As American operations against terrorism spread around the globe to
places like Afghanistan and the Philippines, an increasing tendency
has been for commentators to draw parallels with past experience in
Vietnam. Even soldiers on the ground have begun to speak in such
terms. Dr. Conrad Crane analyzes the Army's response to that defeat
in Southeast Asia and its long-term impact. Contrary to the
accepted wisdom that nations which lose wars tend to learn best how
to correct their mistakes, he argues that Americans tried to forget
the unhappy experience with counterinsurgency by refocusing on
conventional wars. While that process eventually produced the
powerful force that won the Persian Gulf War, it left an Army with
force structure, doctrine, and attitudes that are much less
applicable to the peace operations and counterterrorism campaign it
now faces.
General
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