What do philosophy and computer science have in common? It turns out, quite a lot! In providing an introduction to computer science (using Python), Daniel Lim presents in this book key philosophical issues, ranging from external world skepticism to the existence of God to the problem of induction. These issues, and others, are introduced through the use of critical computational concepts, ranging from image manipulation to recursive programming to elementary machine learning techniques. In illuminating some of the overlapping conceptual spaces of computer science and philosophy, Lim teaches the reader fundamental programming skills and also allows her to develop the critical thinking skills essential for examining some of the enduring questions of philosophy. Key Features Teaches readers actual computer programming, not merely ideas about computers Includes fun programming projects (like digital image manipulation and Game of Life simulation), allowing the reader to develop the ability to write larger computer programs that require decomposition, abstraction, and algorithmic thinking Uses computational concepts to introduce, clarify, and develop a variety of philosophical issues Covers various aspects of machine learning and relates them to philosophical issues involving science and induction as well as to ethical issues Provides a framework to critically analyze arguments in classic and contemporary philosophical debates

Issues surrounding the status and nature of `nonexistent objects' constitute one of philosophy's oldest and densest thickets. In this book Perszyk takes his readers surefootedly through this thicket, informed both historically and at the level of contemporary discussion of relevant themes. His main aim is to develop a `bundle' or `set of properties' interpretation of Meinong's theory of nonexistent objects (as opposed to a set of properties neo-Meinongian metaphysics), and to defend this nonstandard interpretation against competing views in both the philosophical and scholarly literature on Meinong. The Meinong who emerges is neither the hero nor the villain his friends and foes have commonly led us to believe. This clearly written book is a valuable addition both to the literature on Meinong and to contemporary metaphysics of modality. It is written for students and professionals interested in these, and related, areas.

Jewish German philosopher Ernst Cassirer was a leading proponent of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. The essays in this volume provide a window into Cassirer's discovery of the symbolic nature of human existence-that our entire emotional and intellectual life is configured and formed through the originary expressive power of word and image, that it is in and through the symbolic cultural systems of language, art, myth, religion, science, and technology that human life realizes itself and attains not only its form, its visibility, but also its reality. Thought and being are set in opposition and united in genuine correspondence by the symbolic strife between them that Cassirer calls Auseinandersetzung, which determines the ethical relationship of the self to the other.

A revival of panpsychistic considerations of the mind's place in nature has recently enriched the debate on the mind-body problem in contemporary philosophy of mind. The essays assembled in the present collection aim to supply a positive contribution to these considerations, providing new perspectives on panpsychism by shedding new light on its arguments and impacts as well as on its problems and theoretical challenges. Panpsychism is discussed as a position that understands consciousness as a truly fundamental feature of our reality - not only with respect to the human species, but also with respect to the evolution of the universe as such.

Plato's Timaeus was his only cosmological dialogue and for almost thirteen hundred years it provided the basis in the West for educated people's general view of the natural world. The author provides a translation of this important work, together with the Critias - the source of the legendary tale of Atlantis. He has taken particular care to provide an accurate rendering of Plato's words and to avoid putting his own or any other interpretation on the works.

This book provides a clear and informed account of aesthetic and callistic concepts as they occur in the works of Plato and Aristotle. The author illustrates their ideas on art and beauty by close reference to their texts and finds a profound similarity which unites them, revealing many of their differences to be complementary aspects of an essentially similar viewpoint. He also shows how Greek notions of art and beauty are not merely primitive steps in the advance to modern ideas but have a direct relevance to modern critical controversies.

Andrea Bottani Massimiliano Carrara Pierdaniele Giaretta What do we do when we do metaphysics? The aim of this introduction is to give a provisional answer to this question, and then to explain the subtitle of the volume. It is easy to observe that when we do meta physics we engage in a linguistic activity, mainly consisting of uttering declarative sentences that are not very clear to most people. That is true, but, of course, it is not very informative. What do we speak of when we do metaphysics? A traditional answer could be: we speak of what things really are, so suggesting that things can appear in a way that is different from the way they really are. So understood, meta physics is about the sense, or the senses, of "real being." A question that immediately arises is whether the sense of being is unique or is different for different types of things. Another question is whether it is possible that something could appear to be, but really not be. Modem analytic metaphysicians usually answer that the sense of being is unique, while acknowledging that there are different kinds of things, and that to say that something could appear to be but really not be is a plain contradiction, unless what is understood is that it could appear to us that there is something having such and such features, but viii Individuals, Essence, and Identity really there is no such a thing."

