Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics - The Myth of Neutrality (Hardcover, New)

Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.

General

Imprint:	Cambridge UniversityPress
Country of origin:	United Kingdom
Series:	Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Release date:	April 2013
First published:	April 2013
Authors:	Christopher Adolph
Dimensions:	234 x 156 x 25mm (L x W x T)
Format:	Hardcover
Pages:	390
Edition:	New
ISBN-13:	978-1-107-03261-3
Categories:	Books > Social sciences > Politics & government > Comparative politics Books > Business & Economics > Finance & accounting > Finance > Banking Books > Money & Finance > Banking Promotions
LSN:	1-107-03261-X
Barcode:	9781107032613

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