Sensations - A Defense of Type Materialism (Hardcover, New)

This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism, functionalism), and explores a number of important issues: the forms and limits of introspective awareness of sensations, the semantic properties of sensory concepts, knowledge of other minds, and unity of consciousness. The book is a significant contribution to the philosophy of mind, and has much to say to psychologists and cognitive scientists.

General

Imprint:	Cambridge UniversityPress
Country of origin:	United Kingdom
Series:	Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Release date:	1991
First published:	1991
Authors:	Christopher S. Hill
Dimensions:	225 x 150 x 22mm (L x W x T)
Format:	Hardcover
Pages:	264
Edition:	New
ISBN-13:	978-0-521-39423-9
Categories:	Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Philosophy of mind Books > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Philosophy of mind Promotions
LSN:	0-521-39423-6
Barcode:	9780521394239

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