Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to
international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or
cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states
continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated?
Examining a variety of different institutions including the World
Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission,
this book explores the different methods that states employ to
ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the
problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The
contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to
design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than
at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help
explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are
willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all
evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies
that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political
masters.
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