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Books > History > American history > From 1900 > Postwar, from 1945 > Vietnam War
Every Marine who has served in Vietnam has been heavily involved in
efforts to improve the situation of the Vietnamese people. The
civil affairs actions of the III Marine Amphibious Force have been
every bit as important as the combat actions. In this reference
pamphlet, which follows an earlier history of the first year of
Marine Corps civic action in Vietnam, the story of the second year
of civilian aid policies, programs, and activities is related. The
use of civic action by the Marine Corps to accomplish its assigned
mission is nothing new. Examples of how the Marines have employed
civic action in the past can be found by reading accounts of their
exploits during the 1920s in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican
Republic. From these accomplishments and astute observations made
by men such as Major Earl H. Ellis and others, accounts of "lessons
learned" about civic action can be found recorded in the Small Wars
Manual of 1940, which points out: "The motive in small wars is not
material destruction. It is usually a project dealing with the
social, economic, and political development of the people. It is of
primary importance that the fullest benefit be derived from the
psychological aspects of the situation. That implies a serious
study of the people, their racial, political, religious, and mental
development. By analysis and study the reasons for existing
emergency may be deduced; the most practical method of solving the
problem is to understand the possible approaches thereto and the
repercussion to be expected from any action which may be
contemplated. By this study and the ability to apply correct
psychological doctrine, many pitfalls may be avoided and the
success of the undertaking assured." With the basic concept of
small wars in mind, the Manual of 1940 goes on to point out: "The
purpose should always be to restore normal government or give the
people a better government than they had before, and to estabJ.sh
peace, order, and security on as permanent a basis as practicable.
In so doing one should endeavor to make self-sufficient native
agencies responsible for these matters. With all this accomplished,
one should be able to leave the country with the lasting friendship
and respect of the native population." The concept of civic action
may be simply stated, but the organization and application of
carrying out an effective program becomes a difficult matter. This
difficulty in application can be seen through the scope and
magnitude of the U. S. Marine Corps civic action effort in the I
Corps area of South Vietnam. There the Marine Corps came
face-to-face with the age old problem of guerrilla warfare; winning
the confidence of the population which is vital in defeating the
insurgent. It was in the field of winning the confidence of a large
civilian population, while at the same time fighting a war, that
the Marine Corps was least prepared when its troops landed in South
Vietnam.
This publication tells the story of the United States Ari Force's
involvement in the region form the end of the second World War
until the major infusion of American troops into Vietnam in1965.
During these years, and most noticeably after 1961, the Air Force's
principal role in Southeast Asia was to advise the Vietnamese Air
Force in its struggle against insurgents seeking the collapse of
the Saigon government. This story includes some issues of universal
applicability to the Air Force: the role of air power in an
insurgency, the most effective way to advise a foreign ally, and
how to coordinate with other American agencies (both military and
civilian) which are doing the same thing. It also deals with issue
unique to the Vietnamese conflict: how to coordinate a centralized,
technological modern air force with a feudal, decentralized,
indigenous one without overwhelming it, and how best to adapt
fighter, reconnaissance, airlift, and liaison planes to a jungle
environment.
The U.S. Air Force reached its nadir during the opening two years
of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in North Vietnam. Never had the
Air Force operated with so many restraints and to so little effect.
These pages are painful but necessary reading for all who care
about the nation's military power. Van Staaveren wrote this book
near the end of his distinguished government service. He was an Air
Force historian in Korea during the Korean War and he began to
write about the Vietnam War while it was still being fought.
The Air Force presents this volume, a truly monumental effort at
recounting the myriad of widely separate but not unrelated events
and operations that took place during the spring invasion of
Vietnam in 1972. The authors present an illuminating story of
people and machines that fought so gallantly during this major
enemy offensive.
Throughout the War in Southeast Asia, Communist forces form North
Vietnam infiltrated the isolated, neutral state of Laos. Men and
supplies crossed the mountain passes and travelled along an
intricate web of roads and jungle paths known as the Ho Chi Minh
Trail to the Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam. American
involvement in Laos began which a photo-reconnaissance missions
and, as the war in Vietnam intensified, expanded to a series of
air-ground operations from bases in Vietnam and Thailand against
fixed targets and infiltration routes in southern Laos. This volume
examines this complex operational environment. United States Air
Force. Center for Air Force History.
