This book focuses on three interdependent challenges related to managing transitions toward sustainable development, namely (a) mapping sustainability for global knowledge e-networking, (b) extending the value chain of knowledge and e-networking, and (c) engaging in explorations of new methods and venues for further developing knowledge and e-networking. While each of these challenges constitutes fundamentally different types of endeavors, they are highly interconnected. Jointly, they contribute to our expansion of knowledge and its applications in support of transitions toward sustainable development.

The central theme of this book revolves around ways of transcending barriers that impede the use of knowledge and knowledge networking in transitions toward sustainability. In order to transcend these barriers, we examine the potential contributions of innovations in information technologies as well as computation and representation of attendant complexities. A related theme addresses new ways of managing information and systematic observation for the purpose of enhancing the value of knowledge. Finally, this book shows applications of new methodologies and related findings that would contribute to our understanding of sustainablity issues that have not yet been explored. In many ways, this is a book of theory and of practice; and it is one of methods as well as policy and performance.

While Kant is commonly regarded as one of the most austere philosophers of all time, this book provides quite a different perspective of the founder of transcendental philosophy. Kant is often thought of as being boring, methodical, and humorless. Yet the thirty jokes and anecdotes collected and illustrated here for the first time reveal a man and a thinker who was deeply interested in how humor and laughter shape how we think, feel, and communicate with fellow human beings. In addition to a foreword on Kant's theory of humor by Noel Carroll as well as Clewis's informative chapters, Kant's Humorous Writings contains new translations of Kant's jokes, quips, and anecdotes. Each of the thirty excerpts is illustrated and supplemented by historical commentaries which explain their significance.

"Well-Being and Theism" is divided into two distinctive parts. The first part argues that desire-fulfillment welfare theories fail to capture the 'good' part of ?good for', and that objective list welfare theories fail to capture the 'for' part of ?good for'. Then, with the aim of capturing both of these parts of ?good for', a conjunctive theory-one which places both a value constraint and a desire constraint on well-being-is advanced. Lauinger then defends this proposition, which he calls the desire-perfectionism theory, against possible objections.? ?
In the second part, Lauinger explores the question "What metaphysics best supports the claim that the vast majority of humans have the desires for friendship, accomplishment, health, etc., built into themselves?" It is argued that there are two general metaphysical routes that might convincingly be taken here, and that each one leads us toward theism.

Why does knowledge of philosophy presuppose knowledge of reality? What are the characters in Deleuze's theatre and philosophy? How are his famous metaphysical distinctions secondary to the concept of philosophy as practice and politics? These questions are answered through careful analysis and application of Deleuzian principles.

The development of science, logic, mathematics, and psychology in the 19th century made it necessary to introduce a growing number of new entities, of which classical empiricism and strong extensionalism were unable to give a wholly satisfying account. One of the major issues confronting the 20th century philosophers was to identify which of these entities should be rationally accepted as part of the furniture of the world and which should not, and to provide a general account of how the latter are nevertheless subject to true predication. The 13 original essays collected in this volume explore some of the main approaches to this issue in the 20th century, including Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, Carnap, Frege, Twardowski, Kotarbinski, Nicolai Hartmann, and realist phenomenologists.

While the field of aesthetics has long been dominated by European philosophy, recent inquiries have expanded the arena to accommodate different cultures as well as different definitions and meanings. Aesthetics often establishes the pattern that connects culture functions in a society. In African and African American societies it functions as the keeper of the traditions. The African aesthetic is visible from popular culture to the classical cultures. In all art forms, including body adornment arts, there emerge symbols, colors, rhythms, styles, and forms that function as artistic instruments and cultural histories. While acknowledging African cultural diversity, the focus here is on the commonalities in the aesthetic that make an Ibo recognize a Kikuyu and a Jamaican recognize a Chewa and an African American recognize a Sotho. The deep structure manifest in African cultures in the diaspora is proof of the aesthetic continuity. The debate continues over the exact nature of African aesthetics, and in this volume scholars and teachers in the fields of African and African American studies approach the subject from a broad range of disciplines. Dance, music, art, theatre, and literature are examined in order fully to appreciate and delineate what the specific qualities and aspects of an African aesthetic might be. Additionally, theoretical concepts and issues are discussed in order to define more clearly what is meant by an African aesthetic. The term African here applies to all Africans, both continental and diasporan, and encompasses historically used terms such as Negro, Black, and Afro-American. This thoughtful and thought-provoking volume will be a valuable addition to the readings of scholars and students in fields ranging from African studies to general philosophy and cultural studies.

