What are preferences and are they reasons for action? Is it
rational to cooperate with others even if that entails acting
against one's preferences? The dominant position in philosophy on
the topic of practical rationality is that one acts so as to
maximize the satisfaction of one's preferences. This view is most
closely associated with the work of David Gauthier, and in this
collection of essays some of the most innovative philosophers
working in this field explore the controversies surrounding
Gauthier's position. Several essays argue against influential
conceptions of preference, while others suggest that received
conceptions of rational action misidentify the normative
significance of rules and practices. This collection will be of
particular interest to philosophers of social theory and to
reflective social scientists in such fields as economics, political
science and psychology.
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