Previous studies of foreign policy decision making have largely
focused on the choice among specified options rather than the prior
question of how the options were specified in the first place. Such
'problem representation' is the focus of this volume. How do the
game theorists' options and utilities come about? Concretely, for
example, how and why in the Cuban missile crisis were blockade, air
strike, and invasion chosen as options? To answer such questions,
the editors contend the representation of the problem to which the
options are a response, the determinants of that representation,
and its ramifications must all be analyzed. The contributors to the
volume consider these issues both conceptually and empirically,
employing the methods of both international relations and political
psychology.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!