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Adorno: A Critical Reader" presents a collection of new essays by many of the world's top critics, who examine Adorno's lasting impact on the arts, politics, history, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and sociology.

Few intellectuals captured as much critical attention in the late twentieth century as Theodor W. Adorno. A growing number of his writings, lectures, and addresses have recently become available in English, a development that has inspired a reassessment of his oeuvre and placed Adorno at the center of debates about the role and responsibilities of the intellectual.

Readers interested in the origins of cultural studies and critical theory will find this book an important examination of the broad work of one of the major intellectuals of the twentieth century. Those interested in the arts, politics, history, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and sociology will delight in this important collection of essays that re-evaluate Adorno's work in the context of the many fields that his writings have shaped irreversibly.

How does Nietzsche, as psychologist, envision the future of religion and atheism? While there has been no lack of "psychological" studies that have sought to illuminate Nietzsche's philosophy of religion by interpreting his biography, this monograph is the first comprehensive study to approach the topic through the philosopher's own psychological thinking. The author shows how Nietzsche's critical writings on religion, and especially on religious decline and future possibilities, are informed by his psychological thinking about moods. The author furthermore argues that the clarification of this aspect of the philosopher's work is essential to interpreting some of the most ambiguous words found in his writings; the words that God is dead. Instead of merely denying the existence of God in a way that leaves a melancholic need for religion or a futile search for replacements intact, Nietzsche arguably envisions the possibility of a radical atheism, which is characterized by a mood of joyful doubt. The examination of this vision should be of great interest to scholars of Nietzsche and of the history of philosophy, but also of relevance to all those who take an interest in the interdisciplinary discourse on secularization.

This volume is dedicated to Wittgenstein's remarks on Frazer's The Golden Bough and represents a collaboration of scholars within philosophy and the study of religion. For the first time, specialized investigations of the philological and philosophical aspects Wittgenstein's manuscripts are combined with the outlook of philosophical anthropology and ritual studies. In the first section of the book Wittgenstein's remarks are presented and discussed in light of his Nachlass and relevant lecture-notes by G.E. Moore, reproduced in this book as facsimiles. The second section deals with the cultural and philosophical background of the early remarks, while the third section focuses specifically on the general problem of understanding as being a main issue of these remarks. The fourth section concentrates on the philosophical development characteristic of the later remarks. Finally, the fifth section reviews Wittgenstein's opposition to Frazer, and the ramifications of his remarks, in light of ritual studies. The book is intended for scholars in philosophy and religious studies, as well as for the general reader with an academic interest in philosophy and the philosophy of religion.

In this thoroughly revised edition, James Cox provides an easily accessible introduction to the phenomenology of religion, which he contends continues as a foundational method for the academic study of religion in the twenty-first century. After dealing with the problematic issue of defining religion, he describes the historical background to phenomenology by tracing its roots to developments in philosophy and the social sciences in the early twentieth century. The phenomenological method is then outlined as a step-by-step process, which includes a survey of the important classifications of religious behaviour. The author concludes with a discussion of the place of the phenomenology of religion in the current academic climate and argues that it can be aligned with the growing scholarly interest in the cognitive science of religion.>

This work addresses the topic of philosophical complexity, which shares certain assumptions with scientific complexity, cybernetics, and General Systems Theory, but which is also developing as a subject field in its own right. Specifically, the post-structural reading of philosophical complexity that was pioneered by Paul Cilliers is further developed in this study. To this end, the ideas of a number of contemporary French post-structural theorists and their predecessors - including Derrida, Nancy, Bataille, Levinas, Foucault, Saussure, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Hegel - are introduced. The implications that their various insights hold for our understanding of complex human systems are teased out at the hand of the themes of economy, (social) ontology, subjectivity, epistemology, and ethics. The analyses are also illuminated at the hand of the problematic of the foreigner and the related challenges of showing hospitality to foreigners. The study presents a sophisticated account of both philosophical complexity and philosophies of difference. By relating these subject fields, the study also extends our understanding of philosophical complexity, and offers an original characterisation of the aforementioned philosophers as complex thinkers.

