Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be
policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved
investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred
prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where,
instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become
regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of
prosecution and such prosecution agreements is being used to
regulate corporate behavior. This practice has been sharply
criticized on numerous fronts: agreements are too lenient, there is
too little oversight of these agreements, and, perhaps most
important, the criminal prosecutors doing the regulating aren't
subject to the same checks and balances that civil regulatory
agencies are.
"Prosecutors in the Boardroom" explores the questions raised by
this practice by compiling the insights of the leading lights in
the field, including criminal law professors who specialize in the
field of corporate criminal liability and criminal law, a top
economist at the SEC who studies corporate wrongdoing, and a
leading expert on the use of monitors in criminal law. The essays
in this volume move beyond criticisms of the practice to closely
examine exactly how regulation by prosecutors works. Broadly, the
contributors consider who should police corporate misconduct and
how it should be policed, and in conclusion offer a policy
blueprint of best practices for federal and state prosecution.
Contributors: Cindy R. Alexander, Jennifer Arlen, Anthony S.
Barkow, Rachel E. Barkow, Sara Sun Beale, Samuel W. Buell, Mark A.
Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Richard A. Epstein, Brandon L.
Garrett, Lisa Kern Griffin, and Vikramaditya Khanna
General
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