The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and
enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do
countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO
rather than settling their differences on their own? In "Why
Adjudicate?, " Christina Davis investigates the domestic politics
behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute
settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their
citizens.
Davis demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands,
and international politics influence which countries and cases
appear before the WTO. Democratic checks and balances bias the
trade policy process toward public lawsuits and away from informal
settlements. Trade officials use legal complaints to manage
domestic politics and defend trade interests. WTO dispute
settlement enables states and domestic groups to signal resolve
more effectively, thereby enhancing the information available to
policymakers and reducing the risk of a trade war. Davis
establishes her argument with data on trade disputes and landmark
cases, including the Boeing-Airbus controversy over aircraft
subsidies, disagreement over Chinese intellectual property rights,
and Japan's repeated challenges of U.S. steel industry protection.
In her analysis of foreign trade barriers against U.S. exports,
Davis explains why the United States gains better outcomes for
cases taken to formal dispute settlement than for those negotiated.
Case studies of Peru and Vietnam show that legal action can also
benefit developing countries.
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