While Kant is commonly regarded as one of the most austere philosophers of all time, this book provides quite a different perspective of the founder of transcendental philosophy. Kant is often thought of as being boring, methodical, and humorless. Yet the thirty jokes and anecdotes collected and illustrated here for the first time reveal a man and a thinker who was deeply interested in how humor and laughter shape how we think, feel, and communicate with fellow human beings. In addition to a foreword on Kant's theory of humor by Noel Carroll as well as Clewis's informative chapters, Kant's Humorous Writings contains new translations of Kant's jokes, quips, and anecdotes. Each of the thirty excerpts is illustrated and supplemented by historical commentaries which explain their significance.

What are individuals? How can they be identified? These are crucial questions for philosophers and scientists alike. Criteria of individuality seem to differ markedly between metaphysics and the empirical sciences - and this might well explain why no work has hitherto attempted to relate the contributions of metaphysics, physics and biology on this question. This timely volume brings together various strands of research into 'individuality', examining how different sciences handle the issue, and reflecting on how this scientific work relates to metaphysical concerns. The collection makes a major contribution to clarifying and overcoming obstacles to the construction of a general conception of the individual adequate for both physics and biology, and perhaps even beyond.

Paul Lettinck has restored a lost text of Philoponus by translating it for the first time from Arabic (only limited fragments have survived in the original Greek). The text, recovered from annotations in an Arabic translation of Aristotle, is an abridging paraphrase of Philoponus' commentary on Physics Books 5-7, with two final comments on Book 8. The Simplicius text, which consists of his comments on Aristotle's treatment of the void in chapters 6-9 of Book 4 of the Physics, comes from Simplicius' huge commentary on Book 4. Simplicius' comments on Aristotle's treatment of place and time have been translated by J. O. Urmson in two earlier volumes of this series.

This book presents new insights into Leibniz's research on planetary theory and his system of pre-established harmony. Although some aspects of this theory have been explored in the literature, others are less well known. In particular, the book offers new contributions on the connection between the planetary theory and the theory of gravitation. It also provides an in-depth discussion of Kepler's influence on Leibniz's planetary theory and more generally, on Leibniz's concept of pre-established harmony. Three initial chapters presenting the mathematical and physical details of Leibniz's works provide a frame of reference. The book then goes on to discuss research on Leibniz's conception of gravity and the connection between Leibniz and Kepler.

In "Heidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of Being", Philip Tonner presents an interpretation of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger in terms of the doctrine of the 'univocity of being'. According to the doctrine of univocity there is a fundamental concept of being that is truly predicable of everything that exists. This book explores Heidegger's engagement with the work of John Duns Scotus, who raised philosophical univocity to its historical apotheosis. Early in his career, Heidegger wrote a book-length study of what he took to be a philosophical text of Duns Scotus'. Yet, the word 'univocity' rarely features in translations of Heidegger's works. Tonner shows, by way of a comprehensive discussion of Heidegger's philosophy, that a univocal notion of being in fact plays a distinctive and crucial role in his thought. This book thus presents a novel interpretation of Heidegger's work as a whole that builds on a suggested interpretation by Gilles Deleuze in "Difference and Repetition" and casts a new light on Heidegger's philosophy, clearly illuminating his debt to Duns Scotus. "Continuum Studies in Continental Philosophy" presents cutting-edge scholarship in the field of modern European thought. The wholly original arguments, perspectives and research findings in titles in this series make it an important and stimulating resource for students and academics from across the discipline.

The non-technical, basic yet familiar features of time are investigated, e.g. two novel, detailed arguments defending the common view that 'time rolls relentlessly' are advanced; a number of hitherto neglected fundamental differences between spatio-temporal location and every other physical property are discussed; the unresolved problem, why the past is so much better known than the future is tackled. For those who wish to delve deeper, 25% of the book consists of problems to ponder and their possible solutions.

This book is a study of John Locke's metaphysics of organisms and persons, with particular emphasis on his theory of identity through time and his conventionalism with respect to kinds and essences. After presenting three arguments for thinking that the organisms and persons in Locke's ontology have both spatial and temporal extent, the author argues that on a four-dimensional ontology there is no contradiction between Locke's theory of identity and his rejection of essentialism.

