This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics
within the public choice and constitutional political economy
tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work
across the field.The expert contributions are underpinned by the
notion of moving economic thinking away from the analysis of the
logic of a situation given a set of well-established and
well-enforced 'rules of the game', towards a deeper analysis of the
logic behind the selection of the rules of the game themselves.
Within this context, the theme of choice between rules (as well as
the more conventional analysis within rules) across historical time
and place, and in various thought experiments and conceptual
situations, is explored in detail. Extensive case studies back
theory with empirical evidence, and topics discussed include: the
foundations of constitutional economics; constitutional political
economy; political competition and voting; public choice and public
policy; and extensions to public choice theory. This stimulating
book will prove a thought-provoking read for academics and both
under- and post-graduate students in the fields of economics
(particularly public choice and Austrian economics), public policy
and political science. Contributors: P. Bernholz, V.K. Borooah, G.
Brennan, G. Brosio, J.M. Buchanan, F. Cabrillo, R.D. Congleton, G.
Eusepi, S. Fedeli, M. Ferrero, S. Fitzpatrick, F. Forte, B.S. Frey,
J. Helin, M.J. Holler, J.D. Montoro-Pons, S. Neckermann, H. Nurmi,
M. Paldam, M.A. Puchades-Navarro, G.C. Romagnoli, P. Salmon, V.J.
Vanberg, B.-A. Wickstroem
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