Throughout the War in Southeast Asia, Communist forces form North Vietnam infiltrated the isolated, neutral state of Laos. Men and supplies crossed the mountain passes and travelled along an intricate web of roads and jungle paths known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam. American involvement in Laos began which a photo-reconnaissance missions and, as the war in Vietnam intensified, expanded to a series of air-ground operations from bases in Vietnam and Thailand against fixed targets and infiltration routes in southern Laos. This volume examines this complex operational environment. United States Air Force. Center for Air Force History.

The U.S. Air Force reached its nadir during the opening two years of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in North Vietnam. Never had the Air Force operated with so many restraints and to so little effect. These pages are painful but necessary reading for all who care about the nation's military power. Van Staaveren wrote this book near the end of his distinguished government service. He was an Air Force historian in Korea during the Korean War and he began to write about the Vietnam War while it was still being fought.

During the Vietnam War, hundreds of American POWs faced years of brutal conditions and horrific torture at the hands of communist interrogators who ruthlessly plied them for military intelligence and propaganda. Determined to maintain their Code of Conduct, the prisoners developed a powerful underground resistance. To quash it, the North Vietnamese singled out its eleven leaders, Vietnam's own "dirty dozen," and banished them to an isolated jail that would become known as Alcatraz. None would leave its solitary cells and interrogation rooms unscathed; one would never return. As these men suffered in Hanoi, their wives launched an extraordinary campaign that would ultimately spark the POW/MIA movement. When the survivors finally returned, one would receive the Medal of Honor, another became a U.S. Senator, and a third still serves in Congress. A story of survival and triumph in the vein of Unbroken and Band of Brothers, Defiant will inspire anyone wondering how courage, faith, and brotherhood can endure even in the darkest of situations.

The war in Vietnam, spanning more than twenty years, was one of the most divisive conflicts ever to envelop the United States, and its complexity and consequences did not end with the fall of Saigon in 1975. As Peter Sills demonstrates in "Toxic War," veterans faced a new enemy beyond post-traumatic stress disorder or debilitating battle injuries. Many of them faced a new, more pernicious, slow-killing enemy: the cancerous effects of Agent Orange.

Originally introduced by Dow and other chemical companies as a herbicide in the United States and adopted by the military as a method of deforesting the war zone of Vietnam, in order to deny the enemy cover, Agent Orange also found its way into the systems of numerous active-duty soldiers. Sills argues that manufacturers understood the dangers of this compound and did nothing to protect American soldiers.

"Toxic War" takes the reader behind the scenes into the halls of political power and industry, where the debates about the use of Agent Orange and its potential side effects raged. In the end, the only way these veterans could seek justice was in the court of law and public opinion. Unprecedented in its access to legal, medical, and government documentation, as well as to the personal testimonies of veterans, "Toxic War" endeavors to explore all sides of this epic battle.

Reverberations of the Vietnam War can still be felt in American culture. The post-9/11 United States forays into the Middle East, the invasion and occupation of Iraq especially, have evoked comparisons to the nearly two decades of American presence in Viet Nam (1954-1973). That evocation has renewed interest in the Vietnam War, resulting in the re-printing of older War narratives and the publication of new ones. This volume tracks those echoes as they appear in American, Vietnamese American, and Vietnamese war literature, much of which has joined the American literary canon. Using a wide range of theoretical approaches, these essays analyze works by Michael Herr, Bao Ninh, Duong Thu Huong, Bobbie Ann Mason, le thi diem thuy, Tim O'Brien, Larry Heinemann, and newcomers Denis Johnson, Karl Marlantes, and Tatjana Solis. Including an historical timeline of the conflict and annotated guides to further reading, this is an essential guide for students and readers of contemporary American fiction

The assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem on November 1, 1963, left a leadership void in Saigon that was never filled. Heads of state went through Saigon like a revolving door, yet none of them were able to successfully lead and govern the people of South Vietnam. On the other side of the globe, President of the United States John F. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963. While the U.S. had a line of succession, President Johnson was relatively new to the Vietnam situation. Even though Johnson was new, he still had Kennedy's cabinet and advisers to aid his decisions. Despite this, by early 1964 two new leaders, Nguyen Khanh and Lyndon Johnson sought a solution to the decades long struggle in Vietnam. President Johnson inherited a three-front war in Vietnam. One front was North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong (VC) insurgency in South Vietnam, and Johnson had to stop this support in order to defeat the VC. The insurgency itself constituted another front that had to be defeated in order to maintain a free and independent South Vietnam. The third overarching front was the creation of a stable and legitimate government in Saigon capable of governing the people of South Vietnam. The question for his administration was on which of these aspects to focus. Before Johnson could make that decision, he first had to decide if the U.S. should continue to aid Saigon; therefore, he had three options: leave Vietnam, continue in an advisory role, or escalate U.S. involvement. The political and military situations in Vietnam deteriorated to such a point through 1964-1965 that by February 1965 there were no good choices left from which President Johnson could choose. Johnson desired for there to be a stable South Vietnamese government before he committed U.S. forces to its defense; however, no such government emerged. The administration was unwilling to risk U.S. prestige, resources, and lives unless they were confident South Vietnam could succeed without U.S. support. Because of the instability in South Vietnam as well as the perceived risk of communist aggression, President Johnson decided that escalatory military actions would be limited and gradual. Therefore, President Johnson made the least bad decision he could in February 1965 by initiating Operation ROLLING THUNDER and committing the United States to the Vietnam War.

An oral history of American Support Troops, our hidden army, during the Vietnam War.

In 1971, while U.S. ground forces were prohibited from crossing the Laotian border, a South Vietnamese Army corps, with U.S. air support, launched the largest airmobile operation in the history of warfare, Lam Son 719. The objective: to sever the North Vietnamese Army's main logistical artery, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, at its hub, Tchepone in Laos, an operation that, according to General Creighton Abrams, could have been the decisive battle of the war, hastening the withdrawal of U.S. forces and ensuring the survival of South Vietnam. The outcome: defeat of the South Vietnamese Army and heavy losses of U.S. helicopters and aircrews, but a successful preemptive strike that met President Nixon's near-term political objectives. Author Robert Sander, a helicopter pilot in Lam Son 719, explores why an operation of such importance failed. Drawing on archives and interviews, and firsthand testimony and reports, Sander chronicles not only the planning and execution of the operation but also the maneuvers of the bastions of political and military power during the ten-year effort to end Communist infiltration of South Vietnam leading up to Lam Son 719. The result is a picture from disparate perspectives: the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations; the South Vietnamese government led by President Nguyen Van Thieu; and senior U.S. military commanders and army aviators. Sander's conclusion is at once powerful and persuasively clear. Lam Son 719 was doomed in both the planning and execution - a casualty of domestic and international politics, flawed assumptions, incompetent execution, and the resolve of the North Vietnamese Army. A powerful work of military and political history, this book offers eloquent testimony that ""failure, like success, cannot be measured in absolute terms.

James V. Weatherill served as an Army helicopter pilot in Vietnam from November 1967 to November 1968. His memoir, THE BLADES CARRY ME: INSIDE THE HELICOPTER WAR IN VIETNAM, takes the reader into the CH-47 Chinook helicopter cockpit and the daily life of a 22-year-old pilot. The young man must reconcile his ideals of patriotism, courage, and honor with the reality and politics of a war where victory is measured by body-count ratios instead of territory gained or lost. When it's time to go home, he realizes he'll leave more than war behind. On the home front, the pilot's wife, Annie, provides a counterpoint as a pregnant college senior and military spouse during an unpopular war. With letters and tape recordings their sole means of communication, how will they grow up without growing apart?

