The decisions to negotiate in the South African and
Israeli/Palestinian conflicts can be understood in terms of changed
perceptions of threat among political elites and their
constituents. As perceptions of an imminent threat to national
survival receded, debate over national security policy became a
focus of internal politics on the government sides in each case and
prompted changes of leadership. The new leaders, F.W. de Klerk and
Yitzhak Rabin, faced emerging threats at the national and
international levels that made negotiation seem advantageous.
Lieberfeld analyzes the decisions of the opposition ANC and PLO in
terms of changing threat perceptions and incentives for
compromise.
Lieberfeld also evaluates developments since the breakthrough
agreements. He concludes by identifying revised indicators of
conflicts' ripeness for negotiated settlement and discussing their
applicability to other cases of intense, protracted conflict.
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