Why do some countries choose to end wars short of total victory
while others fight on, sometimes in the face of appalling odds?
"How Wars End" argues that two central factors shape
war-termination decision making: information about the balance of
power and the resolve of one's enemy, and fears that the other
side's commitment to abide by a war-ending peace settlement may not
be credible.
Dan Reiter explains how information about combat outcomes and
other factors may persuade a warring nation to demand more or less
in peace negotiations, and why a country might refuse to negotiate
limited terms and instead tenaciously pursue absolute victory if it
fears that its enemy might renege on a peace deal. He fully lays
out the theory and then tests it on more than twenty cases of
war-termination behavior, including decisions during the American
Civil War, the two world wars, and the Korean War. Reiter helps
solve some of the most enduring puzzles in military history, such
as why Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, why
Germany in 1918 renewed its attack in the West after securing peace
with Russia in the East, and why Britain refused to seek peace
terms with Germany after France fell in 1940.
"How Wars End" concludes with a timely discussion of
twentieth-century American foreign policy, framing the Bush
Doctrine's emphasis on preventive war in the context of the
theory.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!