This book examines the lessons of the U.S.-Soviet experiment with
detente in the 1970s, with particular attention to the effort to
develop a basis for cooperating in crisis prevention.- The authors,
less concerned with who was to blame for the failure of dA (c)tente
than with understanding the flaws in its conceptualization and
implementation, have joined efforts to analyze the difficulties the
two superpowers experienced in their attempt to avoid dangerous
confrontations and crises that would damage the overall detente
relationship. The book includes case studies of several Middle East
conflicts, the Angolan crisis of 1975, the Rhodesian conflict, the
Ogaden war of 1977-1978, the abortive U.S.-Soviet talks on
limitation of conventional arms transfers to third areas, and the
Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. It also provides an analysis of
preventive diplomacy as a strategy for mediating third-area
conflicts and avoiding superpower confrontations and offers
guidelines for reshaping U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and
for moderating competition for influence in the Third World.
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