Modern legislators are increasingly motivated to serve their
constituents in personal ways. Representatives act like ultimate
ombudsmen: they keep in close touch with their constituents and try
to cultivate a relationship with them based on service and
accessibility. "The Personal Vote" describes the behavior of
representatives in the United States and Great Britain and the
response of their constituents as well. It shows how congressmen
and members of Parliament earn personalized support and how this
attenuates their ties to national leaders and parties.
The larger significance of this empirical work arises from its
implications for the structure of legislative institutions and the
nature of legislative action. Personalized electoral support
correlates with decentralized governing institutions and
special-interest policy making. Such systems tend to inconsistency
and stalemate. The United States illustrates a mature case of this
development, and Britain is showing the first movements in this
direction with the decline of an established two-party system, the
rise of a centrist third party, greater volatility in the vote,
growing backbench independence and increasing backbench pressure
for committees and staff.
This book is essential for specialists in American national
government, British politics, and comparative legislatures and
comparative parties.
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