This investigation of time and space is motivated by gaps in our current understanding: by the lack of definitions, by our failure to appreciate the nature of these entities, by our inability to pin down their properties. The author's approach is based on two key ideas: The first idea is to seek the geo-historical origins of time and space concepts. A thorough investigation of a diversified archaeological corpus, allows him to draft coherent definitions; it furthermore gives clues as to whether time and space were discovered or invented. The second idea is to define the units before trying to define space and time. The results presented here are unexpected: Time and space were not discovered in nature, but they were invented; time is not a phenomenon and space has no materiality; they are only concepts. This runs contrary to the opinion of most scientific and the philosophical authorities, although one would seek in vain for a theoretical validation of the conventional position. This book will provide much food for thought for philosophers and scientists, as well as interested general readers.

1.1. Why the Ontology 0/ Time? The intention that directs this research consists in an attempt to provide a herme- neutic analysis ofthe drastic changes, which have occurred in 20th century philoso- phy, in identifying the new role ascribed to the subject of time and temporality within the scope ofontology. Afterthe fundamental works ofE. Husserl, M. Heid- egger. P. Rica:ur. and E. Levinas, it has been understood that the traditional issue (which could be traced back to Parmenides) between being and time, between the eternal and the transient (or historical), must once again be re-examined. Time it- self is recognized now as the deepest ground of ontological inquiry, which sets in motion the entire system offundamental philosophical concepts. This does not mean, of course, that our understanding of time did not change in the course of these fundamental transformations. In order to comprehend the new role oftime within "first philosophy," the concept o/time itselfis to be subjected to a careful investigation and interpretation. It is necessary to come back to Aristotle's quest ions in Physics IV: In what sense can we ascribe being to time itself. and what is the "nature" of time as (a) being'! In other words, to understand the role oftime within the scope of ontology means to develop simultaneously the ontology 0/ time. This is what the title ofthis work intends to designate. Moreover, my aim is to dem- onstrate that in a defmite sense the postmodern onto-Iogy is chrono-Iogy.

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The purpose of the book is to develop internal realism, the metaphysical-episte mological doctrine initiated by Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History, "Introduction," Many Faces). In doing so I shall rely - sometimes quite heavily - on the notion of conceptual scheme. I shall use the notion in a somewhat idiosyncratic way, which, however, has some affinities with the ways the notion has been used during its history. So I shall start by sketching the history of the notion. This will provide some background, and it will also give opportunity to raise some of the most important problems I will have to solve in the later chapters. The story starts with Kant. Kant thought that the world as we know it, the world of tables, chairs and hippopotami, is constituted in part by the human mind. His cen tral argument relied on an analysis of space and time, and presupposed his famous doctrine that knowledge cannot extend beyond all possible experience. It is a central property of experience - he claimed - that it is structured spatially and temporally. However, for various reasons, space and time cannot be features of the world, as it is independently of our experience. So he concluded that they must be the forms of human sensibility, i. e. necessary ingredients of the way things appear to our senses."

This edited volume presents new lines of research dealing with the language of thought and its philosophical implications in the time of Ockham. It features more than 20 essays that also serve as a tribute to the ground-breaking work of a leading expert in late medieval philosophy: Claude Panaccio. Coverage addresses topics in the philosophy of mind and cognition (externalism, mental causation, resemblance, habits, sensory awareness, the psychology, illusion, representationalism), concepts (universal, transcendental, identity, syncategorematic), logic and language (definitions, syllogisms, modality, supposition, obligationes, etc.), action theory (belief, will, action), and more. A distinctive feature of this work is that it brings together contributions in both French and English, the two major research languages today on the main theme in question. It unites the most renowned specialists in the field as well as many of Claude Panaccio's former students who have engaged with his work over the years. In furthering this dialogue, the essays render key topics in fourteenth-century thought accessible to the contemporary philosophical community without being anachronistic or insensitive to the particularities of the medieval context. As a result, this book will appeal to a general population of philosophers and historians of philosophy with an interest in logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics.

J. T. Ismael's monograph is an ambitious contribution to the metaphysics and the philosophy of language and mind. She tackles a philosophical question whose origin goes back to Descartes: What am I? The self is not a mere thing among things - but if so, what is it, and what is its relationship to the world? Ismael is an original and creative thinker who tries to understand our problematic concepts about the self and how they are related to our use of language in particular.

