A small team from the US Navy arrives in Vietnam in the spring of 1962. At first, its members only hear whispers about what they are supposed to accomplish. The unit goes by the name MTT 10-62 because its mission is so secret. This is the first Sea, Air and Land team-later known as the SEALs-and it's gearing up to train a group of volunteers from the Vietnamese Junk Force in counterinsurgency and maritime warfare. Told mostly through the perspective of Chris "Doc" David-a first class hospital corpsman, first class diver, and diving medical technician-and Lt. Bill Evans, "SEAL Doc" shows how the first SEALs work in conjunction with Army Special Forces and others to stop the spread of communism. While the SEALs are outstanding fighters and tacticians, they get little material support to accomplish their mission. The team arrives in Da Nang with nothing but stateside uniforms, and their vehicles and gasoline must be "liberated" from Vietnamese motor pools. Meanwhile, the daily challenges the SEALs face are preparing them for a final explosive mission and setting the stage for the future development of Navy SEALs in "SEAL Doc, " a historical novel based on the true story of the SEALs.

The Pentagon Papers, officially titled "Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force," was commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1967. In June of 1971, small portions of the report were leaked to the press and widely distributed. However, the publications of the report that resulted from these leaks were incomplete and suffered from many quality issues.

On the 40th anniversary of the leak to the press, the National Archives, along with the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Presidential Libraries, has released the complete report. The 48 boxes in this series contain a complete copy of the 7,000 page report along with numerous copies of different volumes of the report, all declassified. Approximately 34% of the report is available for the first time.

What is unique about this, compared to other versions, is that:

* The complete Report is now available with no redactions compared to previous releases

* The Report is presented as Leslie Gelb presented it to then Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford on January 15, 1969

* All the supplemental back-documentation is included. In the Gravel Edition, 80% of the documents in Part V.B. were not included.

This release includes the complete account of peace negotiations, significant portions of which were not previously available either in the House Armed Services Committee redacted copy of the Report or in the Gravel Edition.

This facsimile volume contains:

Part IV. A. 1.] Evolution of the War. NATO and SEATO: A Comparison

Part IV. A. 2.] Evolution of the War. Aid for France in Indochina, 1950-54

Part IV. A. 3.] Evolution of the War. U.S. and France's Withdrawal from Vietnam, 1954-56

Part IV. A. 4.] Evolution of the War. U.S. Training of Vietnamese National Army, 1954-59

Part IV. A. 5.] Evolution of the War. Origins of the Insurgency

This controversial and timely book about the American experience in Vietnam provides the first full exploration of the perspectives of the North Vietnamese leadership before, during, and after the war. Herbert Y. Schandler offers unique insights into the mindsets of the North Vietnamese and their response to diplomatic and military actions of the Americans, laying out the full scale of the disastrous U.S. political and military misunderstandings of Vietnamese history and motivations. Including frank quotes from Vietnamese leaders, the book offers important new knowledge that allows us to learn invaluable lessons from the perspective of a victorious enemy. Unlike most military officers who served in Vietnam, Schandler is convinced the war was unwinnable, no matter how long America stayed the course or how many resources were devoted to it. He is remarkably qualified to make these judgments as an infantry commander during the Vietnam War, a Pentagon policymaker, and a scholar who taught at West Point and National Defense University. His extensive personal interviews with North Vietnamese are drawn from his many trips to Hanoi after the war. Schandler provides not only a definitive analysis of the American failure in Vietnam but a crucial foundation for exploring the potential for success in the current guerrilla wars the United States is fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This book contains descriptions of all of the naval and riverine weapons used by both sides during the Vietnam War. It also includes the dates that most major weapons were involved.

Conventional wisdom holds that the US Army in Vietnam, thrust into an unconventional war where occupying terrain was a meaningless measure of success, depended on body counts as its sole measure of military progress. In No Sure Victory, Army officer and historian Gregory Daddis looks far deeper into the Army's techniques for measuring military success and presents a much more complicated-and disturbing-account of the American misadventure in Indochina.
Daddis shows how the US Army, which confronted an unfamiliar enemy and an even more unfamiliar form of warfare, adopted a massive, and eventually unmanageable, system of measurements and formulas to track the progress of military operations that ranged from pacification efforts to search-and-destroy missions. The Army's monthly "Measurement of Progress" reports covered innumerable aspects of the fighting in Vietnam-force ratios, Vietcong/North Vietnamese Army incidents, tactical air sorties, weapons losses, security of base areas and roads, population control, area control, and hamlet defenses. Concentrating more on data collection and less on data analysis, these indiscriminate attempts to gauge success may actually have hindered the army's ability to evaluate the true outcome of the fight at hand--a roadblock that Daddis believes significantly contributed to the many failures that American forces suffered in Vietnam.
Filled with incisive analysis and rich historical detail, No Sure Victory is not only a valuable case study in unconventional warfare, but a cautionary tale that offers important perspectives on how to measure performance in current and future armed conflict. Given America's ongoing counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, No Sure Victory provides valuable historical perspective on how to measure--and mismeasure--military success.

After spending a year in Germany as a security guard with the 50th Ordnance Company, Curtis Gay went to Viet Nam as a Private First Class. Six months later he was a Sergeant in the 25th Infantry Division and experienced some of the most intense fighting of the war. This book is his story.