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Defiant
(Paperback)
Alvin Townley
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During the Vietnam War, hundreds of American POWs faced years of
brutal conditions and horrific torture at the hands of communist
interrogators who ruthlessly plied them for military intelligence
and propaganda. Determined to maintain their Code of Conduct, the
prisoners developed a powerful underground resistance. To quash it,
the North Vietnamese singled out its eleven leaders, Vietnam's own
"dirty dozen," and banished them to an isolated jail that would
become known as Alcatraz. None would leave its solitary cells and
interrogation rooms unscathed; one would never return. As these men
suffered in Hanoi, their wives launched an extraordinary campaign
that would ultimately spark the POW/MIA movement. When the
survivors finally returned, one would receive the Medal of Honor,
another became a U.S. Senator, and a third still serves in
Congress. A story of survival and triumph in the vein of Unbroken
and Band of Brothers, Defiant will inspire anyone wondering how
courage, faith, and brotherhood can endure even in the darkest of
situations.
The war in Vietnam, spanning more than twenty years, was one of the
most divisive conflicts ever to envelop the United States, and its
complexity and consequences did not end with the fall of Saigon in
1975. As Peter Sills demonstrates in "Toxic War," veterans faced a
new enemy beyond post-traumatic stress disorder or debilitating
battle injuries. Many of them faced a new, more pernicious,
slow-killing enemy: the cancerous effects of Agent Orange.
Originally introduced by Dow and other chemical companies as a
herbicide in the United States and adopted by the military as a
method of deforesting the war zone of Vietnam, in order to deny the
enemy cover, Agent Orange also found its way into the systems of
numerous active-duty soldiers. Sills argues that manufacturers
understood the dangers of this compound and did nothing to protect
American soldiers.
"Toxic War" takes the reader behind the scenes into the halls of
political power and industry, where the debates about the use of
Agent Orange and its potential side effects raged. In the end, the
only way these veterans could seek justice was in the court of law
and public opinion. Unprecedented in its access to legal, medical,
and government documentation, as well as to the personal
testimonies of veterans, "Toxic War" endeavors to explore all sides
of this epic battle.
Reverberations of the Vietnam War can still be felt in American
culture. The post-9/11 United States forays into the Middle East,
the invasion and occupation of Iraq especially, have evoked
comparisons to the nearly two decades of American presence in Viet
Nam (1954-1973). That evocation has renewed interest in the Vietnam
War, resulting in the re-printing of older War narratives and the
publication of new ones. This volume tracks those echoes as they
appear in American, Vietnamese American, and Vietnamese war
literature, much of which has joined the American literary canon.
Using a wide range of theoretical approaches, these essays analyze
works by Michael Herr, Bao Ninh, Duong Thu Huong, Bobbie Ann Mason,
le thi diem thuy, Tim O'Brien, Larry Heinemann, and newcomers Denis
Johnson, Karl Marlantes, and Tatjana Solis. Including an historical
timeline of the conflict and annotated guides to further reading,
this is an essential guide for students and readers of contemporary
American fiction
In 1971, while U.S. ground forces were prohibited from crossing the
Laotian border, a South Vietnamese Army corps, with U.S. air
support, launched the largest airmobile operation in the history of
warfare, Lam Son 719. The objective: to sever the North Vietnamese
Army's main logistical artery, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, at its hub,
Tchepone in Laos, an operation that, according to General Creighton
Abrams, could have been the decisive battle of the war, hastening
the withdrawal of U.S. forces and ensuring the survival of South
Vietnam. The outcome: defeat of the South Vietnamese Army and heavy
losses of U.S. helicopters and aircrews, but a successful
preemptive strike that met President Nixon's near-term political
objectives. Author Robert Sander, a helicopter pilot in Lam Son
719, explores why an operation of such importance failed. Drawing
on archives and interviews, and firsthand testimony and reports,
Sander chronicles not only the planning and execution of the
operation but also the maneuvers of the bastions of political and
military power during the ten-year effort to end Communist
infiltration of South Vietnam leading up to Lam Son 719. The result
is a picture from disparate perspectives: the Kennedy, Johnson, and
Nixon administrations; the South Vietnamese government led by
President Nguyen Van Thieu; and senior U.S. military commanders and
army aviators. Sander's conclusion is at once powerful and
persuasively clear. Lam Son 719 was doomed in both the planning and
execution - a casualty of domestic and international politics,
flawed assumptions, incompetent execution, and the resolve of the
North Vietnamese Army. A powerful work of military and political
history, this book offers eloquent testimony that ""failure, like
success, cannot be measured in absolute terms.
The assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem on
November 1, 1963, left a leadership void in Saigon that was never
filled. Heads of state went through Saigon like a revolving door,
yet none of them were able to successfully lead and govern the
people of South Vietnam. On the other side of the globe, President
of the United States John F. Kennedy was assassinated on November
22, 1963. While the U.S. had a line of succession, President
Johnson was relatively new to the Vietnam situation. Even though
Johnson was new, he still had Kennedy's cabinet and advisers to aid
his decisions. Despite this, by early 1964 two new leaders, Nguyen
Khanh and Lyndon Johnson sought a solution to the decades long
struggle in Vietnam. President Johnson inherited a three-front war
in Vietnam. One front was North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong
(VC) insurgency in South Vietnam, and Johnson had to stop this
support in order to defeat the VC. The insurgency itself
constituted another front that had to be defeated in order to
maintain a free and independent South Vietnam. The third
overarching front was the creation of a stable and legitimate
government in Saigon capable of governing the people of South
Vietnam. The question for his administration was on which of these
aspects to focus. Before Johnson could make that decision, he first
had to decide if the U.S. should continue to aid Saigon; therefore,
he had three options: leave Vietnam, continue in an advisory role,
or escalate U.S. involvement. The political and military situations
in Vietnam deteriorated to such a point through 1964-1965 that by
February 1965 there were no good choices left from which President
Johnson could choose. Johnson desired for there to be a stable
South Vietnamese government before he committed U.S. forces to its
defense; however, no such government emerged. The administration
was unwilling to risk U.S. prestige, resources, and lives unless
they were confident South Vietnam could succeed without U.S.
support. Because of the instability in South Vietnam as well as the
perceived risk of communist aggression, President Johnson decided
that escalatory military actions would be limited and gradual.
Therefore, President Johnson made the least bad decision he could
in February 1965 by initiating Operation ROLLING THUNDER and
committing the United States to the Vietnam War.
An oral history of American Support Troops, our hidden army, during
the Vietnam War.
James V. Weatherill served as an Army helicopter pilot in Vietnam
from November 1967 to November 1968. His memoir, THE BLADES CARRY
ME: INSIDE THE HELICOPTER WAR IN VIETNAM, takes the reader into the
CH-47 Chinook helicopter cockpit and the daily life of a
22-year-old pilot. The young man must reconcile his ideals of
patriotism, courage, and honor with the reality and politics of a
war where victory is measured by body-count ratios instead of
territory gained or lost. When it's time to go home, he realizes
he'll leave more than war behind. On the home front, the pilot's
wife, Annie, provides a counterpoint as a pregnant college senior
and military spouse during an unpopular war. With letters and tape
recordings their sole means of communication, how will they grow up
without growing apart?
During the Vietnam War, when conventional warfare tactics weren't
proving enough to eliminate Communist insurgency, the U.S. Army
implemented small unit operations to take a new kind of fight to
the enemy. Five to six man Long Range Patrol teams, composed of
specially trained young enlisted soldiers, went behind enemy lines
to gather intelligence on Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army
units, capture POWs, or set deadly ambushes that unnerved the enemy
in their once-thought-secure jungle sanctuaries. These Long Range
Patrol or LRP teams would lead to the re-establishment of the 75th
Infantry Ranger Companies in combat and would carry on the proud
history and legacy of the U.S. Army Rangers. It would also earn
them a coveted place in special operations units, at times at a
painful and deadly cost. In this remarkably humble, first-hand
account, Seymour covers what it took to do 54 LRP/Ranger missions
behind the lines, and the dozens of team insertions and white
knuckle extractions that he took part in. In The Jungle... Camping
with the Enemy offers a unique and personal insight from an
extraordinary soldier and those who served as LRP/Rangers with the
U.S. Army First Air Cavalry Division.
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