Comparing the lived world with the ideal world, noted American philosophical naturalist, poet, and literary critic George Santayana (1863-1952) seeks in this influential compilation of his earlier works to outline the ancient ideal of a well-ordered life, one in which reason is the organizing force that recognizes the need to allocate science, religion, art, social concerns, and practical wisdom their proper role and appropriate emphasis within the fully developed human experience.

The present book intends to approach the problem of mind, meaning and consciousness from a non-naturalist or transcendental point of view. The naturalization of consciousness has reached a dead-end. There can be no proper solution to the problem of mind within the naturalist framework. This work intends to reverse this trend and bring back the long neglected transcendental theory laid down by Kant and Husserl in the West and Vedanta and Buddhism in India. The novelty of this approach lies in how we can make an autonomous space for mind and meaning without denying its connection with the world. The transcendental theory does not disown the embodied nature of consciousness, but goes beyond the body in search of higher meanings and values. The scope of this work extends from mind and consciousness to the world and brings the world into the space of mind and meaning with a hope to enchant the world. The world needs to be retrieved from the stranglehold of scientism and naturalism. This book will dispel the illusion about naturalism which has gripped the minds of our generation. The researchers interested in the philosophy of mind and consciousness can benefit from this work.

Jan Patocka's contribution to phenomenology and the philosophy of history mean that he is considered one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century. Yet, his writing is not widely available in English and the Anglophone world remains rather unfamiliar with his work. In this new book of essential Patocka texts, of which the majority have been translated from the original Czech for the first time, readers will experience a general introduction to the key tenets of his philosophy. This includes his thoughts on the relationship between philosophy and political engagement which strike at the heart of contemporary debates about freedom, political participation and responsibility and a truly pressing issue for modern Europe, what exactly constitutes a European identity? In this important collection, Patocka provides an original vision of the relationship between self, world, and history that will benefit students, philosophers and those who are interested in the ideals that underpin our democracies.

The problem of persistence is as old as the tradition of systematic ontology. How can we explain that the middle-sized standard objects of everyday s life are regarded normally as remaining 'the same', even if they change their properties and their material constituents? The aim of this edition is to present new arguments, perspectives, and theoretical backgrounds concerning 'persistence': There is much more to consider than the classical distinction between 'endurantism' and 'perdurantism'. The volume includes contributions authored by S. Barker, P. Dowe, A. Chrudzimski, P. Grenon, B. Smith, L. Jansen, E.J. Lowe, U. Meixner, K. Miller, E. Runggaldier, J. Seibt, and E. Tegtmeier."

This book introduces the reader to Whitehead's complex and often misunderstood metaphysics by showing that it deals with questions about the nature of causation originally raised by the philosophy of Leibniz. Whitehead's philosophy is an attempt at rehabilitating Leibniz's theory of monads by recasting it in terms of novel ontological categories.

When we ask whether something exists, we expect a yes or no answer, not a further query about what kind of existence, how much of it, whether we mean existence for you or existence for me, or whether we are asking about some property which it might have. In this book, this simple requirement is defended and pursued into its various and sometimes surprising implications. In the course of this pursuit, such questions arise as `Do appearances exist?' `Do unknowable things exist?' `Do past and future exist?' `Does God necessarily exist?' This novel and non-technical approach to important philosophical questions will be of interest to senior students of philosophy and, indeed, to all general readers with philosophical interests.

Gustav Bergmann (1906-1987) was, arguably, the greatest ontologist of the twentieth century in pursuing the fundamental questions of first philosophy as deeply as any philosopher of any time. In 2006 and 2007, international conferences devoted solely to Bergmann s work were held at the University of Iowa in the USA, Universite de Provence in France, and Universita degli Studi Roma Tre in Italy. The papers in this volume were presented at the first of these conferences, in Iowa City, where Bergmann taught for nearly four decades after escaping from Europe, following the dissolution of the Vienna Circle of which he had been the youngest member. There are nine philosophical papers, reminiscences of three of his students, and a complete bibliography of his published writings."

