript-it is argued that reflexivity distinguishes-definitively, albeit relatively-the being and becoming of the human.

How do mental events such as choices and decisions lead to physical action? The problem of mental causation is one of the most important and intriguing philosophical issues of our time and has been at the centre of debates in the philosophy of mind for the past fifty years. In opposition to the recent wave of reductionist theories, this book argues that it is possible to account for mental causation within a nonreductive framework as it adopts a broadly Davidsonian approach to mental causation: reasons cause actions because they are identical to physical events. This work then defends this approach from the frequently raised criticism that it entails epiphenomenalism - the inefficacy of the mental. Moreover, Mental Causation moves beyond Davidson's views by reconsidering the question of whether reasons causally explain actions, arguing in opposition to Davidson, that explanations appealing to reasons represent a distinct category of explanation from causal explanation. Essential reading for anyone interested in debates about mental causation, this is an excellent text for senior undergraduates, graduate students, and professional philosophers.

Why should there be anything at all? Why, in particular, should a material world exist? Bede Rundle advances clear, non-technical answers to these perplexing questions. If, as the theist maintains, God is a being who cannot but exist, his existence explains why there is something rather than nothing. However, this can also be explained on the basis of a weaker claim. Not that there is some particular being that has to be, but simply that there has to be something or other. Rundle proffers arguments for thinking that that is indeed how the question is to be put to rest. Traditionally, the existence of the physical universe is held to depend on God, but the theist faces a major difficulty in making clear how a being outside space and time, as God is customarily conceived to be, could stand in an intelligible relation to the world, whether as its creator or as the author of events within it. Rundle argues that a creator of physical reality is not required, since there is no alternative to its existence. There has to be something, and a physical universe is the only real possibility. He supports this claim by eliminating rival contenders; he dismisses the supernatural, and argues that, while other forms of being, notably the abstract and the mental, are not reducible to the physical, they presuppose its existence. The question whether ultimate explanations can ever be given is forever in the background, and the book concludes with an investigation of this issue and of the possibility that the universe could have existed for an infinite time. Other topics discussed include causality, space, verifiability, essence, existence, necessity, spirit, fine tuning, and laws of Nature. Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing offers an explanation of fundamental facts of existence in purely philosophical terms, without appeal either to theology or cosmology. It will provoke and intrigue anyone who wonders about these questions.

This title offers a fresh approach to the plays that suggests they can be seen as metaphysical 'experiments' conducted in the medium of drama.Metaphysics is usually associated with that part of the philosophical tradition which asks about 'last things', questions such as: How many substances are there in the world? Which is more fundamental, quantity or quality? Are events prior to things, or do they happen to those things? While he wasn't a philosopher, Shakespeare was obviously interested in 'ultimates' of this sort. Instead of probing these issues with argument, however, he did so with plays. "Shakespearean Metaphysics" argues for Shakespeare's inclusion within a metaphysical tradition that opposes empiricism and Cartesian dualism.Through close readings of three major plays - "The Tempest", "King Lear" and "Twelfth Night" - Witmore proposes that Shakespeare's manner of depicting life on stage itself constitutes an 'answer' to metaphysical questions raised by later thinkers such as Spinoza, Bergson, and Whitehead. Each of these readings shifts the interpretative frame around the plays in radical ways; taken together they show the limits of our understanding of theatrical play as an 'illusion' generated by the physical circumstances of production."Shakespeare Now!" is a series of short books that engage imaginatively and often provocatively with the possibilities of Shakespeare's plays. It goes back to the source - the most living language imaginable - and recaptures the excitement, audacity and surprise of Shakespeare. It will return you to the plays with opened eyes.

Responding to growing interest in the Kantian tradition and in issues concerning space and time, this volume offers an insightful and original contribution to the literature by bringing together analytical and phenomenological approaches in a productive exchange on topical issues such as action, perception, the body, and cognition and its limits.