The distinguished scholar of ancient philosophy J.L. Ackrill here presents the best of his essays on Plato and Aristotle from the past forty years. He brings philosophical acuity and philological expertise to a range of texts and topics in ancient thought - from ethics and logic to epistemology and metaphysics - which continue to be widely discussed today.

Every form of life is coded by the genetic code. Life continually changes and evolves. However, the language of the Code does not change. A billion years ago, the primitive life forms on Earth spoke the same body language as they do today. They used the same Code. Nothing has changed. Is this Code eternal? What are the principles of its design? Of course, some will even ask, who designed it? In order to respond to these questions, the book takes an unexpected tack. It develops the proposition that "two takes" are necessary in order to understand reality, a left side take, and a right side take. All of present day sciences, including mathematics are based on the left side take on reality. All of the languages of present day science, including conventional mathematics, are "left side" languages. The book develops the foundations for another kind of science, the "right side" science. We call it the First Science. The book argues that the language for this right side unifying science is none other than the Code. It is here that the story becomes quite extravagant. This Code is so generic that it can code literally anything, not just the biological. In this perspective, the life principle permeates just about everything that exists. The origin of the First Science goes back to Aristotle, and even before. According to Aristotle, the First Science was even supposed to provide knowledge of God. The book explores this ancient territory with modern eyes and ends up revealing a new science and a new kind of geometry. The science is proposed as the unifying science, not only of matter and mathematics, but of consciousness and the generic form of things.

The ten essays in this collection were written to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the lectures which became Wilfrid Sellars's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, one of the crowning achievements of 20th-century analytic philosophy. Both appreciative and critical of Sellars's accomplishment, they engage with his treatment of crucial issues in metaphysics and epistemology. The topics include the standing of empiricism, Sellars's complex treatment of perception, his dissatisfaction with both foundationalist and coherentist epistemologies, his commitment to realism, and the status of the normative (the "logical space of reasons" and the "manifest image"). The volume shows how vibrant Sellarsian philosophy remains in the 21st century.

Leibniz (1646 - 1716) was a true polymath and has been called the most comprehensive thinker since Aristotle. In these two great works by the founder of modern German speculative philosophy, the reader is introduced to Leibniz's metaphysics, including his conception of physical substance, the motion and resistance of bodies, and the role of the divine within the dynamic universe.

The Parmenides is notorious for the criticisms it directs against Plato's own Theory of Forms, as presented in the middle period. But the second and major portion of the dialogue has generally been avoided, despite its being offered as Plato's response to the problems; the text seems intractably obscure, appearing to consist of a series of bad arguments leading to contradictory conclusions. Carefully analyzing these arguments and the methodological remarks which precede them, Meinwald shows that to understand Plato's response we need to recognize his important distinction between two kinds of predication. Read in the light of this distinction, the arguments can be seen to be sound, and the contradictions merely apparent. Meinwald then proceeds to demonstrate the direct application of Plato's crucial innovation in solving the problems of the first part of the dialogue, including the infamous Third Man. On Meinwald's interpretation, the new distinction is associated with developments in metaphysics which take Plato well beyond the problems commonly thought to tell against Platonism.

Puts the emphasis on conceptual questions: Why is there no such thing as absolute motion? What is the physical meaning of relativity of simultaneity? But, the most important question that is addressed in this book is "what is the nature of spacetime?" or, equivalently, "what is the dimensionality of the world at the macroscopic level?"

Develops answers to these questions via a thorough analysis of relativistic effects and explicitly asking whether the objects involved in those effects are three-dimensional or four-dimensional.

Discusses the implication of the result (this analysis clearly shows that if the world and the physical objects were three-dimensional, none of the kinematic relativistic effects and the experimental evidence supporting them would be possible) for physics, philosophy, and our entire world view are discussed.

This book argues that a plausible account of emergence requires replacing the traditional assumption that what primarily exists are particular entities with generic processes. Traversing contemporary physics and issues of identity over time, it then proceeds to develop a metaphysical taxonomy of emergent entities and of the character of human life.

The Aurea Catena Homeri, written in German by Dr. Anton Josef Kirchweger, was first printed in 1723, though it was distributed in a handwritten format prior to that time. It is said to be one of the most important books ever created giving insight into alchemy-the idea that all creation, no matter what its nature, is closely interconnected, that a deeply secret connection pervades all of nature, that one thing relates to the next and things depend upon each other.

