The Magyar Fuggetlensegi Mozgalom (Hungarian Independence Movement or MFM) played an important role in the history of Hungary in the latter part of World War II and the years immediately after. The bulk of this volume is based on Szent-Miklosy's personal experiences as a participant in the activities of the MFM. The author, the last survivor in the West of the MFM, describes the unsuccessful attempts of the group first to assist efforts to obtain an armistice with the Allies and to save the Jewish population of Budapest, and then to introduce a Western-style democratic political system into Hungary. He also identifies the causes of the movement's failures, causes that lay not just in the actions of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, but also in the ambivalent foreign policies of France, Great Britain, and the United States, as well as in the shortcomings of Hungarian leadership. The author concludes that despite the eventual failure of the MFM its various efforts had to be made in order to demonstrate Hungary's commitment to Western European culture, independence, Hungarians living outside its borders, the defense of the Jewish population, and a Western-style of democracy.

As Mickolus once more demonstrates, terrorism is alive and well at the beginning of the 1990s. This volume combines a chronology of terrorism, (the fourth Mickolus has produced), with a selective bibliography on the topic, (his third). Covering the period from 1988-1991, this volume follows the same definition of terrorism and the same format and method devised for its predecessor volumes. The result is the most comprehensive look at terrorism available for the period. The earlier volumes are the standard reference chronologies and bibliographies for students and scholars as well as military observers and public policy makers.

Facing the threats posed by dedicated suicide bombers who have access to modern technology for mass destruction and who intend to cause maximum human suffering and casualties, democratic governments have hard choices to make. On the one hand, they must uphold the basic values of democratic societies based on due process and human rights. On the other, they need to pre-empt the kind of destruction inflicted upon New York, Madrid, London, and Bali. The premise of this book is that for intelligence organizations to be able to face up to the challenges of global terrorism, they must think outside the box and utilize all of their resources effectively and creatively. To overcome the enemy, we must also secure the peace. Winning the hearts and minds of the terrorists' pool of potential recruits will be essential to cutting off the supply of suicide bombers. The support and cooperation of the people in countries where the terrorists strike must be sustained by ensuring they have confidence in the government and intelligence services. If a government and its intelligence services become so focused on pre-empting terrorist attacks that they infringe on the rights of their citizens and encroach on democratic norms, they unwittingly fall into a trap set by Al Qaeda and its kind. These organizations aim to destroy the democratic way of life so cherished in the West, and to incite the Muslim populations in democratic countries and their non-Muslim fellow citizens into a vicious circle of mutual hatred and violence. This book therefore addresses not only the question of how intelligence organizations can improve their efficacy in pre-empting terrorist outrages, but also the wider issue of removing the forces that sustain global terrorism as a scourge of the 21st century. The general public in the target countries and recruiting grounds must also be persuaded that—despite their rhetoric—the terrorists are not engaged in a holy war. Ultimately, the brand of global terrorism promoted by Osama bin Laden and his associates is meant to satisfy their own vanity and aspirations toward semi-divine status; the organization they have formed for this purpose is merely a global syndicate that commits serious crimes of a particularly heinous nature. Intelligence services of various countries need to find convincing evidence to prove this point. But it is up to governments, civil society, and the media in different parts of the world to work together if the evidence unearthed by national intelligence services is to be accepted by the general public. Unless the emotional or quasi-religious appeal of the global terrorists can be removed, the simple arrest of bin Laden and his close associates—or even the destruction of Al Qaeda as an organization—will not be sufficient to prevent others from rising to replace them.

The Bush administration was remarkably successful in dominating the debate over why we had to go to war with Iraq, but it would soon be faced with the more daunting task of winning the monumental rhetorical struggle over how to write the script of the Iraq War endgame. We examine the twists and turns of the discursive battle over the war's denouement as it played out against the backdrop of the war on terror, and we conclude that while Bush failed to win the argument that Iraq was one with our fight against terrorism, his underlying worldview that we must confront terrorist evil through global military engagement remains an important component of Obama adminstration rhetoric.