The core belief underlying this book is that the most useful and effective models to strengthen our intelligence are system ones, developed following the logic of Systems Thinking. Such models can explore complexity, dynamics, and change, and it is the author's view that intelligence depends on the ability to construct models of this nature. The book is designed to allow the reader not only to acquire simple information on Systems Thinking but above all to gradually learn the logic and techniques that make this way of thinking an instrument for the improvement of intelligence. In order to aid the learning and practice of the Systems Thinking discipline, the author has abandoned a rigid formal language for a more discursive style. He writes in the first person, with an ample number of citations and critical analyses, and without ever giving in to the temptation to use formal mathematics.

This book explores the ways deconstruction addresses the issue of futurity (what Jacques Derrida calls the "to-come," [l'a-venir]). In order to achieve this, it focuses on three French expressions, venue, survenue, and voir-venir, each taken from the work of Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Catherine Malabou. The idea behind this focus is to elude the issue of the one and only "to-come," as if this was a uniform and coherent entity or structure of experience, and to put forward instead the possibility of a multiplicity of structures, each with a different intonation or pitch. Overall, this book makes an original contribution to the way deconstruction addresses the issue of futurity in the act of writing and translation.

If I am asked in the framework of Book 1, "Who are you?" I, in answering, might say "I don't know who in the world I am." Nevertheless there is a sense in which I always know what "I" refers to and can never not know, even if I have become, e.g., amnesiac. Yet in Book 2, "Who are you?" has other senses of oneself in mind than the non-sortal "myself". For example, it might be the pragmatic context, as in a bureaucratic setting; but "Who are you?" or "Who am I?" might be more anguished and be rendered by "What sort of person are you?" or "What sort am I?" Such a question often surfaces in the face of a "limit-situation", such as one's death or in the wake of a shameful deed where we are compelled to find our "centers", what we also will call "Existenz". "Existenz" here refers to the center of the person. In the face of the limit-situation one is called upon to act unconditionally in the determination of oneself and one's being in the world. In this Book 2 we discuss chiefly one's normative personal-moral identity which stands in contrast to the transcendental I where one's non-sortal unique identity is given from the start. This moral identity requires a unique self-determination and normative self-constitution which may be thought of with the help of the metaphor of "vocation". We will see that it has especial ties to one's Existenz as well as to love. This Book 2 claims that the moral-personal ideal sense of who one is is linked to the transcendental who through a notion of entelechy. The person strives to embody the I-ness that one both ineluctably is and which, however, points to who one is not yet and who one ought to be. The final two chapters tell a philosophical-theological likely story of a basic theme of Plotinus: We must learn to honor ourselves because of our honorable kinship and lineage "Yonder".

The present volume contains many of the papers presented at a four-day conference held by the Husserl-Archives in Leuven in April 2009 to c- memorate the one hundred and ?ftieth anniversary of Edmund Husserl's birth. The conference was organized to facilitate the critical evaluation of Husserl's philosophical project from various perspectives and in light of the current philosophical and scienti?c climate. Still today, the characteristic tension between Husserl's concrete and detailed descriptions of consciousness, on the one hand, and his radical philosophical claim to ultimate truth and certainty in thinking, feeling, and acting, on the other, calls for a sustained re?ection on the relation between a Husserlian phenomenological philosophy and philosophy in general. What can phenomenological re?ection contribute to the ongoing discussion of certain perennial philosophical questions and which phi- sophical problems are raised by a phenomenological philosophy itself? In addition to addressing the question of the relation between p- nomenology and philosophy in general, phenomenology today cannot avoid addressing the nature of its relation to the methods and results of the natural and human sciences. In fact, for Husserl, phenomenology is not just one among many philosophical methods and entirely unrelated to the sciences. Rather, according to Husserl, phenomenology should be a "?rst philosophy" and should aim to become the standard for all true science.

The discussion of Kant's Practical Philosophy has been marred by viewing it as purely formalist and centered only on the categorical imperative. This important new study sets out a much more vivid account of the nature and range of Kant's concerns demonstrating his commitment to the notion of rational religion and including extensive discussion of his treatment of evil. Culminating with accounts of property, the nature of right and virtue, this work presents Kant as a vital revolutionary thinker.

