A recent trend in metaethics has been to reject the apparent choice
between pure cognitivism, where moral (and other normative)
judgments are understood as representational or belief-like states,
and pure non-cognitivism, where they are understood as
non-representational or desire-like states. Rather, philosophers
have adopted views which seek in some way to combine the strengths
of each side while avoiding the standard problems for each. Some
such views claim that moral judgments are complexes of belief-like
and desire-like components. Other views claim that normative
language serves both to ascribe properties and to express
desire-like attitudes. This collection of twelve new essays
examines the prospects for such 'hybrid views' of normative thought
and language. The papers, which focus mainly on moral thought and
talk, provide a guide to this debate while also pushing it forward
along numerous fronts.
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