Most models of party competition assume that citizens vote for a
platform rather than narrowly targeted material benefits. However,
there are many countries where politicians win elections by giving
money, jobs, and services in direct exchange for votes. This is not
just true in the developing world, but also in economically
developed countries - such as Japan and Austria - that clearly meet
the definition of stable, modern democracies. This book offers
explanations for why politicians engage in clientelistic behaviours
and why voters respond. Using newly collected data on national and
sub-national patterns of patronage and electoral competition, the
contributors demonstrate why explanations based on economic
modernization or electoral institutions cannot account for
international variation in patron-client and programmatic
competition. Instead, they show how the interaction of economic
development, party competition, governance of the economy, and
ethnic heterogeneity may work together to determine the choices of
patrons, clients and policies.
General
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