In this book David Currie and Paul Levine address a broad range of
issues concerning the design and conduct of macroeconomic policy in
open economies. Adopting neo-Keynesian models for which monetary
and fiscal policy have short-term real effects, they analyse active
stabilisation policies in both a single- and multi-country context.
Questions addressed include: the merits of simple policy rules,
policy design in the face of uncertainty and international policy
coordination. A central feature of the book is the treatment of
credibility and the effect of a policy-maker's reputation for
sticking to announced policies. These considerations are integrated
with coordination issues to produce a unique synthesis. The volume
develops optimal control methods and dynamic game theory to handle
relationships between governments and a conscious rational private
sector and produces a unified, coherent approach to the subject.
This book will be of interest to students and teachers of open
economy macroeconomics and to professional economists interested in
using macroeconomic models to design policy.
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