The United States and the Soviet Union missed numerous
diplomatic opportunities to resolve differences and control the
arms race because neither state trusted the other, according to
Deborah Welch Larson. In Anatomy of Mistrust, she shows that the
goals of Soviet and U.S. leaders were frequently complementary, and
an agreement should have been attainable. Lost opportunities
contributed to bankruptcy for the Soviet Union, serious damage to
the economy of the United States, decreased public support for
internationalist policies, and a proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
Synthesizing different understandings of trust and mistrust from
the theoretical traditions of economics, psychology, and game
theory, Larson analyzes five cases that might have been turning
points in U.S.-Soviet relations: the two-year period following
Stalin's death in 1953; Khrushchev's peace offensive from the
launching of Sputnik until the U-2 incident; the Kennedy
administration; the Nixon-Brezhnev detente; and the Gorbachev
period. Larson concludes that leaders in the United States often
refused to accept Soviet offers to negotiate because they feared a
trap. Mutual trust is necessary, she concludes, although it may not
be sufficient, for states to cooperate in managing their
security.
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