Curtis spent a year as a Drill Sergeant at Fort Dix, New Jersey before leaving the Army in 1968. After a long career in the electrical industry, he is retired and lives in Durham, North Carolina with his wife.

Part I is a compendium of World War II service recollections embracing the unusual, bizarre and humorous, most of which never appeared in the news or any publications. However, I do believe readers will be very interested in the other side of war. Part II is an incisive review of Vietnam, and why we failed or should never have been involved militarily. Part III is a current analysis of terrorism and the Iraq war, including a new proposal to address the global aspects of terrorism and the Palestinian issue.

Thirty-five long years and I was still seeking answers. If I could make someone in the government listen to the facts, I knew they'd want to act on them. After all, who wouldn't want to find one of our POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War? IS ANYBODY LISTENING? tells of dignitaries, presidents and those involved with the POW/MIA issue as I've known it since November 1968 when my husband, a Special Forces officer, became missing-in-action. The pages reveal my feelings and torment during my many trips to Southeast Asia in search of answers, and my frustrations while wandering the halls of Washington D.C. for help. The book was written to show the issue's insidious cover-up and my commitment to the truth.

This book chronicles one man's journey through life, finding happiness among the hardships and amusement amid the danger in Vietnam. This vivid account takes you on an armchair ride through an unpredictable and intriguing life. Set against the backdrop of The War, follow this young civilian engineer, family man and patriot through a war torn land as he strives to secure his young family's future and seek a more meaningful purpose to his own life. He returns home a changed man, only to confront a completely new set of obstacles, not least of which is a country in turmoil.

Helsing provides a unique perspective on the escalation of the Vietnam War. He examines what many analysts and former policymakers in the Johnson administration have acknowledged as a crucial factor in the way the United States escalated in Vietnam: Johnson's desire for both guns and butter--his belief that he must stem the advance of communism in Southeast Asia while pursuing a Great Society at home.

He argues that the United States government, the president, and his key advisers in particular engaged in a major pattern of deception in how the United States committed its military force in Vietnam. He then argues that a significant sector of the government was deceived as well. The first half of the book traces and analyzes the pattern of deception from 1964 through July 1965. The second half shows how the military and political decisions to escalate influenced--and were influenced by--the economic advice and policies being given the President. This in-depth analysis will be of particular concern to scholars, students, and researchers involved with U.S. foreign and military policy, the Vietnam War, and Presidential war powers.

The Vietnam War: An Encyclopedia of Quotations presents the story of this seminal conflict as told through the words of the famous, infamous, and anonymous. All sides of the controversy are presented in chronological resource that starts with a look at Vietnamese history, then traces the events preceding France's war, continues through America's entry into the conflict, and concludes with the war's aftermath. This is the story of the Vietnam War told through quotations in chronological sequence. Starting with the beginnings of Vietnamese history, it traces the events preceding the French war, continues through the American war, and ends with its aftermath. All sides of the controversy are represented. Here are the voices of warriors, presidents, generals, government leaders, civilians, aid workers, pilots, infantrymen, nurses, historians, war correspondents, sociologists, POWs, peasants, draft dodgers, guerillas, and war resisters. They speak from government capitals, hooches, hospital wards, jungle trails, landing zones, aircraft carriers, draft boards, Buddhist temples, and prison cells. They talk of firefights, ambushes in the jungle, bombing raids, coups, assassinations, suicides, demonstrations, atrocities, and teach-ins. Here are Ho Chi Minh, Lyndon Johnson, Giap, Westmoreland, Kennedy, De Gaulle, Eisenhower, Nixon, McNamara, Kissinger, and many people you have never heard of. Meet Hanoi Hannah, who broadcast propaganda from the North Vietnamese capital; John McCain tells you what it was like to be shot down over enemy territory and taken prisoner; John Kerry tells a U.S. Senate committee why he opposes the Vietnam War. You will learn about My Lai, Agent Orange, Kent State, the Pentagon Papers, and the plan to free American POWs that went awry. Features include a chronology, biographical sketches, Medal of Honor winners, bibliography, nineteen photos, and an index.

The Vietnam War has had many long-reaching, traumatic effects, not just on the veterans of the war, but on their children as well. In this book, Weber examines the concept of the war as a social monad, a confusing array of personal stories and public histories that disrupt traditional ways of knowing the social world for the second generation.

SOS and then stopped the ship. Seven Khmer Rouge soldiers boarded the Mayaguez and their leader, Battalion Commander Sa Mean, pointed at a map indicating that the ship should proceed to the east of Poulo Wai. One of the crew members broadcast a Mayday which was picked up by an Australian vessel. The Mayaguez arrived off Poulo Wai at approximately 4pm and a further 20 Khmer Rouge boarded the vessel. At 12:05 EST (21:05 Cambodia), a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) was convened to discuss the situation. The members of the NSC were determined to end the crisis decisively, believing that the fall of South Vietnam less than two weeks before and the forced withdrawal of the United States from Cambodia, (Operation Eagle Pull) and South Vietnam (Operation Frequent Wind) had severely damaged the U.S.'s reputation. They also wished to avoid comparisons to the Pueblo incident of 1968, where the failure to promptly use military force to halt the hijacking of a US intelligence ship by North Korea led to an eleven-month hostage situation.