0
Your cart

Your cart is empty

Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Metaphysics & ontology

Buy Now

Elbow Room - The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Paperback) Loot Price: R1,396
Discovery Miles 13 960
Elbow Room - The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Paperback): Daniel C. Dennett

Elbow Room - The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Paperback)

Daniel C. Dennett

 (sign in to rate)
Loot Price R1,396 Discovery Miles 13 960 | Repayment Terms: R131 pm x 12*

Bookmark and Share

Expected to ship within 10 - 15 working days

"Sir," harrumphed Dr. Johnson, "We know our will is free, and there's an end on't." Professor Dennett (Philosophy, Tufts) also knows the will is free, but in this witty, wide-ranging, steadily persuasive essay he transforms Johnson's (and most other people's) intuitive certitude into a series of rationally articulated probabilities. The "elbow room" he argues for is the sphere inhabited by "us sinners" (limited, conditioned, but responsible agents), as opposed to both the realms of absolute freedom imagined by Socrates, Kant, Sartre, Chisolm, et al., and the dungeons of determinism or fatalism. The latter, of course, are what really worry us; but Dennett shows that the specters of heteronomy are neither irrefutable axioms nor solid science, but "unfocused images" that break down under scrutiny. In one of his many illuminating metaphors, he contrasts body English (the determinist's view that all our thinking and straining and deciding affect the real world no more than a golfer's antics after hitting a putt help to sink it) with follow-through: the seemingly illogical but undeniable fact that "keeping one's head down" after striking the ball - doggedly assuming our deliberations and choices make a difference - makes for a better shot. But if Dennett assaults behavioristic and related models of mind, he's no kinder to "soft" ideas of free will, such as the belief that there can be no moral or criminal guilt unless a person in a given situation could have done otherwise: first of all, we can never say with authority whether alternate actions were possible or not (too many imponderables); second, even if we knew, our knowledge would have little value (all "microcircumstances" being unique); and third, the agent's lack of an alternative might have no importance (if he had made himself a hardened criminal). As readers of The Mind's I (1981) will remember, Dennett has a remarkable gift for constructing humanistic psychology out of materials garnered from physics, biology, and cybernetics. He's in even better form here - and with his sprightly style and exceptional clarity, he's a worthy descendant, if not a disciple, of his great forebear, William James. (Kirkus Reviews)
Based on the author's presentation of the John Locke lectures at Oxford, 1983.

General

Imprint: Oxford UniversityPress
Country of origin: United Kingdom
Release date: February 1985
Authors: Daniel C. Dennett
Dimensions: 229 x 149 x 13mm (L x W x T)
Format: Paperback
Pages: 210
ISBN-13: 978-0-19-824790-6
Categories: Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Metaphysics & ontology
Books > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Metaphysics & ontology
LSN: 0-19-824790-7
Barcode: 9780198247906

Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate? Let us know about it.

Does this product have an incorrect or missing image? Send us a new image.

Is this product missing categories? Add more categories.

Review This Product

No reviews yet - be the first to create one!

Partners