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Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration - Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Perspectives, No. 2 (Paperback)
Loot Price: R348
Discovery Miles 3 480
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Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration - Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Perspectives, No. 2 (Paperback)
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Loot Price R348
Discovery Miles 3 480
Expected to ship within 10 - 15 working days
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The national security system has an authority problem. The problem
is highlighted by the debate over czars, Presidential appointees
who oversee a particular issue area, often without Senate
confirmation. The practice of appointing czars is controversial for
the wrong reasons. Commentators worry that czars create confusion
and circumvent congressional oversight. What deserves greater
attention is why Presidents appoint czars in the first place and
what, if anything, should be done about it. When the interagency
process fails to produce the cooperation among departments and
agencies necessary to solve a national security (or other) problem,
Presidents often designate a lead individual-or czar-to do the job
because they do not have enough time to do it themselves. It is
widely recognized that the chief executive needs help integrating
the diverse departments and agencies, but past attempts to improve
interagency cooperation have generally failed because they paid
insufficient attention to the difficult problem of authority. New
positions or organizations are often created with great fanfare and
directed to ensure a coordinated response to some particular
national security issue-intelligence, warfighting, reconstruction,
or counterterrorism- only to fail because they lack sufficient
authority. Ultimately, the departments and agencies in the national
security system see little reason to follow their lead. At the
heart of the problem is the inability to reconcile a desire for a
clear chain of command from the President down through the heads of
the departments and agencies with the need to empower new
mechanisms (individuals or organizational constructs) with
sufficient authority to integrate efforts across the departments
and agencies in pursuit of specified national missions. "Unity of
command" from the President on down through the functional
departments and agencies seems to preclude "unity of effort" for
missions that are intrinsically interagency in nature and cut
across those same chains of command. In this paper, we argue that
solving the interagency integration problem requires an expanded
Chief of Mission (COM) authority. COM authority is granted to
Ambassadors to oversee and direct the activities of employees from
diverse government organizations working in a foreign country, but
it could also serve as a model for empowering other leaders in the
national security system to solve problems requiring interagency
cooperation. As we explain, the Chief of Mission model requires
expansion to work well beyond the bilateral setting of a U.S.
Embassy in a foreign country, including more legal authority,
process adjustments, and wider application. However, the model does
point a way forward to escape the dilemma that the current system
imposes on Presidents who want unity of effort without sacrificing
unified command.
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