Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy (Hardcover, 1986 ed.)

By now it has become obvious that Federal Reserve actions have an immense impact on the functioning of our economy. As a result, a great deal of research has been done on the Fed and on monetary policy. Much of this work is normative; it tells us what the Fed should do. Positive work on the Fed has usually tried to elucidate particular Fed policies, and has not tried to present a theory of why the Fed behaves the way it does. The dominant theory of Fed behavior is that the Fed does what it believes to be best for the public welfare. This theory - usually left implicit - is so simple, and seemingly so obviously correct, that it has received widespread credence without extended discussion or tests. When thinking about govern ment in general many observers doubt that it nearly always acts in the public interest. However, they ascribe this unfortunate state of affairs mainly to political pressures. Since the Fed is relatively removed from such pressures, the public interest theory of government seems more applicable to it."

General

Imprint:	Kluwer Academic Publishers
Country of origin:	Netherlands
Series:	Financial and Monetary Policy Studies, 13
Release date:	November 1986
First published:	1986
Editors:	E. Froedge Toma • M. Toma
Dimensions:	235 x 155 x 15mm (L x W x T)
Format:	Hardcover
Pages:	253
Edition:	1986 ed.
ISBN-13:	978-90-247-3366-8
Categories:	Books > Business & Economics > Economics > Macroeconomics > Monetary economics Promotions
LSN:	90-247-3366-9
Barcode:	9789024733668

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