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Volition and Allied Causal Concepts (Paperback)
Loot Price: R477
Discovery Miles 4 770
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Volition and Allied Causal Concepts (Paperback)
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Loot Price R477
Discovery Miles 4 770
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Volition and Allied Causal Concepts is a work of aetiology and
metapsychology. Aetiology is the branch of philosophy and logic
devoted to the study of causality (the cause-effect relation) in
all its forms; and metapsychology is the study of the basic
concepts common to all psychological discourse, most of which are
causal. Volition (or free will) is to be distinguished from
causation and natural spontaneity. The latter categories, i.e.
deterministic causality and its negation, have been treated in a
separate work, The Logic of Causation. Volition may be
characterized as personal causality, a relation between an agent
(the self or soul) and his actions (acts of will). Unlike
causation, this relation cannot be entirely defined using
conditional (if-then) propositions. Although we can say that the
agent is a sine qua non of his actions, we cannot say that the
agent is invariably (in all or specific circumstances) followed by
his actions. It appears that both an act of will and its negation
remain possible to a soul in any given set of circumstances. This
defines freedom of the will, and implies the responsibility of the
agent for his actions. Introspection provides knowledge of
particular acts of will. The existence of freewill implies a
distinction between necessary causation (determinism independent of
volition) and inertial causation (determinism, except when some
contrary will interferes). An act of will occurs on a spiritual
plane. It may have natural (mental or physical) consequences; those
that inevitably follow it may be regarded as directly willed,
whereas those that vary according to circumstances must be
considered indirectly willed. Volition presupposes some degree of
consciousness. So-called involuntary acts of will involve a minimum
of attention, whereas mindful acts are fully conscious. Even pure
whim involves intention. Most volitions moreover involve valuation,
some sort of projection of goals, deliberation on means, choice and
decision. To judge responsibility, various distinctions are called
for, like that between intentional, incidental and accidental
consequences. Volitional action can be affected through the terms
and conditions of the world surrounding its agent, but also more
intimately through the influence of concrete or abstract aspects of
that world that the subject has cognized. The causal concept of
influence, and its implication of cognition (of inner or outer
information, including emotions), are crucial to measuring the
effort involved in volition. Influences make willing easier or
harder, yet do not curtail its essential freedom. All the causal
concepts used in psychological explanation - affections, appetites,
instincts, habits, obsessions, compulsions, urges and impulses -
can be elucidated thanks to this important finding. Much of human
(and animal) behavior can thus be both acknowledged as volitional
and as variously influenced. Volition and Allied Causal Concepts is
a work of ambitious scope, intent on finally resolving
philosophical and logical issues that have always impeded progress
in psychology. It clarifies the structure and workings of the
psyche, facilitating hygienic and therapeutic endeavors. The
relation between volition and physical laws is discussed, as is the
place of volition in biology. Concepts used in biology, analogous
to that of purpose, are incidentally analyzed. Theological issues
are also dealt with, as are some topics in ethics and law.
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