Alain Badiou is arguably the most important and original philosopher working in France today. Swimming against the tide of postmodern orthodoxy, Badiou's thought revitalizes philosophy's perennial attempt to provide a systematic theory of truth. This volume, assembled with the collaboration of the author, presents for the first time in English a comprehensive outline of Badiou's ambitious system. Starting from the controversial assertion that ontology is mathematics, this volume sets out the theory of the emergence of truths from the singular relationship between a subject and an event. Also included is a substantial excerpt from Badiou's forthcoming work on the logics of appearance and the concept of world, presented here in advance of its French publication. Ranging from startling re-readings of canonical figures (Spinoza, Kant and Hegel) to decisive engagements with poetry, psychoanalysis and radical politics, Theoretical Writings is an indispensable introduction to one of the great thinkers of our time. The volume includes a preface by Alain Badiou, an extensive editor's introduction, and a glossary of key terms.

Almost everyone can run. Only very few can run a marathon. But what is it for agents to be able to do things? This question, while central to many debates in philosophy, is still awaiting a comprehensive answer. The book provides just that. Drawing on some valuable insights from previous works of abilities and making use of possible world semantics, Jaster develops the "success view", a view on which abilities are a matter of successful behavior. Along the way, she explores the gradable nature of abilities, the contextsensitivity of ability statements, the difference between general and specific abilities, the relationship between abilities and dispositions, and the ability to act otherwise. The book is mandatory reading for anyone working on abilities, and provides valuable insights for anyone dealing with agents' abilities in other fields of philosophy. For this book, Romy Jaster has received both the Wolfgang Stegmuller Prize and the De Gruyter Prize for Analytical Philosophy of Mind or Metaphysics/Ontology.

Engaging recent developments within the bio-cultural study of religion, Shults unveils the evolved cognitive and coalitional mechanisms by which god-conceptions are engendered in minds and nurtured in societies. He discovers and attempts to liberate a radically atheist trajectory that has long been suppressed within the discipline of theology.

In the early twentieth century an apparently obscure philosophical debate took place between F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell. The historical outcome was momentous: the demise of the movement known as British Idealism, and its eventual replacement by the various forms of analytic philosophy. Since then, a conception of this debate and its rights and wrongs has become entrenched in English-language philosophy. Stewart Candlish examines afresh the events of this formative period in twentieth-century thought and comes to some surprising conclusions.

Even though important developments within 20th and 21st century philosophy have widened the scope of epistemology, this has not yet resulted in a systematic meta-epistemological debate about epistemology's aims, methods, and criteria of success. Ideas such as the methodology of reflective equilibrium, the proposal to "naturalize" epistemology, constructivist impulses fuelling the "sociology of scientific knowledge", pragmatist calls for taking into account the practical point of epistemic evaluations, as well as feminist criticism of the abstract and individualist assumptions built into traditional epistemology are widely discussed, but they have not typically resulted in the call for, let alone the construction of, a suitable meta-epistemological framework. This book motivates and elaborates such a new meta-epistemology. It provides a pragmatist, social and functionalist account of epistemic states that offers the conceptual space for revised or even replaced epistemic concepts. This is what it means to "refurbish epistemology": The book assesses conceptual tools in relation to epistemology's functionally defined conceptual space, responsive to both intra-epistemic considerations and political and moral values.

The Courage of the Truth is the last course that Michel Foucault delivered at the College de France before his death in 1984. In this course, he continues the theme of the previous year's lectures in exploring the notion of "truth-telling" in politics to establish a number of ethically irreducible conditionsbased on courage and conviction.