This book traces the events and developments that quickly discredited the Global War on Terror (GWOT), especially its failure to deal with the threat of global terrorism after the events of 11 September 2001. It examines the various strategies, including Global Counterinsurgency (GCOIN), which have been put forward as alternatives to the GWOT. While a consensus can be found on the key elements of a grand strategy, based on the mistakes and failures in the GWOT, it is far from clear if any GCOIN strategy could work. In fact, the US pursuit of a grand strategy is probably a chimera.

This text offers a fresh look at Taiwan's state workers in from the postwar period to the present day and examines the rise and fall of labor insurgency in the past two decades. Challenging the conventional image of docile working class, it unearths a series of workers resistance, hidden and public, in a high authoritarian era.

Media, Myth and Terrorism is a rigorous case study of Blitz mythology in British newspaper responses to the July 7th bombings. Considering how the press, politicians and the public were caught up in popular accounts of Britain's past, Kelsey explores the ideological battleground that took place in the weeks following the bombings.

Explores current debates around religious extremism as a means to understand and re-think the connections between terrorism, insurgency and state failure. Using case studies of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq, she develops a better understanding of the underlying causes and conditions necessary for terrorism and insurgency to occur.

Over the past 25 years, the United States government has developed, through trial and error, both an understanding of terrorism and the means to deal with it. Using information collected in interviews with key decisionmakers from the Nixon to the Clinton administrations, David Tucker draws both strategic and tactical lessons from the United States' encounters with various terrorist groups. These lessons can be usefully applied to future counterterrorism efforts, as well as to other aspects of national security policy in a post-Cold War world where major conflicts will continue to be played out in numerous small struggles. This study will be must-reading for scholars and professionals in international relations, foreign policy, and military/political affairs.

This book is about the role of negotiation in resolving terrorist barricade hostage crises. What lessons can be learned from past deadly incidents so that crisis negotiators and decision makers can act with greater effectiveness in the future? What are the lessons the terrorists are learning and how will they affect the dynamics of future incidents? What can we learn about the terrorist threat, and about preventing the escalation of future terrorist hostage-taking situations? While there are many trained crisis negotiators around the world, almost none of them has ever had contact with a terrorist hostage-taking incident. Further, the entire training program of most hostage negotiators focuses on resolving crises that do not take into consideration issues such as ideology, religion, or the differing sets of strategic objectives and mindsets of ideological hostage takers. This is especially true with regard to the terrorists of the "new" breed, who have become less discriminate, more lethal, and more willing to execute hostages and die during the incident. Further, many of the paradigms and presumptions upon which the contemporary practice of crisis negotiation is based do not reflect the reality of the "new terrorists." The main focus of this book is on the detailed reconstruction and analysis of the two most high-profile cases in recent years, the Moscow theater and the Beslan school hostage crises, with a clear purpose of drawing lessons for hostage negotiation strategies in the future. This is an issue of top priority. Terrorist manuals from countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq reveal that terrorist organizations are very closely observing and analyzing the lessons learned fromthese two incidents, suggesting that we are likely to see this type of "new" terrorist hostage taking involving large numbers of suicide fighters and executions of hostages at some point in the future. This raises a wide array of questions about appropriate responses and negotiation strategies. From the first glance, it is clear that we are not prepared.

This comparative study of terrorism and counter-measures and their effect upon democratic practices and traditions is published under the auspices of the University of New Brunswick Centre for Conflict Studies in Canada. David A. Charters, Editor, has brought together a team of well-known experts to assess the nature of international terrorism in recent years and the possible effect of anti-terrorist policies and counter-measures upon democratic processes and civil liberties in Britain, Germany, Israel, Italy, France, and the United States. Their findings challenge current notions about terrorism and its consequences. A selected bibliography points to some of the most important sources of information on terrorism today.

A primer to terrorist financing and resourcing, this book examines what terrorist organizations must acquire in order to survive and operate, and describes the various means used to meet these needs. It observes how terrorism financing and resourcing has evolved since the beginning of the Age of Modern Terrorism and develops a seven category typology of terrorist resourcing based on how each selected strategy affects a group's operational autonomy. To illustrate this typology, case studies for each category are provided, based on actual examples drawn from the history of terrorism.