John McDowell's 'minimal empiricism' is one of the most influential and widely discussed doctrines in contemporary philosophy. Richard Gaskin subjects it to careful examination and criticism. The doctrine is undermined, he argues, by inadequacies in the way McDowell conceives what he styles the 'order of justification' connecting world, experience, and judgement. McDowell's conception of the roles played by causation and nature in this order is threatened with vacuity; and the requirements of self-consciousness and verbal articulacy which he places on subjects participating in the justificatory relation between experience and judgement are unwarranted, and have the implausible consequence that infants and non-human animals are excluded from the 'order of justification' and so are deprived of experience of the world. Above all, McDowell's position is vitiated by a substantial error he commits in the philosophy of language: following ancient tradition rather than Frege's radical departure from that tradition, he locates concepts at the level of sense rather than at the level of reference in the semantical hierarchy. This error generates an unwanted Kantian transcendental idealism which in effect delivers a reductio ad absurdum of McDowell's metaphysical economy. Gaskin goes on to show how to correct the mistake, and thereby presents his own version of empiricism. First we must follow Frege in his location of concepts at the level of reference, but then we must go beyond Frege and locate not only concepts but also propositions at that level; and this in turn requires us to take seriously an idea which McDowell mentions only to reject, that of objects as speaking to us 'in the world's own language'. If empiricism is to have any chance of success it must be still more minimal in its pretensions than McDowell allows: in particular, it must abandon the individualistic and intellectualistic construction which McDowell places on the 'order of justification'.

This book argues that definite descriptions ('the table', 'the King of France') refer to individuals, as Gottlob Frege claimed. This apparently simple conclusion flies in the face of philosophical orthodoxy, which incorporates Bertrand Russell's theory that definite descriptions are devices of quantification. Paul Elbourne presents the first fully-argued defence of the Fregean view. He builds an explicit fragment of English using a version of situation semantics. He uses intrinsic aspects of his system to account for the presupposition projection behaviour of definite descriptions, a range of modal properties, and the problem of incompleteness. At the same time, he draws on an unusually wide range of linguistic and philosophical literature, from early work by Frege, Peano, and Russell to the latest findings in linguistics, philosophy of language, and psycholinguistics. His penultimate chapter addresses the semantics of pronouns and offers a new and more radical version of his earlier thesis that they too are Fregean definite descriptions.

Thomas Holden presents a fascinating study of theories of matter in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These theories were plagued by a complex of interrelated problems concerning matter's divisibility, composition, and internal architecture. Is any material body infinitely divisible? Must we posit atoms or elemental minima from which bodies are ultimately composed? Are the parts of material bodies themselves material concreta? Or are they merely potentialities or possible existents? Questions such as these - and the press of subtler questions hidden in their amibiguities - deeply unsettled philosophers of the early modern period. They seemed to expose serious paradoxes in the new world view pioneered by Galileo, Descartes, and Newton. The new science's account of a fundamentally geometrical Creation, mathematicizable and intelligible to the human inquirer, seemed to be under threat. This was a great scandal, and the philosophers of the period accordingly made various attempts to disarm the paradoxes. All the great figures address the issue: most famously Leibniz and Kant, but also Galileo, Hobbes, Newton, Hume, and Reid, in addition to a crowd of lesser figures. Thomas Holden offers a brilliant synthesis of these discussions and presents his own overarching interpretation of the controversy, locating the underlying problem in the tension between the early moderns' account of material parts on the one hand and the programme of the geometrization of nature on the other.

