Most contemporary versions of moral realism are beset with
difficulties. Many of these difficulties arise because of a faulty
conception of the nature of goodness. Goodness, God, and Evil lays
out and defends a new version of moral realism that re-conceives
the nature of goodness.
Alexander argues that the adjective 'good' is best thought of as
an attributive adjective and not as a predicative one. In other
words, the adjective 'good' logically cannot be detached from the
noun (or noun phrase) that it modifies. It is further argued that
this conception of the function of the adjective implies that
recent attempts to provide necessary a posteriori identities
between goodness and something else must fail.
The convertibility of being and goodness, the privation theory
of evil, a denial of the fact-value distinction, human nature as
the ground of human morality and even a novel argument for the
existence of God are some of the implications of the account of
goodness that Alexander offers.
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