In "The Golden Chain of Homer," editors Gregory S. Hamilton and Philip N. Wheeler provide an English translation of Aurea Catena Homeri, complete with frequent, detailed footnotes and extensive commentary that offers a detailed analysis and insight into Kirchweger's work, considered a masterpiece of alchemical literature.

"The Golden Chain of Homer" shows Kirchweger's book in a new, enlightening way. Through this translation, it becomes easier to understand alchemical principles and unveil the mysteries that shroud the science of alchemy.

In this book, Aladdin M. Yaqub describes a simple conception of truth and shows that it yields a semantical theory that accommodates the whole range of our seemingly conflicting intuitions about truth. Yaqub's conception takes the Tarskian biconditionals (such as "The sentence 'Johannes loved Clara' is true if and only if Johannes loved Clara") as correctly and completely defining the notion of truth. The semantical theory, which is called the revision theory, that emerges from this conception paints a metaphysical picture of truth as a property whose applicability is given by a revision process rather than by a fixed extension. The main advantage of this revision process is its ability to explain why truth seems in many cases almost redundant, in others substantial, and yet in others paradoxical (as in the famous Liar). Yaqub offers a comprehensive defense of the revision theory of truth by developing consistent and adequate formal semantics for languages in which all sorts of problematic sentences (Liar and company) can be constructed. He also gives a detailed critical exposition of the proposals of Herzberger, Gupta, and Belnap. Yaqub concludes by introducing a logic of truth that further demonstrates the adequacy of the revision theory. The Liar Speaks the Truth starts with a basic and intuitive understanding of the notion of truth and ends with a complex logic of truth. The book will interest students of logic, truth theory, formal semantics, and philosophy of language.

If you have become as discouraged as I have in the past in the struggle to decipher what philosophers are really up to, then this book will provide very helpful explanations. It is not a book that can be read through quickly, and it does require a fairly broad familiarity with the language of philosophy, however the effort to understand it is very well worth it. It is also not a book that reassures the kind of person who seeks to avoid personal responsibility and self-direction. It dissolves ordinary refuges of transcendently comforting words rather than promotes them. That is, this book is for fiercely independently-minded individuals. If you want to not be misled into the same mistakes philosophers have been making over the past two millennia, then this book is essential towards your quest.

Self and World is an exploration of the nature of self-awareness. Quassim Cassam challenges the widespread and influential view that we cannot be introspectively aware of ourselves as objects in the world. In opposition to the views of many empiricist and idealistic philosophers, including Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein, he argues that the self is not systematically elusive from the perspective of self-consciousness, and that consciousness of our thoughts and experiences requires a sense of our thinking, experiencing selves as shaped, located, and solid physical objects in a world of such objects. Awareness of oneself as a physical object involves forms of bodily self-awareness whose importance has seldom been properly acknowledged in philosophical accounts of the self and self-awareness. The conception of self-awareness defended in this book helps to undermins the idealist thesis that the self does not belong to the world, and also the claim that the existence of subjects or persons is only a derivative feature of reality. In the final part of the book, Cassam argues that the existence of persons is a substantial fact about the world, and that it is not possible to give a complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist. This clear, original, and challenging treatment of one of the deepest intellectual problems will demand the attention of all philosophers and cognitive scientists who are concerned with the self.

This is an highly original philosophical study of the relationship between what reality is and what we think it to be. In "Reality and Its Appearance", Nicholas Rescher aims to address the conceptual and analytical question: how does the concept of reality function and how should we think with regard to the issue of reality's relations to appearances? Rescher argues that the distinction between reality and its appearance is not a substantive distinction between two types of being, but rather relates to different ways of understanding one selfsame mode of being. The book proposes that while realism is a sensible and tenable position, nevertheless there is something to be said for idealism as well. In the cognitive as in the moral life, perfection is beyond our human grasp and we have no choice but to rest content with the best that we can manage to achieve in practice. This perspective shifts the approach from a cognitive absolutism to a pragmatism that is prepared to come to terms with the limitations inherent in our situations. On this basis Rescher defends a substantive realism that itself rests on a justificatory rationale of a decidedly pragmatic orientation. "Continuum Studies in American Philosophy" presents cutting-edge scholarship in both the history of and contemporary movements in American philosophy. The wholly original arguments, perspectives and research findings in titles in this series make it an important and stimulating resource for students and academics from across the field.