David Cooper explores and defends the view that a reality independent of human perspectives is necessarily indescribable, a 'mystery'. Other views are shown to be hubristic. Humanists, for whom 'man is the measure' of reality, exaggerate our capacity to live without the sense of an independent measure. Absolutists, who proclaim our capacity to know an independent reality, exaggerate our cognitive powers. In this highly original book Cooper restores to philosophy a proper appreciation of mystery - that is what provides a measure of our beliefs and conduct.

The collective focus of the essays here presented consists of the attempt to overcome the deadlock between metaphysical and non- (or anti-) metaphysical Hegel interpretations. There is no doubt that Hegel rejects traditional and influential forms of metaphysical thought. There is also no doubt that he grounds his philosophical system on a metaphysical theory of thought and reality. The question asked by the contributors in this volume is therefore: what kind of metaphysics does Hegel reject, and what kind does he embrace? Some of the papers address the issue in general and comprehensive terms, but from different, even opposite perspectives: Hegel's claim of a 'unity' of logic and metaphysics; his potentially deflationary understanding of metaphysics; his overt metaphysical commitments; his subject-less notion of logical thought; and his criticism of Kant's critique of metaphysics. Other contributors discuss the same topics in view of very specific subject-matter in Hegel's corpus, to wit: the philosophy of self-consciousness; practical philosophy; teleology and holism; a particular brand of naturalism; language's relation to thought; 'true' and 'spurious' infinity as pivotal in philosophic thinking; and Hegel's conception of human agency and action.

L. T. Hobhouse (1864-1929) was fundamental to the New Liberal movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. He authored many important works in the fields of philosophy, economics and social liberalism. First published in 1896, The Theory of Knowledge considers the content and validity of knowledge, and the conditions on which our understanding of knowledge is based. It is a rich and important classic, which remains of value to students and academics with an interest in sociology, anthropology and the philosophy of logic.

Despite their neglect in many histories of ideas in the West, the Cambridge Platonists constitute the most significant and influential group of thinkers in the Platonic tradition between the Florentine Renaissance and the Romantic Age. This anthology offers readers a unique, thematically structured compendium of their key texts, along with an extensive introduction and a detailed account of their legacy. The volume draws upon a resurgence of interest in thinkers such as Benjamin Whichcote, 1609-1683; Ralph Cudworth, 1618-1688; Henry More, 1614-1687; John Smith, 1618-1652, and Anne Conway 1631-1679, and includes hitherto neglected extracts and some works of less familiar authors within the group, like George Rust 1627?-1670; Joseph Glanville, 1636-1680 and John Norris 1657-1712. It also highlights the Cambridge Platonists’ important role in the history of philosophy and theology, influencing luminaries such as Shaftesbury, Berkeley, Leibniz, Joseph de Maistre, S.T. Coleridge, and W.R. Emerson. The Cambridge Platonist Anthology is an indispensable guide to the serious study of a pivotal group of Western metaphysicians, and is of great value for both students and scholars of philosophy, literature, history, and theology. Key Features The only systematic anthology to the Cambridge Platonists available, facilitating quick comprehension of key themes and ideas Uses new translations of the Latin works, vastly improving upon faulty and misleading earlier translations Offers a wide range of new perspective on the Cambridge Platonists, showing the extent of their influence in early modern philosophy and beyond.

This volume provides a comprehensive, learned and lively presentation of the whole range of Plato's thought but with a particular emphasis upon how Plato developed his metaphysics with a view to supporting his deepest educational convictions. The author explores the relation of Plato's metaphysics to the epistemological, ethical and political aspects of Plato's theory of education and shows how Plato's basic positions bear directly on the most fundamental questions faced by contemporary education.

