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Pleasure and the Good Life - Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism (Hardcover, New)
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Pleasure and the Good Life - Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism (Hardcover, New)
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Fred Feldman's fascinating new book sets out to defend hedonism as
a theory about the Good Life. He tries to show that, when carefully
and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield
plausible evaluations of human lives. Feldman begins by explaining
what we mean when we ask what the Good Life is. He argues that this
should not be taken to be a question about the morally good life or
about the beneficial life. Rather, the question concerns the
general features of the life that is good in itself for the one who
lives it. Hedonism says (roughly) that the Good Life is the
pleasant life. After showing that the usual formulations of
hedonism are often confused or incoherent, Feldman presents a
simple, clear, coherent form of sensory hedonism that provides a
starting point for discussion. He then considers a webalogue of
classic objections to hedonism, coming from sources as diverse as
Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Ross, Moore, Rawls, Kagan, Nozick,
Brandt, and others. One of Feldman's central themes is that there
is an important distinction between the forms of hedonism that
emphasize sensory pleasure and those that emphasize attitudinal
pleasure. Feldman formulates several kinds of hedonism based on the
idea that attitudinal pleasure is the Good. He claims that
attitudinal forms of hedonism - which have often been ignored in
the literature - are worthy of more careful attention. Another main
theme of the book is the plasticity of hedonism. Hedonism comes in
many forms. Attitudinal hedonism is especially receptive to
variations and modifications. Feldman illustrates this plasticity
by formulating several variants of attitudinal hedonism and showing
how they evade some of the objections. He also shows how it is
possible to develop forms of hedonism that are equivalent to the
allegedly anti-hedonistic theory of G. E. Moore, and the
Aristotelian theory according to which the Good Life is the life of
virtue, or flourishing. He also formulates hedonisms relevantly
like the ones defended by Aristippus and Mill. Feldman argues that
a carefully developed form of attitudinal hedonism is not refuted
by objections concerning 'the shape of a life'. He also defends the
claim that all of the alleged forms of hedonism discussed in the
book genuinely deserve to be called 'hedonism'. Finally, after
dealing with the last of the objections, he gives a sketch of his
hedonistic vision of the Good Life.
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