Now a 6-part mini-series called Why the Rest of Us Die airing on VICE TV! The shocking truth about the government's secret plans to survive a catastrophic attack on US soil--even if the rest of us die--is "a frightening eye-opener" (Kirkus Reviews) that spans the dawn of the nuclear age to today, and "contains everything one could possibly want to know" (The Wall Street Journal). Every day in Washington, DC, the blue-and-gold first Helicopter Squadron, codenamed "MUSSEL," flies over the Potomac River. As obvious as the Presidential motorcade, most people assume the squadron is a travel perk for VIPs. They're only half right: while the helicopters do provide transport, the unit exists to evacuate high-ranking officials in the event of a terrorist or nuclear attack on the capital. In the event of an attack, select officials would be whisked by helicopters to a ring of secret bunkers around Washington, even as ordinary citizens were left to fend for themselves. "In exploring the incredible lengths (and depths) that successive administrations have gone to in planning for the aftermath of a nuclear assault, Graff deftly weaves a tale of secrecy and paranoia" (The New York Times Book Review) with details "that read like they've been ripped from the pages of a pulp spy novel" (Vice). For more than sixty years, the US government has been developing secret Doomsday strategies to protect itself, and the multibillion-dollar Continuity of Government (COG) program takes numerous forms--from its potential to evacuate the Liberty Bell from Philadelphia to the plans to launch nuclear missiles from a Boeing-747 jet flying high over Nebraska. Garrett M. Graff sheds light on the inner workings of the 650-acre compound, called Raven Rock, just miles from Camp David, as well as dozens of other bunkers the government built for its top leaders during the Cold War, from the White House lawn to Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado to Palm Beach, Florida, and the secret plans that would have kicked in after a Cold War nuclear attack to round up foreigners and dissidents and nationalize industries. Equal parts a presidential, military, and cultural history, Raven Rock tracks the evolution of the government plan and the threats of global war from the dawn of the nuclear era through the War on Terror.

During the past decade, we have witnessed a dramatic transformation in the nature and uses of terrorism. In the 70s, it was often repeated that terrorists "want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead"; today, it is more accurate to say that terrorists want a lot of people dead, and even more people crippled by fear and grief. A major strategic intent of modern terrorists is to use larger scale physical attacks to cause stress in the general population. These changes in terrorist strategy have made it clear that we need better psychological and social responses to terrorism and man-made disasters. The psychological science needed to provide proper and effective treatment for victims of horrendous events, such as September 11th, and future potential terrorist acts, simply does not exist, so military, medical, and psychological experts must work together to improve their understanding of mass casualty terrorism.
In Psychology of Terrorism leading national and international experts present the first results of this effort, including the newest findings on treatment of and clinical responses to terrorism along with their respective underlying theories. They address the history of terrorism; types and effects of weapons of mass destruction or disruption; the role of the military, government agencies, and volunteer groups in responding to terrorist threats; psychological consequences of terrorism; and treatment of special populations such as children and older adults.
This volume will be an ideal text for both academic and professional courses as well as a comprehensive resource for mental health clinicians and researchers, medical care providers, educators, public healthspecialists, government employees, police and fire departments, and non-profit agencies that provide services and craft policy.

Wittig presents the first unified, coherent framework for the systematic analysis of terrorist finance. With empirical examples from around the globe, he dispels several popular myths about these activities to make an important step forward in our understanding of not only terrorist finance, but also the place of terrorism in the contemporary world.

First published in 1977 in the US and Britain to universal critical acclaim, Hitler's Children quickly became a world-wide best seller, translated into many other languages, including Japanese.

It tells the story of the West German terrorists who emerged out of the 'New Left' student protest movement of the late 1960s. With bombs and bullets they started killing in the name of 'peace'. Almost all of them came from prosperous, educated families. They were 'Hitler's children' not only in that they had been born in or immediately after the Nazi period - some of their parents having been members of the Nazi party - but also because they were as fiercely against individual freedom as the Nazis were. Their declared ideology was Communism. They were beneficiaries of both American aid and the West German economic miracle. Despising their immeasurable gifts of prosperity and freedom, they 'identified' themselves with Third World victims of wars, poverty and oppression, whose plight they blamed on 'Western imperialism'. In reality, their terrorist activity was for no better cause than self-expression.

