Security protocols are widely used to ensure secure
communications over insecure networks, such as the internet or
airwaves. These protocols use strong cryptography to prevent
intruders from reading or modifying the messages. However, using
cryptography is not enough to ensure their correctness. Combined
with their typical small size, which suggests that one could easily
assess their correctness, this often results in incorrectly
designed protocols.
The authors present a methodology for formally describing
security protocols and their environment. This methodology includes
a model for describing protocols, their execution model, and the
intruder model. The models are extended with a number of
well-defined security properties, which capture the notions of
correct protocols, and secrecy of data. The methodology can be used
to prove that protocols satisfy these properties. Based on the
model they have developed a tool set called Scyther that can
automatically find attacks on security protocols or prove their
correctness. In case studies they show the application of the
methodology as well as the effectiveness of the analysis tool.
The methodology s strong mathematical basis, the strong
separation of concerns in the model, and the accompanying tool set
make it ideally suited both for researchers and graduate students
of information security or formal methods and for advanced
professionals designing critical security protocols.
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