There is a growing interest in delegation to non-majoritarian
institutions in Europe, following both the spread of
principal-agent theory in political science and law and increasing
delegation in practice. During the 1980s and 1990s, governments and
parliaments in West European nations have delegated powers and
functions to non-majoritarian bodies - the EU, independent central
banks, constitutional courts and independent regulatory agencies.
Whereas elected policymakers had been increasing their roles over
several decades, delegation involves a remarkable reversal or at
least transformation of their position. This volume examines key
issues about the politics of delegation: how and why delegation has
taken place; the institutional design of delegation to
non-majoritarian institutions; the consequences of delegation to
non-majoritarian institutions; the legitimacy of non-majoritarian
institutions. The book addresses these questions both theoretically
and empirically, looking at central areas of political life -
central banking, the EU, the increasing role of courts and the
establishment and impacts of independent regulatory agencies.
General
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