Their dreams of leading a revolution were ended when one after another of them died in shoot-outs with the police, or was blown up with his own bomb, or was arrested, tried, and condemned to long terms of imprisonment. All four leaders of the Red Army Faction (dubbed 'the Baader-Meinhof gang' by journalists) committed suicide in prison.

Why was there a deliberate plan to fight the war in Iraq but none to win the peace? This question, which has caused such confusion and consternation among the American public and been the subject of much political wrangling over the past two years, is the focus of Lt. Col. Isaiah Wilson's investigation. Director of the American politics, policy, and strategy program at West Point, Wilson points to a flaw in the government's definition of when, how, and for what reasons the United States intervenes abroad. It is a paradox in the American way of peace and war, he explains, that harkens back to America's war loss in Vietnam. The dilemma we face today in Iraq, the author says, is the result of a flaw in how we have viewed the war from its inception, and Wilson reminds us that Iraq is just the latest, albeit the most poignant and tragic, case in point. His exploration of this paradox calls for new organizational and operational approaches to America's intervention policy. In challenging current western societal military lexicon and doctrine, Wilson offers new hope and practical solutions to overcome the paradox once and for all.

Years after 9/11, the Global War on Terror is still not over. The deepening crisis in Iraq has been accompanied by rising violence in Asia, as the bombings in Indonesia show. The 18 specialists and policymakers who have contributed to this book assess how the security scenario in the Asia Pacific has changed in response to these events. The Asia Pacific is rent by communal conflicts that have generated local jihads, which fuel regional and global jihads. This book assesses state responses to terrorism, paying attention to neglected factors such as money laundering, the emerging role of the EU, the growing fear of the US and increasing concern about the way anti-terrorist legislation curtails civil liberties. With the benefit of extensive fieldwork and access to unique sources in many languages, the contributors analyze key features of the local security scenarios. Pakistan's precarious situation is explored here from many angles, including Islamic militancy, the role of the military and the peace process with India. Again, domestic failures support regional and global terror. Regional anti-terrorist collaboration is also hampered by South-east Asia's counter-terrorism dilemmas, setbacks in the Philippine-US security relationship, the Asian arms race, and growing fears of the US National Missile Defence system and how this system will be perceived by China. The history of state sponsored terrorism and millenarian ideology are crucial to these regional scenarios. The latter, in the particular form of Japan's Aum Shinrikyo movement, reminds us that militant Islamists are not uniquely destructive. An important addition to the literature on terrorism and security, this in-depth and comprehensive analysis of a complex and increasingly unstable region will be welcomed by political scientists, scholars, policymakers, and those seeking a better understanding of whether the Global War on Terror has changed the security architecture of the Asia Pacific in a positive way.

A timely work of major historical importance, examining the whole spectrum of events from the 1916 Easter Rising to the current and ongoing peace process, fully updated with a new afterword for the paperback edition.

'An essential book ... closely-reasoned, formidably intelligent and utterly compelling ... required reading across the political spectrum ... important and riveting' Roy Foster, "The Times "

'An outstanding new book on the IRA ... a calm, rational but in the end devastating deconstruction of the IRA' Henry McDonald, "Observer"

'Superb ... the first full history of the IRA and the best overall account of the organization. English writes to the highest scholarly standards ... Moreover, he writes with the common reader in mind: he has crafted a fine balance of detail and analysis and his prose is clear, fresh and jargon-free ... sets a new standard for debate on republicanism' Peter Hart, "Irish Times"

'The one book I recommend for anyone trying to understand the craziness and complexity of the Northern Ireland tragedy.' Frank McCourt, author of "Angela's Ashes"

After 9/11, the U.S.-led global war on terrorism has intruded into an already complex security environment in the Malay archipelago, home to the world's largest population of Muslims, with the potential to catalyze or unleash further dynamics that could destabilize the region. This book argues that, given the existence of a discrete Malay archipelago security complex, with its security linkages and interactive dynamics, it is a fallacy for the United States to approach this region primarily through the prism of global counter-terrorism. Instead, any strategic policy towards the region needs to be founded upon a deep appreciation of the existing Malay archipelago security complex.

