This is a book about sensory states and their apparent
characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and
epistemological questions and presents an argument for type
materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the
neural states with which they are correlated. According to type
materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and
members of related biological species; silicon-based androids
cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival
theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism,
functionalism), and explores a number of important issues: the
forms and limits of introspective awareness of sensations, the
semantic properties of sensory concepts, knowledge of other minds,
and unity of consciousness. The book is a significant contribution
to the philosophy of mind, and has much to say to psychologists and
cognitive scientists.
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