No experience etched itself more deeply into Air Force thinking than the air campaigns over North Vietnam. Two decades later in the deserts of Southwest Asia, American airmen were able to avoid the gradualism that cost so many lives and planes in the jungles of Southeast Asia. Readers should come away from this book with a sympathetic understanding of the men who bombed North Vietnam. Those airmen handled tough problems in ways that ultimately reshaped the Air Force into the effective instrument on display in the Gulf War. This book is a sequel to Jacob Van Staaveren's Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam, 1965-1966, which we have also declassified and are publishing. Wayne Thompson tells how the Air Force used that failure to build a more capable service-a service which got a better opportunity to demonstrate the potential of air power in 1972. Dr. Thompson began to learn about his subject when he was an Army draftee assigned to an Air Force intelligence station in Taiwan during the Vietnam War. He took time out from writing To Hanoi and Back to serve in the Checkmate group that helped plan the Operation Desert Storm air campaign against Iraq. Later he visited Air Force pilots and commanders in Italy immediately after the Operation Deliberate Force air strikes in Bosnia. During Operation Allied Force over Serbia and its Kosovo province, he returned to Checkmate. Consequently, he is keenly aware of how much the Air Force has changed in some respects-how little in others. Although he pays ample attention to context, his book is about the Air Force. He has written a well-informed account that is both lively and thoughtful.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1969 study. A study requested by the Secretary of Defense in 1965 showed that "when national interests are involved and tactical forces are deployed without a declaration of national emergency or war, a quick-reacting, heavy repair force, organic to the Air Force, is essential." Between June and September 1965, a study group from the Directorate of Civil Engineering at Headquarters USAF had analyzed the problem and obtained Air Staff approval to form such a force. On 23 September 1965, the Tactical Air Command (TAC) was given responsibility for organizing, training, procuring equipment and supplies, and administering the formation of the first two Red Horse Squadrons (the 554th and 555th Civil Engineering Heavy Repair Squadrons). By 18 October 1965, Hq TAC at Langley Field, Virginia, completed and distributed a comprehensive programming plan covering the objectives, timetable of actions, reporting procedures, staffing requirements, and the naming of primary and subordinate unit project officers. The mission and capabilities of the squadrons, their limitations, and material requirements were also recorded. Thus, in the fall of 1965, responding to the changing military and political situation in Southeast Asia and the projected need for a rapid increase of U.S. military forces in that part of the world, Project RED HORSE was initiated. The rapidity of planning, organizing, and executing which characterized these early beginnings, was to become a permanent part of RED HORSE activities.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1971 study.The primary mission of Ranch Hand was defoliation and crop destruction. Defoliation was directed against enemy strongholds, roadsides, power lines, railroads, and other lines of communication. The objectives were to increase visibility for Forward Air Controller (FAC) and tactical aircraft and to make it more difficult for the enemy to ambush ground forces. Two herbicides were used for. defoliation: Orange, a mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T chlorophenoxy acids; and White, a mixture of 2,4-D and picloram. Crop destruction was directed at food plots of enemy troops, the objective being to increase their logistics problem. The herbicide used for crop denial missions was Agent Blue, a sodium salt of cacodylic acid. Proposed targets were carefully screened at all echelons. Requests for defoliation and crop destruction were originated by army commanders at or below the province level. The request, when approved by the Province Chief, was sent to the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS). With their approval, it went to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) which reviewed specific target areas and operational requirements. A coordination meeting was then held at the province where the final plan was agreed upon. Following this, an operations order was published by the JGS and an execution order issued by MACV. It required approximately six months from the time the request for defoliation was first submitted until the final plan was agreed upon by all levels of command. A second mission of the Ranch was that of conducting airlift operations as directed by higher authority. This was accomplished by removing the spray tanks and spray booms from the aircraft and installing the conveyors and other essential equipment for airlift operations. The conversion, when required, was accomplished in less than 24 hours.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1968 eport. "The War in Vietnam--July - December 1967" summarizes and provides an overall look at the Air Force role in North and South Vietnam for the semi- annual period. It is a continuation of the summary of Air Force operations first detailed in "The War in Vietnam - 1965." ROLLING THUNDER gradually increased the weight of effort against a broadening, but still limited, target complex. The high incidence of radar-directed guns and SA-2s in the extended battle area also required changes in tactics by strike and reconnaissance forces. Close air support was instrumental in breaking the enemy attacks on Dak To, Loc Ninh, and Bo Duc, often by putting ordnance within 20 feet of prepared Allied positions. Airlift units retained their basic organizational structure and successfully supported the Allied requirements at Loc Ninh and Dak To. Flying safety was the paramount problem confronting the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), and by August, aircraft losses due to pilot error exceeded combat losses, until finally an intensive instrument training program was initiated. The denial of crops through herbicide destruction often placed a severe strain on the enemy supply system, forcing the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) out of their normal operating areas. Enemy attacks against air bases with a steadily improving rocket capability continued to present formidable problems. Successful efforts were made during the period to substantially increase the B-52 monthly sortie rate to keep pressure on the enemy's supply and infiltration system, while at the same time blocking his efforts to mass along the DMZ.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1968 study."The War in Vietnam" provides an overall look at the Southeast Asia situation, as it relates to the role of the United States Air Force. Intensifying its air operations, the USAF increased its close air support, interdiction, fixed-wing, and helicopter support. New tactics were also used to improve the Search and Rescue capability in highly defended areas and measures were devised to minimize limitations of aircraft in recovering downed airmen. In an effort to exhaust enemy resources and remove his sanctuaries in North Vietnam, one of the major objectives of the air campaign was greater targeting freedom. A probing for target alternatives showed destruction of hard-to-replace vehicles could be more effective than "cratering a road, interdicting a rail line, or destroying a bridge." Since enemy strategy emphasized prolonging the war by keeping the U.S. out of the: Hanoi/Haiphong region, CINCPAC enumerated methods of attacking his air defense system, including MIG air bases and aircraft on the ground.