A rival to Isaac Newton in mathematics and physics, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz believed that our world-the best of all possible worlds-must be governed by a principle of optimality. This book explores Leibniz's pursuit of optimality in five of his most important works in natural philosophy and shows how his principle of optimality bridges his scientific and philosophical studies. The first chapter explores Leibniz's work on the laws of optics and its implications for his defense of natural teleology. The second chapter examines Leibniz's work on the breaking strength of rigid beams and its implications for his thinking about the metaphysical foundations of the material world. The third chapter revisits Leibniz's famous defense of the conservation of vis viva and proposes a novel account of the origin of Leibniz's mature natural philosophy. The fourth chapter takes up Leibniz's efforts to determine the shape of freely hanging chains-the so-called problem of the catenary-and shows how that work provides an illuminating model for his thinking about the teleological structure of wills. Finally, the fifth chapter uses Leibniz's derivation of the path of quickest descent-his solution to the so-called problem of the Brachistochrone-and its historical context as a springboard for an exploration of the legacy of Leibniz's physics. The book closes with a brief discussion of the systematicity of Leibniz's thinking in philosophy and the natural sciences.

This volume presents fourteen original essays which explore the philosophy of Simon Blackburn, one of the UK's most influential contemporary philosophers. Blackburn is best known to the general public for his attempts to make philosophy accessible to those with little or no formal training, but in professional circles his reputation is based on a lifetime pursuit of his distinctive version of a projectivist and anti-realist research program. As he sees things, we must always try first to understand and explain what we are doing when we think and talk as we do. This research program reaches into nearly all of the main areas of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and moral psychology. The books and articles he has written provide us with perhaps the most comprehensive statement and defense of projectivism and anti-realism since Hume. The essays collected here document the range and influence of Blackburn's work. They reveal, among other things, the resourcefulness of his distinctive brand of philosophical pragmatism.

Metaphysics and Music in Adorno and Heidegger explains how two notoriously opposed German philosophers share a rethinking of the possibility of metaphysics via notions of music and waiting. This is connected to the historical materialist project of social change by way of the radical Italian composer Luigi Nono.

Thought, to be thought at all, must be about a world independent of us. But thinking takes capacities for thought, which inevitably shape thought's objects. What would count as something being green is, somehow, fixed by what we, who have being green in mind, are prepared to recognize. So it can seem that what is true, and what is not, is not independent of us. So our thought cannot really be about an independent world. We are confronted with an apparent paradox. Much philosophy, from Locke to Kant to Frege to Wittgenstein, to Hilary Putnam and John McDowell today, is a reaction to this paradox. Charles Travis presents a set of eleven essays, each working in its own way towards dissolving this air of paradox. The key to his account of thought and world is the idea of the parochial: features of our thought which need not belong to all thought.

Alfred North Whitehead is arguably the most original 20th-century philosopher of nature and metaphysics. In recent decades a number of physicists have produced ground-breaking new theories in fundamental physics influenced by his process philosophy. In contrast, few biologists are even aware that Whitehead's radical rethinking of the Cartesian assumptions implicit in 19th-century sciences might be relevant to their enterprise. This book seeks to fill this gap by exploring how Whitehead's process ontology might provide a new philosophical foundation for the biosciences of the 21st century. The central premise shared by all of the volume's authors is the idea that all living processes are irreducible processes. Each chapter focuses on assumptions implicit in some of the core concepts of biology - such as organism, evolution, information, and teleology - that play crucial explanatory roles in the biosciences, but as metaphysical concepts fall outside its purview. The authors each identify important shortcomings implicit in contemporary biological paradigms and show how an approach grounded in a process-oriented metaphysics can avoid them.

First Published in 2012. The Philosophy of MetaReality: creativity, love and freedom is the third of three books elaborating Roy Bhaskar's philosophy of metaReality, which appeared in rapid succession in 2002. A big, rich book teaming with ideas, The Philosophy of MetaReality is undoubtedly the magnum opus of Bhaskar's spiritual turn. Building on a radical new analysis of the self, human agency and society, Roy Bhaskar shows how the world of alienation and crisis we currently inhabit is sustained by the ground-state qualities of intelligence, creativity, love, a capacity for right-action and a potential for human self-realisation or fulfilment. A new introduction to this edition by Mervyn Hartwig, founding editor of Journal of Critical Realism and editor of A Dictionary of Critical Realism (Routledge, 2007), describes the context, significance and impact of the philosophy of metaReality, and supplies an expert guide to its content. This book is essential reading for students and practitioners of both philosophy and the human sciences.