In this paper, I explore the optimal extent to which the central
bank should disseminate information among private agents.
Individual firms are assumed to have diverse private information,
and the central bank provides public information either implicitly,
by setting its policy instrument, or explicitly, by making
announcements about its short-run targets. The optimal degree of
economic transparency is affected differently by cost and demand
shocks. More-accurate central bank forecasts of demand shocks
reduce optimal transparency, while more-accurate forecasts of cost
shocks increase optimal transparency. Increased persistence in
demand (cost) disturbances increases (reduces) optimal
transparency.
General
| Imprint: |
Bibliogov
|
| Country of origin: |
United States |
| Release date: |
September 2012 |
| First published: |
September 2012 |
| Authors: |
Carl E Walsh
|
| Dimensions: |
246 x 189 x 2mm (L x W x T) |
| Format: |
Paperback - Trade
|
| Pages: |
36 |
| ISBN-13: |
978-1-249-55680-0 |
| Categories: |
Books >
Social sciences >
Politics & government >
General
Promotions
|
| LSN: |
1-249-55680-5 |
| Barcode: |
9781249556800 |
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