Local government employees have a higher propensity to engage in
collective bargaining than do private sector employees. This
springs from the tight competition in the local budgeting process
among those requesting, paying for, and providing services.
Spengler looks at this trend using a fiscal discontent hypothesis.
This approach suggests that the taxpayer revolts during the 1970s
and 1980s limited the budget discretion of elected officials and
forced public sector employees to turn to collective voice and
action to better compete for scarce public resources.
Two levels of employee collective voice are examined: the weaker
form of organizing and the stronger collective bargaining model.
Substantial differences in the use of each are analyzed based on
employee occupation, state, and type of local government. Scholars,
business practitioners, policy makers, and researchers in public
administration, labor relations, public policy, and local
government will find this study an important contribution to
understanding the phenomenon of organized collective voice.
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