The majority of narratives about the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War
stress that air power did not play a dominant role. The deployment
of strong, well-integrated air defences by Egypt and Syria, that
caused heavy losses to the Israeli air force early during that
conflict, not only spoiled Israel's pre-war planning, but prevented
it from providing support for Israeli ground forces too. A
cross-examination of interviews with dozens of Egyptian
participants in that conflict, contemporary reporting in the media,
and also intelligence reports, offers an entirely different
picture. Accordingly, for much of that war, the Israelis flew heavy
air strikes on Port Said, on the northern entry to the Suez Canal.
Furthermore, they repeatedly attacked two major Egyptian air bases
in the Nile Delta - el-Mansourah and Tanta - in turn causing some
of the biggest air battles of this war. Indeed, in Egypt, the
response to these attacks reached the level of legend: the supposed
repelling of an Israeli air strike on el-Mansourah, on 14 October
1973, prompted Cairo to declare not only a massive victory, but
also that date for the day of its air force. However, the actual
reasons for Israeli air strikes on Port Said, el-Mansourah and
Tanta remain unclear to this day: there are no Israeli publications
offering a sensible explanation, and there are no Egyptian
publications explaining the reasoning. Only a cross-examination of
additional reporting provides a possible solution: el-Mansourah was
also the base of the only Egyptian unit equipped with R-17E
ballistic missiles, known as the SS-1 Scud in the West. As of
October 1973, these missiles were the only weapon in Egyptian hands
capable of reaching central Israel - and that only if fired from
the area around Port Said. While apparently unimportant in the
overall context, this fact gains immensely in importance
considering reports from the US intelligence services about the
possible deployment of Soviet nuclear warheads to Egypt in October
1973. Discussing all the available information, strategy, tactics,
equipment and related combat operations of both sides, '1973: the
First Nuclear War' provides an in-depth insight into the Israeli
efforts to prevent the deployment of Egyptian Scud missiles -
whether armed with Soviet nuclear warheads or not - in the Port
Said area: an effort that dictated a lengthy segment of the
application of air power during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war,
and resulted in some of the most spectacular air-to-air and
air-to-ground battles of that conflict. Illustrated by over 100
photographs, a dozen maps and 18 colour profiles, this book thus
offers an entirely new thesis about crucial, but previously unknown
factors that determined the flow of the aerial warfare in October
1973.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!
Welcome to Loot.co.za!
Sign in / Register |Wishlists & Gift Vouchers |Help | Advanced search
(2)
(3)