When I heard the rumor that the findings about the central nervous system obtained with new technology, such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and Positron Emission Tomography (PET), were too subtle to correlate with the crude results of many decades of behavioristic psychology, and that some psychologists were now turning to descriptions of subjective phenomena in William James, Edmund Husserl, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty-and even in Buddhism-I asked myself, "Why not Aron Gurwitsch as well?" After all, my teacher regularly reflected on the types, basic concepts, and methods of psychology, worked with Adhemar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein in the institute investigating brain-injured veterans at Frankfurt in the 1920s, conspicuously employed Gestalt theory to revise central Husserlian doctrines, and taught Merleau-Ponty a thing or two. That the last book from his Nachlass had recently been published and that I had recently written an essay on his theory of 1 psychology no doubt helped crystallize this project for me. What is "cognitive science"? At one point in assembling this volume I polled the participants, asking whether they preferred "the cognitive sciences" or "cognitive science. " Most who answered preferred the latter expression. There is still some vagueness here for me, but I do suspect that cognitive science is 2 another example of what I call a "multidiscipline. " A multidiscipline includes participants who confront a set of issues that is best approached under more than one disciplinary perspective."

The editor, Iso Kern, of the three volumes on intersubjectivity in Husserliana XIII-XV, observes that in his "Nachlass" Husserl probably refers to no other lecture so often as this one, i.e., "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1910-1911)." Husserl regarded this work (along with the 1907 "Five Lectures") as basic for his theory of the phenomenological reduction. He regarded these lectures as equally fundamental for the theory of empathy and intersubjectivity, for his theory of the life-world, and for his planned "great systematic work." It contrasts favorably with several later "introductions" because, although quite brief, it has a larger scope than they do and conveys in a relatively elementary way to the students the sense of fresh new beginnings. Further, with the appendices, it reveals Husserl in a critical dialogue with himself. That the second part of the lectures was never written down, can be accounted for in part, because at that time Husserl was busy writing the 1911 path-breaking essay, which complements these lectures, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science."

To what extent can we doubt certainties? How are certainties expressed in words? Which language games convey certainty? To answer these questions we have to recall the method Wittgenstein used in his investigations. When we look at language games and forms of life as inseparable phenomena, do forms of life then provide any certainty? On the other hand, do we automatically relapse into relativism once we doubt certainties? Which formal structures underlie certainty and doubt? The book is intended to answer these questions.

Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy shows that the concept of consciousness was explicated relatively late in the tradition, but that its central features, such as reflexivity, subjectivity and aboutness, attained avid interest very early in philosophical debates. This book reveals how these features have been related to other central topics, such as selfhood, perception, attention and embodiment. At the same time, the articles display that consciousness is not just an isolated issue of philosophy of mind, but is bound to ontological, epistemological and moral discussions. Integrating historical inquiries into the systematic ones enables understanding the complexity and richness of conscious phenomena.

The author argues that is not obvious what it means for our beliefs and assertions to be "truth-directed," and that we need to weaken our ordinary notion of a belief if we are to deal with radical scepticism without surrendering to idealism. Topics examined also include whether there could be alien conceptual schemes and what might happen to us if we abandoned genuine belief in place of mere pragmatic acceptance. A radically new "ecological" model of knowledge is defended.

Unlike those who view Heidegger as an idealist, Taylor Carman asserts that Heidegger is best understood as a realist and offers a new interpretation of his major work, Being and Time. Among the book's distinctive features are an interpretation explicitly oriented within a Kantian framework (often taken for granted in readings of Heidegger) and an analysis of Dasein in relation to recent theories of intentionality; notably those of Dennett and Searle.

This book is an edited collection of essays in celebration of the centenary of Samuel Alexander's Space, Time and Deity, published in 1920. Samuel Alexander (1859-1938) was a leading figure of British philosophy in the early twentieth century. He was partly responsible for the 'new realism' movement along with G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. However, his work has been overlooked in developments of twentieth century philosophy and yet his theories and style of theorising are in vogue. This book begins with three previously unpublished papers by Alexander that shed light on his metaphysical commitments about time, universals, God, knowledge of past truths, grounding, and inference in logic and science. There are also two important posthumous chapters by philosophers of the mid-twentieth century, who elaborate on his life and most significant contributions. The second half of the book contains new essays by current scholars, discussing Alexander on metaphysical realism, idealism, naturalism, space and time, process ontology, ontological categories, epistemology, perception, philosophy of history, emergentism, and empiricism.