Much energy is expended here demonstrating that Ronald Reagan's
policy toward the Soviets was pro- rather than reactive beginning
in 1984. According to Fischer (Political Science/Univ. of Toronto),
both versions of the "conventional wisdom" about the ending of the
Cold War portray Reagan as simply responding to Gorbachev's
initiatives. Liberals dismiss him as the lucky man in office when
the Soviet Union unraveled, conservatives praise him as the
hardliner tightening the screws until the Soviets cried "uncle."
Fischer's examination of events, however, points to a stark shift
in Reagan administration rhetoric and policy prior to the 1985
summit with Gorbachev. The references to an evil empire and
refusals to enter into serious arms negotiations were abruptly
replaced by a more conciliatory attitude shorn of saber-rattling
and positively seeking accommodation with the Soviets. But if the
Reagan Administration was out front rather than reacting to
Gorbachev, the interesting question is explaining this reversal. In
good dissertation-like fashion, three hypotheses are considered:
(1) domestic politics dictated a softening of ideological hyperbole
prior to the 1984 election; (2) moderates within the administration
became more influential in the area of foreign policy; and (3)
Reagan himself decided to take relations with the Soviets in a new
direction. The possibility that multiple factors were at work is
ignored, and the first two potential explanations are rejected as
insufficient. The third is supported through a quasi-psychological
analysis in which Reagan's horror of nuclear weapons, his belief in
an approaching biblical Armageddon, and a series of triggering
events are posited as the basis for his leadership in reaching out
to the Soviets. There is no hard evidence supporting this
hypothesis, of course, but it doesn't matter: This is a purely
academic exercise, somewhat akin to arguing over how many angels
can dance on the head of a pin. (Kirkus Reviews)
It is often assumed that Ronald Reagan's administration was
reactive in bringing about the end of the Cold War, that it was
Mikhail Gorbachev's ""new thinking"" and congenial personality that
led the administration to abandon its hard-line approach toward
Moscow. In this study, the author demonstrates that President
Reagan actually began seeking a rapprochement with the Kremlin
fifteen months before Gorbachev even took office. She shows that
Reagan, known for his long-standing antipathy toward communism,
suddenly began calling for ""dialogue, cooperation and
understanding"" between the superpowers. What caused such a
reversal in policy? Fischer considers three explanations for the
reversal. First, it was an election year and public opinion had
shifted, thus forcing the administration to become more moderate.
Second, new personnel, namely Secretary of State George Schultz and
National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, took control of US
policy and made changes more in line with their personal views.
Third, Reagan himself may have redirected US policy out of his fear
of nuclear war. This last option is the explanation Fischer defends
as most significant. In the fall of 1983, the Kremlin mistook a
NATO military exercise for the preliminary stages of a nuclear
strike and prepared to retaliate. After this narrowly avoided
nuclear exchange, Reagan began to re-examine his views on nuclear
war. This hypothesis, explains why the US policy was reversed, the
timing of the shift, and the nature of the changes made. This study
challenges the conventional wisdom about the president himself and
reveals that Reagan was - at times - the driving force behind
US-Soviet policy. ""The Reagan Reversal"" should stimulate new
controversy among scholars concerning the end of the Cold War.
General
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