This book examines the doctrine of giving no concessions to
terrorists, and uses empirical research to establish whether there
is any link between negotiating with such groups and the spread of
violence.
The logic of the no-concessions doctrine is based on the
argument that other terrorist groups multiply when they realize
that terrorism succeeds in achieving political goals. Proponents of
the no-concessions doctrine have argued that there is a pattern in
terrorist contagion which results from giving in to their demands.
Statistical evidence for terrorist contagion is not convincing
enough, however, as depicting an increase in terrorist incidences
as a consequence of concessions could merely imply a flawed
causality. Without an explanation for such correlations we are left
wondering whether other reasons could be decisive in the increase
in terrorist actions.
Based on field research in four countries and interviews with
current and former members of several different terrorist groups,
this book establishes a qualitative relationship between
concessions to terrorists on the one hand and (non-)contagion of
other terrorist groups on the other. The deterrence effect,
intended by the imperative never to concede, is seriously
challenged. In fact, it can be precisely through concessions that
groups mentalities and actions are called into question.
The book will be of great interest to students of terrorism and
political violence, war and conflict studies, security studies and
IR/politics.
Carolin Goerzig is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the EU Institute
for Security Studies in Paris and has a PhD in Political Science
from Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich.
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