This book challenges common debates in philosophy of mind by questioning the framework of placement problems in contemporary metaphysics. The author argues that placement problems arise when exactly one fundamental ontology serves as the base for all entities, and will propose a pluralist alternative that takes the diversity of our conceptual resources and ontologies seriously. This general pluralist account is applied to issues in philosophy of mind to argue that contemporary debates about the mind-body problem are built on this problematic framework of placement problems. The starting point is the plurality of ontologies in scientific practice. Not only can we describe the world in terms of physical, biological, or psychological ontologies, but any serious engagement with scientific ontologies will identify more specific ontologies in each domain. For example, there is not one unified ontology for biology, but rather a diversity of scientific specializations with different ontological needs. Based on this account of scientific practice the author argues that there is no reason to assume that ontological unification must be possible everywhere. Without this ideal, the scope of ontological unification turns out to be an open empirical question and there is no need to present unification failures as philosophically puzzling "placement problems".

These essays bring together forty years of work in ontology. Intentionality, negation, universals, bare particulars, tropes, general facts, relations, the myth of the 'myth of the given', are among the topics covered. Bergmann, Quine, Sellars, Russell, Wittgenstein, Hume, Bradley, Hochberg, Dummett, Frege, Plato, are among the philosophers discussed. The essays criticize non-Humean notions of cause; they criticize the notion that besides simple atomic facts there are also negative facts and general facts. They defend a realism of properties as universals, against nominalism; bare particulars; a (qualified) realism with regard to logical form; a Russellian account of relations; and an account of minds and intentionality, which is opposed to materialism, but is also a form of (methodological) behaviourism. In general, the ontology is one of logical atomism and empiricist throughout, rooted in a Principle of Acquaintance.

Naturalism is the reigning creed in analytic philosophy. Naturalists claim that natural science provides a complete account of all forms of existence. According to the naturalistic credo there are no aspects of human existence which transcend methods and explanations of science. Our concepts of the self, the mind, subjectivity, human freedom or responsibility is to be defined in terms of established sciences. The aim of the present volume is to draw the balance of naturalism s success so far. Unlike other volumes it does not contain a collection of papers which unanimously reject naturalism. Naturalists and anti-naturalists alike unfold their positions discussing the success or failure of naturalistic approaches. "How successful is naturalism? shows where the lines of agreement and disagreement between naturalists and their critics are to be located in contemporary philosophical discussion. With contributions of Rudder Lynne Baker, Johannes Brandl, Helmut Fink, Ulrich Frey, Georg Gasser & Matthias Stefan, Peter S.M. Hacker, Winfried Loffler, Nancey Murphy, Josef Quitterer, Michael Rea, Thomas Sukopp, Konrad Talmont-Kaminski and Gerd Vollmer."

From Cause to Causation presents both a critical analysis of C.S. Peirce's conception of causation, and a novel approach to causation, based upon the semeiotic of Peirce.
The book begins with a review of the history of causation, and with a critical discussion of contemporary theories of the concept of cause'. The author uncovers a number of inadequacies in the received views of causation, and discusses their historical roots. He makes a distinction between "causality," which is the relation between cause and effect, and causation, which is the production of a certain effect. He argues that, by focusing on causality, the contemporary theories fatally neglect the more fundamental problem of causation. The author successively discusses Peirce's theories of final causation, natural classes, semeiotic, and semeiotic causation. Finally, he uses Peirce's semeiotic to develop a new approach to causation, which relates causation to our experience of signs.

In this fascinating and accessible book, physicist Victor J. Stenger guides the lay reader through the key developments of quantum mechanics and the debate over its apparent paradoxes. In the process, he critically appraises recent metaphysical fads popularized by such authors as Deepak Chopra and Fritjof Capra. Dr. Stenger's knack for elucidating scientific ideas and controversies in language that the nonspecialist can comprehend opens up to the widest possible audience a wealth of information on the most important findings of contemporary physics. Stenger makes it clear that current scientific hypotheses about the material nature of reality are all we need to explain the available evidence and that mystical notions say more about the human need to believe than about the fundamental makeup of the universe.

This book supports a version of the trope-bundle view of individual substances matching also with a coherent account of change, individuation and individual essences. In particular, it is argued that qualitative individuation and qualitative individual essences can be tackled within the frames of a trope account. The adoption of a trope BT together with the individuation of tropes via the bearer substance might create the feeling of circularity since tropes and substances seem mutually to individuate each other. The novel solution to the problem developed here consists in showing that the individuation of concrete individual substances is independent, in crucial respects, from the fact that they are construed as bundles of tropes. Apart from metaphysician colleagues, the book is recommended for advanced students in analytic metaphysics.