Nuclear Insecurity is an insider's account of official American efforts to prevent the theft or diversion of nuclear and radiological weapons that could be used by rogue nations or terrorist groups. This perspective draws heavily from the author's work on the White House National Security Council Staff (1996-2000), where he was directly responsible to President Clinton for the development of U.S. nuclear material security policies and, subsequently, at the U.S. Department of Energy, where he directed the department's largest international nuclear security program, focused primarily on Russia. In Caravelli's assessment, despite exceptional bipartisan political support and very high funding levels that have reached over $9 billion, a series of policy mistakes and programmatic bureaucratic missteps have badly compromised the United States government's efforts to protect against the spread of nuclear weapons and materials. The most striking example of the current situation is that the U.S. government, some 12 years after the start of these programs, still has failed to enhance the security of more than 300 metric tons of nuclear materials in Russia alone, enough to make hundreds of nuclear devices. The book concludes with recommendations and policy prescriptions for addressing some of these problems.

Marianne Wade and Almir Maljevi? Although the worries about terrorism paled in comparison to the economic crisis as a topic during the last US election, one can find plenty of grounds to assume that they remain issue number one in the minds of politicians in Europe. As the German houses of Parliament prepare to call in the mediation committee in the discussion of legislation which would provide the Federal Police - thus far mandated purely with the post-facto investigation of crime - with powers to act to prevent acts of terrorism, Spain's struggle with ETA and the British Government licks its wounds after a resounding defeat of its latest anti-terrorist proposals by the House of Lords, one cannot but wonder whether post 9/11, the Europeans are not even more concerned with terrorism than their US counterparts. A look at media reports, legislative and judicial activities in either Britain or Germany clearly underlines that those two countries are deeply embroiled in anti-terrorist activity. Can it be that Europe is embroiled in the "War on Terror"; constantly providing for new arms in this conflict? Or is it a refusal to participate in the "War on Terror" that fuels a constant need for Parliaments to grapple with the subject; begrudgingly conceding one increasingly draconian measure after the other? The question as to where Europe stands in the "War on Terror" is a fascinating one, but one, which is difficult to answer.

Religious terrorism has become the scourge of the modern world. What causes a person to kill innocent strangers in the name of religion? As both a clinical psychologist and an authority on comparative religion, James W. Jones is uniquely qualified to address this increasingly urgent question. Research on the psychology of violence shows that several factors work to make ordinary people turn "evil." These include feelings of humiliation or shame, a tendency to see the world in black and white, and demonization or dehumanization of other people. Authoritarian religion or "fundamentalism," Jones shows, is a particularly rich source of such ideas and feelings, which he finds throughout the writings of Islamic jihadists, such as the 9/11 conspirators.
Jones goes on to apply this model to two very different religious groups that have engaged in violence: Aum Shinrikyo, the Buddhist splinter group behind the sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subway system, and members of the extreme religious right in the U.S. who have advocated and committed violence against abortion providers. Jones notes that not every adherent of an authoritarian group will turn to violence, and he shows how theories of personality development can explain why certain individuals are easily recruited to perform terrorist acts.

This book places the current wave of religion-based terrorism in a historical perspective, explaining why religion is associated with terrorism, comparing religion-based terrorism to other forms of terrorism, and documenting how religion-based terrorism is a product of powerful political, socioeconomic, and psychological forces. Religion-based terrorism is perceived as one of the most significant threats to U.S. homeland security in the 21st century. Sacred Terror: How Faith Becomes Lethal makes the central argument that religion-based violence and terrorism is primarily a result of political, socioeconomic, and psychological forces, thereby demystifying religion-based terrorism and revealing its inherent similarity to other forms of terrorism and war. Daniel Price examines religious texts and traditions in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; looks at the history of religion-based terrorism; and explores why religion facilitates violence. He builds upon this foundation to explain how religion as an ideological force that motivates violence is not as powerful as commonly believed, and that religious fervor is not unlike other non-religious ideologies such as Marxism, nationalism, and anarchism. The work also presents in-depth analysis of the political, socioeconomic, and psychological forces that are behind religion-based violence, and discusses case studies from multiple religions that illustrate the author's argument.